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INTRODUCTION 
The erosion of the Australian commitment to social justice 
This thesis addresses the question of whether social justice is possible in liberal 
democracies like twenty-first century Australia.  In the Australian context in 
particular, it is legitimate to ask why a defence of the possibility of social justice is 
needed in the year 2001.  Nineteenth century laissez-faire economic liberalism had 
been antithetical to the communitarian notion of social justice prevalent in medieval 
Christendom1 because this notion was seen as incompatible with the individual 
freedom underpinning market operations and the underlying capitalist principle that 
one’s right to subsistence stemmed from one’s ability to earn2.  Three modern 
historians expressed this incompatibility thus: ‘The capitalist notion that one’s right 
to subsistence comes from one’s ability to earn cannot be understood unless one sees 
it in contrast to the pre-capitalist principle that subsistence belonged to any person as 
an attribute of membership in a community’ (Gordon, Hunt et al. 1987, p. 76).  
Economic liberalism was, however, rejected in this country in the early 1900s in 
favour of the so called ‘Australian Settlement’3.  This ‘Australian Settlement’ was 
not a commitment to a socialist, centrally planned, economy but to an economy that 
limited market freedom in order to protect what the nation then perceived as 
important common goods.  Those goods were properly pursued, according to the 
nation at the time, by the exercise of state power, and they included, amongst other 
things, the protection of this country from non-white (cheap) labour and cheap 
imports, and the regulation of workers’ wages and conditions.  To these ends, 
successive Australian governments maintained tariff barriers and restrictive 
immigration laws, and an industrial court.  While it was blatantly racist and sexist, 
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the ‘Australian Settlement’ nonetheless embodied a firm moral and legal 
commitment to social justice for those it included in its polity.  That commitment 
was evident above all in the establishment of social justice as the fundamental 
principle of wage fixation in the first judgment of the Arbitration Court4.  State 
regulation of trade, immigration, and industrial relations enabled the fledgling 
Australian market economy to attain its present status as a developed economy.  
Comparable forms of state protection enabled other major developed economies to 
attain that status5.  In recent decades, however, economic protections such as the 
‘Australian Settlement’ with its principle of social justice have been largely 
supplanted by the more fundamentalist free market policies of a recrudescent 
economic liberalism. 
 
The reasons advanced by some of its protagonists for the re-emergence of economic 
liberalism as the economic orthodoxy of our day seem to me to only partly explain 
this phenomenon.  The first group of these reasons concerns the merits of economic 
liberalism as an economic theory.  One of its progenitors, F.A. Hayek, claims that 
empirically it has proven to be the most productive way of running an economy (see, 
for example, Hayek, F. A. 1988 p. 74-5).  It is undeniable that free market policies 
have proved superior to socialist alternatives for running economies, but, as we noted 
in the previous paragraph, the economies of countries like Australia have never been 
socialist.  Rather they were, until the 1970s, market economies that built their 
productivity and prosperity on the kind of protectionist policies contained in the 
‘Australian Settlement’.  The question therefore remains ‘why should a modern 
nation with a free market economy of the latter kind yield up its protections and its 
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commitment to social justice in favour of the more fundamentalist policies of 
economic liberalism?’.   
 
One answer that is commonly offered to this question is that such deregulation of 
developed economies is due to the phenomenon of ‘globalisation’6.  This is the so 
called ‘hyperglobalist’ thesis, which Held et al. contrast with the ‘sceptical’ and 
‘transformationalist’ theses, and according to which ‘globalization defines a new 
epoch of human history in which “traditional nation-states have become unnatural, 
even impossible business units in a global economy”’ (Held, McGrew et al. 1999, p. 
3, citing Ohmae, 1995, p. 5).  Nation-states, on this view, can no longer operate 
national economies because, whether they like it or not, they are faced with ‘the 
emergence of a single global market …’ (Held, McGrew et al. 1999, p. 3) in which 
they have to compete if they wish to prosper.  But there are several difficulties with 
this answer. 
 
First, to interpret globalisation as a purely economic phenomenon, as the 
‘hyperglobalists’ do, is wrong, according to leading supporter of the so called 
‘transformationalist thesis’, Anthony Giddens.  Rather, Giddens argues (Giddens 
1994, p. 4): ‘Globalization is not only, or even primarily, an economic phenomenon; 
and it should not be equated with the emergence of a “world system”’.  Second, that 
economic relations are more globalised than they were in the nineteenth century, for 
example, is denied by the so called ‘sceptics’ in the globalisation debate (Held, 
McGrew et al. 1999, p. 5ff.).  The increased levels of international economic activity 
that are admitted by all three ‘theses’ have not produced the total de-regulation of 
 - 9 -  
any national economy, or the same specific responses from each nation.  This implies 
that there has been a considerable degree of choice of deregulatory responses on the 
part of different nations.  Globalisation alone, therefore, does not explain Australia’s 
choice to abandon the ‘Australian Settlement’ with its commitment to social justice. 
 
A second reason that might be advanced for such a choice might be that, as Hayek 
argues, economic liberalism is not only an economic theory but also an ideology 
(Hayek, F. A. 1976, p. 54).  Hayek claims that in the institution of the free market we 
have a product of cultural evolution and one of the institutions without which ‘… the 
extended order of civilisation could not continue to exist’ (Hayek, F. A. 1988, p. 27).  
One need not go so far as to accept Hayek’s claims about the origins of the free 
market and its role in civilisation to take this argument from ideology seriously.  
Both the Keynesian economic theory that came to underpin the ‘Australian 
Settlement’ and the economic liberalism that supplanted it were ideological at least 
in the sense that they included a view of how the world ought to be as well as one 
about how it was.  This supplanting therefore marked a shift from a theoretical 
position that included a commitment to social justice to one that excluded such a 
commitment .  One could try to explain the shift from Keynesianism to economic 
liberalism in terms of theories such as T. S. Kuhn’s ‘paradigm’ shifts (Kuhn 1970), 
or Imre Lakatos’s ‘progressive’ and ‘degenerative’ ‘research programmes’ (Lakatos 
1970) or R.S. Laura’s shifts in ‘epistemic primitives’.  While this might be a 
profitable exercise in certain respects, it would not necessarily reveal why this 
particular shift was from a theoretical position that included a commitment to social 
justice to one that did not.  For this reason, I propose to sidestep the analysis of the 
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overall shift and instead pursue a more direct line of speculation about how the 
commitment to social justice got jettisoned in the shift. 
 
My submission is that the commitment to the ‘Australian Settlement’ with its 
commitment to social justice was underpinned by a degree of social solidarity that 
had been severely eroded by the 1970s.  In colonial times and in the early days of the 
Federation, the white population needed and found, in their comparative racial and 
cultural homogeneity, solidarity against a world that was strange and even hostile.  
The ‘world’ to which I refer here included not just peoples of other races and cultures 
but also the natural environment.  The colonists came for land7 and so, 
understandably, they encountered resistance from its original owners.  Because this 
resistance was sometimes violent, it imbued the threatened white communities with 
fear and contempt of its Aboriginal perpetrators8.  Believing in their own racial 
superiority, the colonists could not entertain the idea that resistance to their 
appropriation of Aboriginal land for ‘civilised’ purposes could be in any way 
legitimate.  Painful though their experience of this resistance was for the whites, they 
lived in the confidence that it would be short-lived because of the conventional 
wisdom that the Aborigines were ‘a dying race’9.  While there were grounds for this 
belief in relation to so called ‘full bloods’, there was considerable evidence in the 
early decades of the twentieth century that the so called ‘half-castes’ were growing in 
numbers.  Since this growth was taking place in northern Australia where there were 
a considerable number of people of Asian descent, the possibility of intermarriage 
between these groups was perceived as a real threat to white supremacy.  The very 
existence of those of mixed Aboriginal and Asian blood, according to Reynolds, was 
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‘a threat to the White Australia policy’ (Reynolds 2001, p. 149).  For this reason, 
policies were adopted by administrators in the various States and the Northern 
Territory to forcibly remove ‘half-caste’ children from their families for adoption by 
white families, and to pressure ‘half-caste’ women to intermarry with white men in 
order ‘to breed out the colour …’10.  White colonists were driven together also by 
their encounters with what they saw as this country’s hostile natural environment, a 
judgment reached as a result of many vain attempts at applying European farming 
practices to the Australian environment11.   
 
It was this racial and cultural solidarity in the face firstly of peoples perceived as 
strange and culturally inferior, and secondly of a hostile natural environment that, I 
believe, provided an essential social basis for the ‘Australian Settlement’ with its 
commitment to social justice.  Despite the religious differences imported from the 
‘home countries’ that continued to dog the white population long into the twentieth 
century, this solidarity was enough to motivate and sustain compromise on class 
issues like social justice for workers.  These attitudes to other ‘races’ and to the 
Australian environment have not been eradicated from the white population, but they 
have been tempered by subsequent experiences.  Now that whites have achieved their 
aim of dispossession of indigenous Australians, they are no longer driven together by 
fear of resistance from them.  Rather the white population is now divided over the 
morality of this dispossession12.  And although they have not come to terms with the 
natural environment, they have confidence in the technologies they have developed 
for coping with its challenges - like four wheel drive vehicles.  The comparative 
prosperity of white society has even eroded working class solidarity.  It is the erosion 
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of all these forms of social solidarity - morally ambiguous though they are - that I 
believe provides an essential part of the explanation for Australia’s choice of 
response to globalising economic influences: to jettison the ‘Australian Settlement’ 
and its commitment to social justice.  The consequence of this conclusion for my 
question of whether social justice is possible is that the answer depends in a large 
measure on whether an appropriate form of social solidarity on which to base it is 
possible.   
 
Critics of the notion of social justice might well agree that the collapse of the 
‘Australian Settlement’ with its commitment to social justice was associated with the 
loss of some sense of social solidarity, but argue that this loss paved the way for an 
understanding of justice more appropriate to free societies.  Free societies need an 
understanding of justice that gives primacy to the good of the individual rather than 
that of the community as a whole.  Only thus can the individual effort, on which free 
societies have depended for their political and economic success, be encouraged.  
This putative objection to the notion of social justice implies that social solidarity is 
not essential to the achievement of the good of the individual, and that the individual 
has no obligation to be a member of society, and therefore a contributor to its good.  
It implies that the union we call society is a voluntary and therefore contingent one.  
Even though rational individuals may come to an agreement that such a union is a 
desirable one, its desirability flows from their rational agreement, not from their 
‘nature’ as human beings.  The practical consequences for countries like Australia of 
accepting this argument, I believe, should make us wary of accepting the theory on 
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which the argument is based.  Let me now outline some of what I see as these 
consequences before proceeding to an outline of the theoretical issues. 
 
The first consequence of eroding a commitment to solidarity as a nation in economic 
matters would be that we would forfeit the protection of our economic interests by 
the state.  We have already seen that in the name of economic liberalism, the 
controllers of world capital have demanded, as the condition of investment in all 
countries, the removal, first, of all barriers to the movement of capital in and out of 
the economies of the world13, and, second, of all but the most minimal rules 
governing wages and conditions for workers.  The effect of liberal economic policies 
already implemented in Australia has been an increasingly uneven distribution of 
wealth between the rich and the poor14.  (For poorer countries, the effects of flights of 
capital can be much more devastating as the so called ‘Asian melt-down’ showed15).  
Even political parties of the left, parties that purport to maintain a commitment to 
social justice, have renounced the use of state power for achieving it.  Instead they 
have tried to develop so called Third Way policies to humanise market forces.  But 
one of the chief concessions made by Third Way policies to market ideology is the 
surrender of the social justice principle mentioned above: the principle that the right 
to subsistence comes from membership of a community not from one’s power to 
earn.  This surrender is put in somewhat aggressive terms by the new (2003) Federal 
Leader of the Australian Labor Party: ‘Unless welfare recipients are willing to take 
responsibility for improving themselves and the society in which they live, they have 
no right to permanently live off society.  The days of open-ended welfare need to 
end’ (Latham 2001).  I know of no theory or group that advocates ‘bludging’ on 
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society, so I believe Latham is beating a straw man here.  Worse still, I believe he, 
and many Third Way supporters, are using this straw man to deny any social 
solidarity that is prior to one’s contribution to society.  Until one makes such a 
contribution and thus creates what Latham and Third Way supporters define as social 
solidarity, these people are saying, there can be no claim in justice for subsistence16.   
 
A second consequence of Australia’s eroding its commitment to social solidarity 
would be to place almost beyond solution its most serious problem of justice: 
reconciliation with its indigenous peoples.  Australia’s indigenous peoples claim that 
the British dispossessed the original inhabitants of this land, without treaty or their 
consent, of their sovereignty, land, culture and family bonds.  The Australian nation 
thus established has since that establishment usurped the rightful inheritance of the 
land’s indigenous peoples.  These indigenous peoples thus claim that they are owed 
at least a moral debt by the Australian nation.  Now an individualist conception of 
justice can recognise a legal debt of a nation to individuals or groups.  It is difficult 
to see, however, how on such a conception a moral debt can be either attributed to a 
nation or owed to peoples as peoples.  For what is distinctive about individualist 
conceptions of justice and morality is that by defining moral responsibility in 
individual terms these conceptions deny the transmissibility of such responsibility 
between people and over time.  On such conceptions the debt claimed against the 
nation by its indigenous peoples cannot exist.  In short, unless some kind of social 
solidarity is admitted as applying to both the nation and to these indigenous peoples, 
the latter’s claims cannot be met, and reconciliation is rendered impossible. 
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It is their underlying commitment to an individualist conception of justice and 
morality that restricts the Howard Government’s reconciliation policy to one of so 
called ‘Practical Reconciliation’.  I interpret the latter policy in the following terms.  
Individualist conceptions of justice see the individual as prior to society in the 
fundamental sense that society is the union resulting from a voluntary contract 
between individuals or groups of individuals.  On such conceptions, justice is 
concerned with the rights of individuals or groups of individuals under the terms of 
the social contract.  Thus understood, justice cannot recognise a debt to any people 
since peoples are fundamentally unions of individuals.  Since indigenous peoples are 
members of Australian society, they are, on this conception, entitled as individual 
members or groups of members to the benefits agreed to in the contract.  Since they 
are disadvantaged in the pursuit of those benefits, it is pointless for them to remain 
parties to the contract unless the society acts to relieve their disadvantage.  Since 
their identity as indigenous is only a contingent feature of their citizenship, their 
entitlements are the same as those of all other citizens once their disadvantage is 
removed.  Practical Reconciliation will thus have been achieved.   
 
But this conception of justice ignores the claims of Australia’s indigenous peoples to 
the status of First Peoples of this land.  It dismisses as misguided their sense of 
grievance at lost inheritance: of land, of culture and even of family bonds.  Since 
Australia’s indigenous peoples do not constitute a state, individualist conceptions of 
justice can find no subjects who could validly claim the rights these peoples assert.  
If this seems a high price to pay for our nation’s forfeiting commitment to social 
solidarity, there is more to be added to that price.   
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 Individualist conceptions of justice imply that members of society are engaged in the 
pursuit of their own individual goods.  But success in achieving our individual goods 
is a very slender basis for national unity, especially when the divisions in the nation 
are as wide as those between Australia’s indigenous and non-indigenous peoples.  It 
is therefore difficult to see how national unity can be achieved unless each member 
of Australian society is thought of as being involved in the good of all members, not 
just his or her own individual good.  It is acknowledgement of the latter that entitles 
us to feel solidarity with Cathy Freeman when she wins her Olympic Gold Medal: 
we rejoice with her not just because she is one who has achieved her individual good 
in a spectacular way but because we see her as one of us.  But if we erode our 
commitment to social solidarity, seeing her, and the rest of us, as such becomes a 
sham.  But sham though it may be, it exposes, I believe, our need for a real solidarity 
with our fellow Australians.  This need, and thus the loss we suffer by embracing an 
individualist conception of justice as the basis for our polity, is manifested in other 
dubious expressions of national unity such as our so called Border Protection 
policies. 
 
During the 2001 election campaign, Prime Minister John Howard, repeatedly 
proclaimed that ‘We will decide who shall come here and under what 
circumstances!’ (Hansard, 29/8/2001).  He was referring to the attempt by several 
hundred people rescued at sea by a Norwegian ship to claim their right under 
international law to seek asylum in Australia.  This proclamation was Mr. Howard’s 
defence of his Government’s decision to refuse permission to the Master of the 
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Norwegian vessel to disembark these asylum seekers on Australian shores.  This 
action on the part of the Howard Government in the opinion of many pundits swung 
the election in their favour.  The Commonwealth Border Protection Act (2001), 
passed to deal with this crisis, purported to protect our national sovereignty.  Indeed, 
the Prime Minister in his speech introducing this Bill referred to a ‘flood’17 of people 
threatening to follow in the footsteps of those aboard the Tampa.  In earlier public 
comments members of the Government had canvassed the possibility of Australia’s 
being infiltrated by terrorists by means of these boat arrivals.  That the Prime 
Minister was clearly exaggerating the numbers of potential ‘boat people’ was pointed 
out by Opposition Member, Michael Danby in the same parliamentary debate.  In a 
country of twenty million people, Danby pointed out, we have had only 11, 000 such 
arrivals in the five years of the Howard Government till that time, and only 1500 in 
the previous twelve months.  One might, of course, concede that the Government 
exaggerated the threat but argue that this Act could be defended on other grounds.  
This may be so.  My point here is not so much the merits of the Act as the kind of 
sentiment the entire debate managed to excite in the Australian community.  The 
social solidarity that their system of justice had defined as contingent was now being 
sought in a moment of crisis in a common xenophobia. 
 
My quest in this thesis is for a conception of justice that acknowledges and is based 
upon an understanding of social solidarity as not just contingent but fundamental to 
human nature.  I do not necessarily mean ‘nature’ here in a metaphysical sense, 
though I will consider below some accounts of justice that do hold such a view.  My 
point is rather that the problems of justice we experience in countries like Australia 
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today seem to me to be related to the lack of such an understanding, and that 
therefore their solution, if there is to be one, must entail remedying that defect.  
Having given some indication of the sources of my concern about social justice, I 
need now to turn to an account of the direction I will take through justice theory in 
pursuit of my quest. 
 
Theoretical perspectives on social justice 
What I have been referring to as ‘social solidarity’ was an essential part of the 
conception of justice that prevailed in European society until its overthrow in the 
Enlightenment18.  Social or distributive justice in this conception regulated the 
assignment of his or her due to each member of that ‘solidarity’ or community.  This 
conception of justice originated with the Greeks but was baptised by European 
Christianity.  Its intellectual roots lay in Aristotelian metaphysics, but its authority in 
pre-Enlightenment Christendom was derived from its status as a doctrine of the 
church.  This particular communitarian conception of justice was overthrown when 
metaphysics and the authority of the church fell from favour in the Enlightenment.  
The Enlightenment thinkers, of course, retained a commitment to the ideal of 
‘fraternity’ bequeathed them by the French Revolution, and founded a stream of 
thought that issued eventually in Marxism.  However, I believe that these thinkers 
tampered with the theoretical foundations of social justice in a way which would 
jeopardise that commitment to ‘fraternity’ in modern times in Australia where the 
social supports to that commitment were not as strong as those in Europe. 
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The apostles of the Enlightenment dethroned religion in favour of human reason 
alone as the source of authority on matters of truth, and dispensed with metaphysical 
hypotheses in favour of empirical theories in their understandings of truth.  The 
power of human reason was epitomised for them in empirical science.  This 
Enlightenment faith in science has found enough support19 in the achievements of 
modern science to last into our own time.  Since its inception, science has produced a 
degree of knowledge of and control over the natural world unparalleled in all 
previous human history.  These achievements have won widespread favour for its so 
called empirical methods of investigation and forms of explanation.  The empirical 
explanation of the workings of the physical universe has been couched in terms of 
the kinds of chance and necessity operating in ‘the big bang’ and the process of 
evolution.  The success of empirical science in delivering control over much of the 
physical world in the form of technology has led the social sciences to seek similar 
forms of explanation of human participation in the world.  To the extent that the 
particular communitarian conception of justice of which social justice is a part 
depended upon the pre-Enlightenment explanation of the universe and definition the 
role of human beings within it, the success of science has cast doubt on that 
conception.  Let me set out the sources of that doubt in a little more detail. 
 
The pre-Enlightenment western scientists did not believe that the explanations of the 
physical or social universe could be complete without reference to an underlying or 
metaphysical dimension to them.  This metaphysical dimension to all physical 
objects constituted an order that formed the ultimate explanation of their nature and 
behaviour.  The existence of this order logically implied the existence of its author, 
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who in the Christian west was taken to be God.  This order also defined the place of 
human beings in the universe.  As the highest order of beings within the universe, 
they were superior in nature to the rest and thus also in some sense rulers over it.  
That nature was defined in terms of the possession of a soul, a principle of life that 
transcended the material realm and that in Christian thought was regarded as 
immortal.  In keeping with this spiritual nature, human beings were recognised as 
being governed by a higher set of laws than the physical laws governing the rest of 
nature.  This higher set of laws was the moral order, the core element of which was 
justice.  Justice was what human beings were fitted for in the total order of the 
universe.  It was a moral virtue that the individual learnt and built up by practice 
within his or her community, and that directed that individual towards his or her 
good.   
 
Doubt has been cast on this communitarian conception of justice because the signs of 
order in the universe, which, to pre-Enlightenment scholars, pointed to a designer 
and ruler, have come to be seen by modern scholars as capable of an alternative 
explanation20.  Various combinations of chance and necessity in the ‘big bang’ and 
the evolutionary process could and, many would argue, did, produce the order in the 
physical universe.  The explanation of this order by reference to an ultimate author, 
and thus to a metaphysical dimension of reality, was thus made to appear 
superfluous.  The place and role of human beings within the universe was similarly 
challenged by modern science.  If there was no overall metaphysical order to the 
universe, there could be no place within such an order for human beings.  They too 
had to be defined in the same chance and necessity terms as the rest of the universe.  
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It followed that the moral order, which was supposed to be implicit in their common 
human nature, was an hypothesis as superfluous as the hypothesis of their common 
human nature itself.  But in their attempt to demolish this religious and metaphysical 
basis for morality, the Enlightenment thinkers did not pretend or desire to demolish 
morality itself.  They had moral ideals that were most powerfully expressed in the 
French Revolution: the ideals of ‘liberty, equality and fraternity’.  Nor were they 
entirely successful in eliminating metaphysics from the social sciences.  Since the 
Revolution, the ideals of equality and fraternity have received their greatest emphasis 
in the Marxist tradition while that of liberty has held pride of place in the liberal 
tradition.  Both these traditions have had a profound influence on the modern 
understanding of justice and thus on the question of whether social justice is 
possible. 
 
Karl Marx accepted empiricism in science but his dialectical materialism was a 
metaphysical view of history as directed toward a moral goal.  According to Marx, 
the primary determinant of change in society, and therefore of the course of human 
history, was the drive to satisfy basic material needs.  One’s ability to satisfy those 
needs was dependent upon one’s relationship to the means of production in one’s 
society.  In all but tribal societies where a primitive communism had prevailed, there 
was a division between those who shared in the ownership of the means of 
production and those who did not.  This relationship to the means of production in 
other words divided society into classes which were necessarily in conflict with each 
other.  According to Marx, this conflict had been played out in a dialectical pattern 
throughout human history and in capitalist society it was in its penultimate stage.  
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The oppression by the owner class, the bourgeoisie, of the worker class, the 
proletariat, was destined to end in violent overthrow of the former by the latter, thus 
eliminating class division from society.  A just society would thus be established 
because the inequality of ownership of the means of production would have been 
abolished, the true interests of the masses would be allowed to determine the conduct 
of social, political and economic life to the extent that the state would become 
superfluous and wither.  Production and distribution in such a society would be on 
the basis of the motto ‘from each according to his ability and to each according to his 
needs’.  In short, Marx defined justice most emphatically in social or collective 
terms, but he did not live to see any attempts to establish societies built on his model.  
What Marx would have thought of the attempts at such societies by his successors in 
Russia, and later the entire Soviet Union and China, we will never know.  We do 
know, however, that the repressions on individual freedom -whether in personal, 
social, economic or political life - in these Communist regimes did much to erode the 
credit of communitarian conceptions of justice in the West where the liberal tradition 
had been the basis of life.  F.A. Hayek reacted to Communism by condemning social 
justice as a threat to human liberty, which he regarded as the foundation of our 
civilisation.  His view of justice and his version of the liberal tradition will be the 
subject of my first chapter below precisely because he lays a direct challenge to the 
possibility of social justice.  Before turning to that task, however, it will be useful to 
sketch the roots of the liberal tradition spawned by the Enlightenment.  
 
Another response to the Enlightenment’s critique of religion and metaphysics, a 
response found within the liberal tradition, was to argue that, since morality, of 
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which justice was a part, could no longer have its basis in an order of (moral) facts, it 
had to be given a basis in individual free choice governed by reason.  Moral 
reasoning on this basis could no longer be the assessment of actions as good or bad 
against some factual measure.  Rather it had to consist in aligning chosen ends with 
the means of achieving them, no account of the choice of ends being warranted or 
even possible.  The impetus to moral behaviour and thus the source of moral order in 
the universe was moved from natural law to the human will in Kant’s theory of the 
Categorical Imperative, which required that I will only what I could will should be a 
universal law21.  The basis of justice in traditional natural law theory also gave way 
to a voluntary one in the so called ‘social contract’ associated with the names of 
Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau.  By making the individual will the source of morality 
and justice, the liberal individualist tradition implies that membership of a 
community is only a contingent requirement for attaining one’s good.  Modern 
defenders of this tradition, like Hayek, reject the possibility of social justice because 
they interpret it as the regulation by authoritative command of an exchange system 
that can only achieve equilibrium between demand (people’s wants) and supply 
(satisfaction of those wants) by free individual communication.  If I am going to 
succeed in my quest for an understanding of justice that implies as an essential 
feature social solidarity in some sense, I am going to have to show that belonging to 
society is essential to the attainment of the good of the individual.  If I am to avoid 
the pitfalls of communism, I am also going to have show how a free market can be 
accommodated in such an understanding of justice.  Another formidable difficulty 
confronts me, however, in that task.   
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The kind of society for which I am seeking a communitarian conception of justice is 
the kind found in modern western democracies, and these are all pluralist societies, 
that is to say, societies that do not share a single conception of morality and justice.  
Fortunately, John Rawls has made a monumental attempt to show how social justice 
is possible in pluralist societies22.  His work will be considered in chapters two and 
three of this thesis.  Rawls claims to overcome the problem of pluralism by finding in 
the political culture of modern western democracies an understanding of justice (a) 
sufficient to underpin a system of social and political cooperation, and (b) 
supportable from, but not dependent upon, the content of most of the ‘comprehensive 
doctrinal systems’ held by the groups composing such societies.  The test he 
proposes of the acceptability of what he calls his ‘political liberalism’ is an 
imaginary exercise in what he understands as rationality.  By engaging readers in this 
exercise, Rawls tries to persuade them that two particular principles of justice would 
indeed be the principles chosen by rational representatives of societies’ various 
groups in what he calls the Original Position.  This position is the imaginary one 
where these representatives are charged with the task of choosing the system of 
justice for their society but under conditions where a so called Veil of Ignorance 
prevents them from allowing their own interests to determine their choice.  The Veil 
of Ignorance allows them knowledge of the kind of society they belong to but not of 
their own place in it.  While there are many criticisms of Rawls’ theory of justice, my 
concern will be to appraise it as a basis for the form of social justice I am seeking, 
that is, a form based on social solidarity.  From the point of view of this concern, 
Rawls’ political liberalism faces two difficulties.  Either it provides too thin a theory 
of the good to generate the social solidarity necessary to sustain a regime of social 
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justice, or it smuggles in a thick - metaphysical - account of the good, which, if 
exposed to scrutiny, might also prove unable to generate such social solidarity (or to 
solve the problem of pluralism).  Rawls’ defenders argue strongly that these 
difficulties can be met (Mulhall and Swift 2002).  Rawls’ case for the view that 
justice is prior to the good will be considered in chapter two, and his proposed 
‘political’ as distinct from ‘metaphysical’ conception of the good appraised as a basis 
for justice in chapter three.  
 
There are, of course, a number of philosophers who, though they do not call 
themselves by the name, are broadly known as ‘communitarians’.  Among these, one 
group in particular, the neo-Aristotelian school, continues to adhere to the pre-
Enlightenment view of justice23 sketched above (p. 19).  One of this school’s best 
known commentators on the notion of justice and a major critic of ‘liberal 
modernity’, of which Hayek and Rawls are outstanding representatives, is Alasdair 
MacIntyre24, whose account of justice will be examined in chapter four.  According 
to MacIntyre, justice, in some versions of the liberal tradition, has become detached 
from distributions within a community because in those versions justice at its most 
fundamental level has been severed from its conceptual roots.  These roots, he 
argues, consist in the pre-Reformation understanding of justice as communal, that is, 
as iura (Latin: singular ius) or rules defining the relevant community’s members’ 
obligations to one another.  On this understanding, justice was defined in terms of 
rules about one’s obligations to the community, not of individual human rights, and 
distributions were determined according to what was necessary to facilitate the 
common life.  Although the neo-Aristotelian account of justice shows promise as the 
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foundation for social justice that I am seeking, I see difficulties with MacIntyre’s 
version of that account.   
 
First, the fact that MacIntyre himself insists that no nation could be the kind of 
community in which his version of justice could flourish (MacIntyre 1994, p. 302-3) 
indicates that it supposes a commitment to a very thick conception of the good, a 
commitment unlikely to be forthcoming in a liberal pluralist society.  Second, and 
again on MacIntyre’s own admission (MacIntyre 1991a, p. 108), this conception of 
the good would impose community control over many individual freedoms we now 
take for granted in free societies.  While I do not regard all of the freedoms taken for 
granted in free societies as sacrosanct, I am seeking a version of social justice that 
acknowledges individual freedom as a good.  MacIntyre’s version of neo-
Aristotelianism does not seem to do that.  There is, however, another neo-
Aristotelian account of justice that does acknowledge individual freedom as a good, 
and that accepts modern liberal democracies as polities appropriate for its 
application.  I refer to Charles Taylor’s version, which will be considered in chapter 
five. 
 
Taylor (Taylor 1985b, ch. 7) exposes what I believe is the greatest weakness in 
liberal individualist accounts of justice: that by seeing justice as the product of the 
individual will, they assume that the human good they are designed to realise can be 
realised by individuals alone.  If individuals come together for the purpose of 
attaining some particular goods such as mutual protection or economic prosperity, 
this is, on such views, a contingent arrangement.  The cooperation of these 
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individuals is voluntary and instrumental to these purposes, and not an essential 
condition of their achieving their individual human good or a necessary feature of the 
relationship between the individual and society.  My concern with such conceptions 
of justice has been that they are instrumental in character.  Justice in these 
conceptions is not the expression of the essential unity of a society but the means to 
the end of seeing that all members contracted to the relevant society get from it the 
benefit for which they have contracted.  The notion of ‘mutual obligation’, so 
beloved of many modern Third Way governments, is an example of such a 
contractual conception: one is entitled to nothing from society in virtue simply of 
being a member, rather one is entitled to a benefit only if one contributes something 
in return for it.  This notion reduces our status as members of the relevant society to 
that of economic contributors and ignores the fact that in order to be contributors we 
must first of all be a society.  Taylor offers an indication what it could mean to be a 
society in the sense I am looking for in his notion of sharers in a common 
deliberation that supposes mutual respect (Taylor 1985b, pp. 208-9, p. 8).  In this 
final section of the thesis, I shall search several of Taylor’s works for elements of an 
understanding of social justice based on a notion of social solidarity appropriate to 
modern liberal democracies like Australia.   
Conclusion 
My thesis can be summarised in the following terms.  The answer to the question of 
whether social justice is possible in contemporary Australia is dependent upon 
whether a theory of justice can be found that is capable of sustaining a new sense of 
social solidarity in this nation.  The focus of that solidarity - the goods for which we 
are associated - are threefold.  First, we must have a sense of ourselves as a 
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community to the extent that the right to subsistence is independent of our capacity 
to earn  Second, we must have a sense of ourselves as a community sufficient to 
recognise that we fail to be a community for as long as we deny and refuse to repay 
our debt to our indigenous peoples.  Third, we must have a sense of ourselves as 
community sufficient to recognise and repudiate racially and ethnically 
discriminatory admission qualifications.  Limited and discriminatory though it was, 
the social solidarity that, I have argued, underpinned the ‘Australian Settlement’ was 
none the less, I submit, a manifestation our nature as social and political animals.  
The problem with that solidarity, I contend, was that it was focussed upon a set of 
goods that were so morally flawed that no just society could ignore them forever.  
The three goods that I have proposed above will therefore function in this thesis not 
just as ideals to be aimed at but as operational standards for testing particular theories 
of justice as morally acceptable ways of expressing our nature as social and political 
animals.  My quest for a theory of justice capable of meeting these standards will 
lead me to draw elements from all of the theories canvassed in this Introduction, 
particularly from Taylor, but it will lead me in the end to go beyond the claims of all 
of them. 
 
Notes to Introduction
                                          
1  Based ultimately on the Christian belief in the equal dignity of persons as members of the Body of 
Christ. 
2  For an historical account of the rise of capitalism, see (Schumpeter 1954). 
3  On this see (Kelly 1992, Introduction) and (Melleuish 1997, p. 52ff). 
4  As Kelly comments: 
In his first case as President, Higgins [first Justice of the Australian Arbitration Court] put his stamp 
upon the Arbitration Court – the Harvester judgement of 1907 which enshrined the New Protection 
[industrial protection of wages and conditions in return for tariff protection].  Excise duties were to be 
waived for manufacturers if the court certified that they were paying ‘fair and reasonable’ wages 
(Kelly 1992, p. 8) 
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Justice Higgins, using his own method of calculation (see Kelly 1992, p. 8 for an account of this 
method), fixed the actual amount of the basic wage at 42 shillings a week for a family of five.   
Higgins’ judgment was also sexist inasmuch as it assumed that the male was the head of the 
household and accordingly fixed the female wage at half the male level.  
5  In his scathing condemnation of globalisation as a push for greater economic power over all 
countries by the six richest countries in the world, former Deputy Prime Minister of Canada, Paul 
Hellyer, writes: 
To begin, unrestricted free trade is being pushed by the half-dozen biggest, most powerful, most 
industrialized countries in the world.  It is curious that every one of them became big, wealthy and 
powerful by protecting their own industries against foreign competition (Hellyer 1999, p. 62). 
For a similar, but much more detailed, defence of mostly self-contained national free market 
economies, see (Daly and Cobb 1994).  For more general studies of economic theory and practice in 
the United States in particular, see (Krugman, P. R. 1994; Krugman, P.R. 1996; Krugman, P. R. 1997; 
Krugman, P.R. 1997).  For a more general study of the history of economic analysis see (Schumpeter 
1954). 
6  On the nature of this phenomenon, see especially (Camilleri and Falk 1992), (Hellyer 1999); on the 
dilemmas the phenomenon poses for Australia, see (Emy 1993, esp. pp. 198-208). 
7  See (Clendinnen 2003, p. 286). 
8  On the white purpose of taking the land from its Aboriginal owners, Henry Reynolds quotes from an 
1893 speech to Western Australian Parliament by Francis Connor who, referring to a recent massacre 
of Aborigines in the Kimberley region of the colony, said the issue was ‘simply a question of whether 
the natives are to have the country or the whites’ (Reynolds 2001, p. 135). 
 
On the Aboriginal resistance to dispossession of their lands and the white to this resistance, Reynolds 
refers to the killing of thirty whites on two stations, Hornet Bank  and Cullin-la-ringoe, in north 
Queensland in 1857.  Reynolds quotes the report of these murders in the Moreton Bay Courier 
(19/5/1858): 
 
if it is wrong to hold the country - give it up; if it is right - hold it as of old, peaceably if possible but 
when such terrible proof is given of the impossibility of peace, treat them as they deserve; [if] it is 
useless trying to tame them, then destroy them, as you would any other savage beast, men they do not 
deserve to be called (Reynolds 2001, p. 122). 
9  On this see (Reynolds 2001, ch. 9). 
10  The phrase comes from a letter from Dr. Cecil Cook, a government official in the Northern 
Territory, to the Territory’s Administrator on 7 February, 1933.  As Reynolds presents the relevant 
passage, ‘The government, [Cook] insisted, must use every endeavour “to breed out the colour by 
elevating female half-castes to white standard with a view to their absorption by mating into the white 
population’ (Reynolds 2001, p. 151). 
11  This relationship with the Australian environment is perceptively analysed by Germaine Greer in 
the first section of her recent publication ‘Whitefella jump up’ (Greer 2003). 
12  Just how divided the nation is on this issue can be seen at the academic level in the exchanges 
between the so called ‘black armband’ historians such as Henry Reynolds (Reynolds 1987; 1990; 
1990; 1993; 1996; 1998; 1999; 2001) (Manne 2001)and those dubbed by Germaine Greer the ‘white 
blindfold’ historians such as (Windschuttle 1994; 1997), (Johns 2001b), and (Sandall 2001).  More 
importantly, this issue divides the population at large, starting with the Prime Minister, John Howard, 
who coined the phrase the ‘black armband’ view of Australian history. 
13  This demand is expressed in principle 1 of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).  This principle 
uses the odd euphemism ‘Most Favored Nation  (MFN) status’ to express the rule that all nations 
should be treated equally in matters of trade.  Indeed, the WTO itself is so embarrassed by the term 
that it feels compelled to explain its oddity: 
The name sounds like a contradiction. It suggests some kind of special treatment for one particular 
country, but in the WTO it actually means non-discrimination — treating virtually everyone equally.  
What happens under the WTO is this. Each member treats all the other members equally as “most-
favoured” trading partners. If a country improves the benefits that it gives to one trading partner, it has 
to give the same “best” treatment to all the other WTO members so that they all remain “most-
favoured”.   
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The reason for the WTO’s embarrassment is made clear by the sting in the principle’s tail exposed in 
the last part of its explanation: 
In general, MFN means that every time a country lowers a trade barrier or opens up a market, it has to 
do so for the same goods or services from all its trading partners — whether rich or poor, weak or 
strong. 
For a cogent defence of the view that the WTO principles and those of the now defunct Multilateral 
Agreement on Trade (MAI) are devices of the rich countries of the world for extending their control 
over trade and investment across all international borders,  see (Hellyer 1999, ch. 5). 
14  For an account of who gets what in Australia see the book with that subtitle (Stilwell 1993)  Other 
important works on economic rationalism and its effects in Australia include (Rees, Rodley et al. 
1993)  (King and Lloyd 1993)  (Carroll and Manne 1992) and (Horne 1992). 
15  Paul Hellyer argues that the unbridled freedom of banks to make loans to developing countries has 
led to greed overruling prudence in their lending policies.  Rises in interest rates frequently produced 
levels of debt, repayment of which required much more foreign currency than these countries’ exports 
were earning.  Their domestic economies, already suffering grievously as a result of this diversion of 
export earnings, were further ground down by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditions on 
‘rescue’ loans to these countries.  Hellyer claims that the IMF has been ‘… reduced to a tool of U.S. 
foreign policy as determined in the Treasury Department’ citing in support of his claim the boast of 
Deputy U.S. Treasury Secretary, Lawrence Summers, ‘… that the IMF package did more to promote 
the U.S. trade agenda in South Korea than decades of bilateral negotiations’ (Hellyer 1999, 29, 30, 
note omitted).  Chapter Three of Hellyer’s book provides an incisive critique of the role of the IMF in 
perpetuating rather than alleviating the dependence of developing economies on foreign loans and 
thus foreign agendas. 
16  In fact, because individuals, on economic rationalist ideology, are motivated by self-interest, pleas 
of ‘social injustice’ are dismissed by economic rationalists as assertions of special interests.  Debra 
Brennan cites the example of Australian Financial Review journalist, David Clark, accusing child care 
workers of creating regulations in their industry simply ‘to feather their own nests’ (AFR, 5/7/88).  
Commenting on the ‘dominance of market thinking in public administration’, Brennan remarks:  
Notions of community, solidarity, justice and equity have no place in these ways of thinking.  They 
are seen either as irrelevant, or as a smokescreen for other motives or as dangerous because of their 
potential to undermine market-based approaches to problem-solving (Brennan 1996, p. 12, 15). 
17  Hansard, 29/8/2001. 
18  Alasdair MacIntyre has written extensively on this issue.  See especially (MacIntyre 1985; 1988).   
19  That those achievements have not been unequivocally good, and that indeed they have produced a 
world characterised by ‘manufactured uncertainty’ is attested to by sociologists of the standing of 
Anthony Giddens (Giddens 1994, Introduction, chs. 1,3,6), and Ulrich Beck (Beck 1998a, p. 10 esp.; 
Beck 1998b). 
20  For contemporary discussions of scientific views of the world and some of the implications of 
science for religion see (Hawking 1988) and (Davies 1984). 
21  Kant’s words were: ‘Always so act that you are able to will that the maxim of your action be also a 
universal law’.  The same source goes on to comment: 
Kant also provides three subsidiary formulations of the principle.  The first enjoins that the agent 
should be able to will that the maxim be also a law of nature.  The second enjoins that persons never 
be treated as means only, but always as ends-in-themselves.  The third enjoins that the agent should be 
able to regard his maxim also as part of a universal legislation.  This implies that one regard oneself 
both as legislator and as subject of the moral law (Mautner 1999). 
 
I am not arguing that by shifting the impetus to moral behaviour  to the human will, Kant was 
attempting to erode the European post-revolutionary commitment to ‘fraternity’.  Indeed, his 
universalisability test was an attempt at giving concrete expression to that commitment.  My point is 
rather that in shifting the source of that impetus from human nature to the individual will, he 
unwittingly laid the foundations for that erosion in the future. 
22  Rawls’s original attempt was of course his Theory of Justice (1972).  However, his attempt to tailor 
that theory for application to a pluralist society was his later Political Liberalism (1996). 
23  I have already acknowledged that the communitarian conception of justice continued in a post-
Christian incarnation in the tradition stemming from the equality and fraternity elements of the French 
Revolution, the tradition reflected in the works of Kant, Hegel and Marx. 
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24  MacIntyre’s critique of liberal modernity is delivered in several works including (MacIntyre 1985), 
(MacIntyre 1988), (MacIntyre 1990b).  His contrast of the understanding of justice as ‘individual 
rights’ with its interpretation as iura is spelt out in some detail in (MacIntyre 1991a).   MacIntyre 
extends his thesis on the epistemological questions raised in these earlier works in his (MacIntyre 
1990b).  A discussion of this thesis contrasting it with those of Imre Lakatos, and Theo Meyering can 
be found in (Murphy 1995).  An extended appraisal of MacIntyre’s critique of ‘liberal modernity’  is 
available in (Kitchen 1997).  For a critical review of After Virtue by a disappointed socialist, see 
(Sedgwick 1982).  For  a sympathetic but searching critical review of Whose Justice?  Which 
Rationality?, see (Appel 1990). 
  
 - 32 -  
CHAPTER ONE 
 
Hayek on the ‘mirage of social justice’  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As I have indicated in the Introduction, part of my quest in this research project is for 
a system of justice capable of ensuring that the entitlement to subsistence is not 
dependent on one’s capacity to earn.  Rather I am seeking a ground of a claim to a 
share in the wealth created by society in bonds that tie people together in some sorts 
of communities.  One of the progenitors of the neo-liberal economic system that 
prevails in most countries today is F.A. Hayek.  Although he argues that the 
economic system he advocates - the free market whose main characteristic is 
competition between participants - ‘is compatible with an extensive system of social 
services …’ (Hayek, F.A. 1944, p. 37), Hayek’s system recognises no communal 
bonds.  Moreover, he argues that any attempt to implement ‘social justice’ as he 
understands it, namely, as an economic system that allocates definite shares of the 
relevant society’s wealth to its citizens, would, by removing the individual freedom 
on which they depend, undermine not only the economic order but also the order of 
the free society itself.  Justice, he holds, is thus misconceived as a system for 
achieving common ends such as allocating shares of society’s wealth, and must 
rather be conceived as the rules of just individual conduct.   
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If Hayek were correct in the role he assigns to individual freedom in generating the 
order of the free market and of the free society, then social justice would indeed be 
impossible in such a society.  While Hayek has shown that the role of individual 
freedom in these orders is perhaps more important than advocates of social justice 
had previously realised, I will try to show in this chapter that he exaggerates that role 
and by doing so places intolerable burdens on individual freedom.  In order to carry 
out this task I will need to expose and criticise the roots of Hayek’s thought. 
  
Hayek’s critique of social justice was based on the social theoretical commitments of 
the Austrian school of economic thought, a school of which he was a prominent 
member.  The roots of those commitments, however, lay in the epistemological and 
ontological legacy bequeathed to the Vienna of Hayek’s day by Immanuel Kant.  In 
the first section of this chapter I will briefly outline the theoretical commitments of 
the Austrian school, and in the second section I will outline the elements of Hayek’s 
social theory that spring from them: his conception of the proper economic and 
politico-legal orders for a free society and their underlying morality, as well as their 
status as the fruits of social evolution.  In doing so, I will try to expose the Kantian 
roots of this thought.  In the third section of this chapter I will appraise Hayek’s 
claims and in the final section draw some conclusions.   
 
Hayek and the Austrian School: theoretical roots of his critique of 
social justice 
 
As we saw in the Introduction F.A. Hayek was a prominent member of the Austrian 
school of social and economic thought, a school that sought to establish new and 
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more adequate foundations for liberal ideology1.  The establishment of these 
foundations, we observed, entailed rejecting two particular theoretical developments 
that had been combined to define the nature and method of the social sciences.  The 
first of these approaches was ‘historicism’, characterised by Cubeddu as ‘the belief 
that through the study of historical events it is possible to discover their meaning and 
derive the laws regulating their unfolding’ (Cubeddu 1993, p. 21)2. The second was 
‘rational constructivism’, an approach to the social sciences that combined 
‘scientism’ with what Hayek called the ‘engineering type of mind’ (Hayek, Friedrich 
A. 1979, p. 25).  ‘Scientism’ was the belief that science was capable of giving an 
exclusive and exhaustive account of all facts including social facts.  The ‘engineering 
type of mind’ was one according to which science, understood in this scientistic 
sense, could provide the knowledge necessary for constructing a sustainable social 
order.  Hayek and the Austrian School rejected the ‘collectivist’ assumption of these 
theories that the proper objects of the social sciences were ‘wholes’ like ‘societies’ or 
‘economies’ or ‘capitalism’ or ‘nations’ (Hayek, Friedrich A. 1979, p. 96), and the 
possibility, to which this methodological tendency gave rise (Cubeddu 1993, p. 35), 
of discovering or constructing some sort of objective social order.  For Hayek, the 
social sciences were concerned with human actions and individual human purposes, 
and, because of the limited nature of human knowledge, order in the economy and 
society as a whole was much more the unintended result of many human actions than 
the intended result of some ‘rational’ process.  This distinctive position of Hayek and 
the Austrian School in the debate about the nature of order in free societies stemmed, 
according to Cubeddu, from their ‘theory of subjective values’ (Cubeddu 1993, p. 
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35-6), the theory that shaped Hayek’s conception of both the economic and politico-
legal orders of such societies.  
 
According to the ‘theory of subjective values’, values are not objective properties of 
things but measures of the usefulness human beings see such things as having for 
meeting their needs, which for Hayek are definable only as their subjective purposes.  
As Hayek puts it:  
Value is not an attribute or a physical property possessed by things themselves, irrespective 
of their relations to men, but solely an aspect of these relations that enables men to take 
account, in their decisions about the use of such things, of the better opportunities others 
might have for their use.  Increase in value appears only with, and is relevant only with 
regard to, human purposes (Hayek, F. A. 1988, p. 95). 
The satisfaction of human needs, Hayek's purpose for any political and economic 
order, can only be achieved, he argues, if individuals’ purposes can be freely 
expressed to those capable of providing the means of their satisfaction: 
The efforts of millions of individuals in different situations, with different possessions and 
desires, having access to different information about means, knowing little or nothing about 
one another's particular needs, and aiming at different scales of ends, are coordinated by 
means of exchange systems (Hayek, F. A. 1988, p. 95). 
 
For Hayek, ‘exchange systems’, of course, mean markets.  As we shall see in the 
next section, however, the order created by individuals pursuing their own ends in 
markets is created in the context of a similar but wider order of political and legal 
cooperation by which Hayek means society.  The order of both markets and society 
depends for Hayek upon an individualist tradition of morality.  This tradition and the 
orders it underpins, he holds, are the fruits of social evolution.  The alternative source 
of order to the market was believed by many during the twentieth century to be state 
imposition on society of ‘historicist’ or ‘social constructivist’ plans.  Such plans, if 
implemented, according to Hayek, would be attempts at halting the process of 
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evolution (Hayek, F. A. 1988, p. 74) and would lead to the destruction of the very 
condition necessary for the achievement of a sustainable order in society, namely, 
human freedom.  Modern attempts at constructing the so called ‘welfare state’ were, 
according to Hayek, steps towards such destruction3.  Since such attempts are most 
often justified by appeals to ‘social justice’, the latter notion is regarded by Hayek as 
the symbol of the threat to the free society, and is made the target of a sustained 
attack on his part.  The first error, Hayek holds, made by defenders of social justice is 
to fail to understand, or to reject, the consequences of the theory of subjective values 
for their conception of the wealth distribution system proper to free societies. 
Distribution systems in free societies 
 
In free societies, wealth, according to Hayek, is distributed by the free market, that is, 
by freely negotiated contracts between individuals acting ‘on the basis of their own 
knowledge and in the service of their own ends...’ (Hayek, F. A. 1976, p. 86)4.  The 
free market is an institution painstakingly evolved over time to meet a fundamental 
problem of human existence: how to coordinate individual knowledge and ends in a 
system of cooperation to satisfy the needs of all members of society5.  According to 
Hayek, the free market system of cooperation that produces the distributions, which 
meet human needs, constitutes an order, ‘the extended order of human cooperation 
… known as capitalism’ (Hayek, F. A. 1988, p. 6).  As we shall see in a moment, 
capitalism for Hayek consists of more than a market order - it is also the order of the 
society in which the market order exists as well as the tradition of morality 
underpinning both orders.   
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For Hayek, ‘order’ is ‘...a state of affairs in which a multiplicity of elements of 
various kinds are so related to each other that we may learn from our acquaintance 
with some spatial or temporal part of the whole to form correct expectations 
concerning the rest, or at least expectations which have a good chance of proving 
correct’ (Hayek, F.A. 1973, p. 36, note omitted and italics in original).  In a market 
order, for example, a manufacturer neither knows nor needs to know the specific 
needs of every potential purchaser of his product; it is sufficient that he knows his 
retailers are better acquainted with these needs and that they will buy certain amounts 
of his product from him at various prices.  This limited knowledge derived from 
contracts freely engaged in in the past is sufficient to give the manufacturer reliable 
expectations of the relevant people's future behaviour.  On Hayek's definition, in 
other words, the necessary and sufficient condition for describing a state of affairs as 
an order of some kind is its ability to guide members’ expectations of each other's 
future behaviour.  The order of a free market system is of a particular kind which 
Hayek calls ‘spontaneous’. 
 
A ‘spontaneous order’ or ‘kosmos’ is, according to Hayek, a ‘grown order’ which is 
‘self-generating’ (Hayek, F.A. 1973, p.37).  We are familiar with the phenomenon of 
‘spontaneous order’ in the natural world in the formation of crystals, for example, but 
Hayek is arguing that such order exists in the social world as well.  ‘Spontaneous 
order’ is to be distinguished from a ‘taxis’ or ‘made order’ which Hayek 
characterises as ‘... a construction, an artificial order or, especially where we have to 
deal with a directed social order, as an organization’ (Hayek, F.A. 1973, p. 37).  A 
free society is a ‘spontaneous order’ because it is generated by the free interactions 
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of its members in the service of their individual ends.  A socialist regime is, however, 
an ‘organization’ because, on Hayek's account, its order is not self-generated but 
imposed ‘ultimately [by] some single authority’ (Hayek, F.A. 1973, p. 36) in the 
service of some common end.  The independence of the market order of any common 
end is, according to Hayek, obscured by our use of the term ‘economy’ to designate 
that order. 
 
A strict definition of the term ‘economy’ reveals it to be the antithesis of the 
spontaneous order of the market: 
An economy ... consists of a complex of activities by which a given set of means is allocated 
in accordance with a unitary plan among the competing ends according to their relative 
importance  (Hayek, F. A. 1976, p. 107). 
But for Hayek the idea that participants in the market should be subject to a plan 
serving  ‘a single order of ends’ (Hayek, F. A. 1976, p. 107) is a socialist error.  
What we commonly term a national economy, according to Hayek, is better termed a 
‘catallaxy’ by which he means  
...a wealth-creating game (and not what game theory calls a zero-sum game), that is, one that 
leads to an increase of the stream of goods and of the prospects of all participants to satisfy 
their needs, but which retains the character of a game in the sense in which the term is 
defined by the Oxford English Dictionary:  ‘a contest played according to rules and decided 
by superior skill, strength or good fortune’ (Hayek, F. A. 1976, p. 115). 
This concept of a ‘catallaxy’ captures those features of a market which make it a 
‘spontaneous order’ rather than an ‘organization’.  A 'catallaxy', first of all, provides 
the opportunity and motivation to engage in the ‘human cooperation’ (Hayek, F. A. 
1988, p. 6) which constitutes the ‘spontaneous order’ of the market: a ‘catallaxy’ 
encourages the creation of wealth by offering to all players the possibility of 
attaining virtually unlimited shares of it through diligence, skill and luck.  Secondly, 
a ‘catallaxy’ coordinates needs and responses by providing a method of making such 
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needs known.  In a ‘catallaxy’ players attain wealth by meeting the needs of other 
participants.  Since these needs cannot be foreknown to the providers, they have to 
be learnt by the indirect method of seeing what prices people are prepared to pay for 
potential means of fulfilling such needs:  
The manufacturer does not produce shoes because he knows that Jones needs them.  He 
produces because he knows that dozens of traders will buy certain numbers at various prices 
because they (or rather the retailer they serve) know that thousands of Joneses, whom the 
manufacturer does not know, want to buy them (Hayek, F. A. 1976, p. 115-6). 
The price mechanism of a ‘catallaxy’ thus transmits the knowledge which generates 
the responses, the combination of which constitute the ‘human cooperation’ that 
defines, for Hayek, the ‘spontaneous order’ of the market, and distinguishes it from 
an ‘organization’ in the service of a common end such as the socialist ideal of social 
justice6.   For Hayek, this belief in common ends is a hangover from an earlier stage 
of cultural evolution, and persistence in it is a rejection of the conception of justice 
appropriate for free societies. 
 
The first and major problem with the conception of justice as ‘social’ or ‘economic’, 
Hayek holds, is the failure of such a conception to take account of the evolutionary 
character of morality and of the institutions like justice in which morality is 
expressed: 
Indeed, the basic point of my argument - that morals, including, especially, our institutions of 
property, freedom and justice, are not a creation of man's reason but a distinct second 
endowment conferred on him by cultural evolution - runs counter to the main intellectual 
outlook of the twentieth century (Hayek, F. A. 1988, p. 52). 
The trust in collective wisdom, which characterised the tribal stage of social 
evolution, characterised also the conception of justice in this stage.  Justice at this 
stage was based on some notion of a common end: 
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...we can hardly say when tribes first appeared as preservers of shared traditions, and cultural 
evolution began.  Yet somehow, however slowly, however marked by setbacks, orderly 
cooperation was extended, and common concrete ends were replaced by general, end-
independent abstract rules of conduct (Hayek, F. A. 1988, p. 31). 
According to Hayek, however, the extension of ‘orderly cooperation’ led to the 
supersession of this end-dependent conception of justice as human beings evolved 
from tribal members dependent upon communal wisdom to individuals capable of 
freely determining their own ends.  And, as we saw in the previous chapter, it was 
the individual’s exercise of freedom for his or her own ends that, on Hayek's view, 
formed the spontaneous order he called society.  The conception of justice, argues 
Hayek, which has emerged from the same evolutionary process is an abstract set of 
rules to guide individual conduct in the pursuit of individual ends, a conception that 
contrasted starkly with its communal predecessor, which was based on concrete 
common ends.  It is failure on the part of communitarians to recognise the 
supersession of dependence upon common ends that gives rise, according to Hayek, 
to the second problem with the notion of social justice.    
 
The second problem with the notion of ‘social justice’, Hayek holds, is that it would 
impose some rational constructivist common end on a spontaneous order produced 
by the choices of individuals freely pursuing their own ends.  Since ‘social justice’ 
would mean distribution of wealth according to a common ideal such as ‘desert’ or 
‘need’, the application to the market of a distribution based on such an ideal would 
violate this spontaneous order.  A distribution of wealth according to some ideal of 
social justice would, in Hayek's terms, be the application by an ‘organization’ of 
‘end-dependent’ rules to a socially evolved process which can only thrive on ‘end-
independent’ rules:  ‘We have chosen the term “rules of just conduct” to describe 
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those end-independent rules which serve the formation of a spontaneous order, in 
contrast to the end-dependent rules of organization’ (Hayek, F. A. 1976, p. 31).  The 
latter kind of rules tends to form a totalitarian society because, according to Hayek, 
one of the conditions for achieving their ends is that somebody in the ‘organization’ 
has the power to command obedience to them.  The former kind, however, supports 
the evolution of an ‘Open Society’ because, being independent of any ends, these 
rules leave individuals free to pursue their various ends.  As we saw in the previous 
chapter, however, Hayek did not mean by this that individuals were free to choose 
any ends they liked.  The test of the morality of an end was whether the individual 
could will, without contradiction, that all persons in like circumstances should will 
the same end, what Hayek calls ‘a test of generalization or universalization’ (Hayek, 
F. A. 1976, 36, omitting notes 6, 7 and 8).  It was by applying this test that 
individuals, according to Hayek, would arrive at the ‘rules of just individual conduct’ 
that defined true justice. 
 
The third problem with the conception of justice as ‘social’ or ‘economic’, according 
to Hayek, is that it conceives an ‘impersonal process’ (Hayek, F. A. 1976, p. 63) of 
distribution under the control of no individual as if it were controlled by some 
individual who could be held responsible for its results (Hayek, F. A. 1976, p. 62).  
Those who hold this conception, Hayek contends, commit a ‘category’ error:  they 
assign to this ‘impersonal process’ the attribute of ‘justice’ or ‘injustice’ which really 
belongs only to ‘human actions or the rules governing them’ (Hayek, F. A. 1976, 
p.31).  It follows from this, according to Hayek, that justice can be properly 
attributed to ‘...not only the actions of individuals but also the concerted actions of 
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many individuals, or the actions of organizations...’ (Hayek, F. A. 1976, p. 32), such 
as governments, but not to society.  Society is not an organization, as the notion of 
social justice implies, because its order is not one ‘made’ to meet a common end, but 
a ‘spontaneous order’ and so long as it remains so ‘... the particular results of the 
social process cannot be just or unjust’ (Hayek, F. A. 1976, p. 32)7. 
 
In short, according to Hayek, attempts by rational constructivists to direct all 
knowledge available in society to the service of one particular end such as social 
justice would paralyse the human power of reason to adapt to new situations, and 
thus stifle the very process of knowledge generation that produced such knowledge 
in the first place.  ‘Indeed,’ Hayek writes, ‘to insist that all future change be just 
would be to demand that evolution come to a halt’ (Hayek, F. A. 1988, p. 74).  A 
world such as the one envisaged by John Rawls in his A Theory of Justice, Hayek 
argues,  
... could never have become civilised: by repressing differentiation due to luck, it would have 
scotched most discoveries of new possibilities.  In such a world we would be deprived of 
those signals that alone can tell each what, as a result of thousands of changes in the 
conditions in which we live, we must now do in order to keep the stream of production 
flowing and, if possible, increasing (Hayek, F. A. 1988 p. 74-5). 
The system of knowledge exchange constituted by the market is what makes possible 
both the economic sustenance of large populations, and the ‘striving’ after individual 
‘non-economic’ ends, which Hayek regards as the point of human existence8.  By 
restricting the freedom to use knowledge in pursuit of individual needs9, socialists 
imposing distributions according to some ideal of social justice are undermining the 
very process that produced and sustains modern civilisation10, a process that is the 
fruit of social evolution11.  I turn now to an appraisal of Hayek's critique of social 
justice. 
 - 43 -  
Appraisal 
 
Hayek’s critique of social justice as a distribution system turns on his 
characterization of capitalist societies and their market economies as ‘spontaneous 
orders’ generated by and dependent upon the free decisions of their members.  The 
‘subjective theory of values’, on which this characterization itself rests, has its roots 
in the Kantian axiology that dominated Viennese thought before World War I12.  This 
axiology formed part of the general ontology and epistemology developed by Kant in 
response to David Hume’s ‘empiricism’.  A brief word about these philosophies and 
this intellectual background to Hayek’s thought will assist our understanding of the 
subjective theory of values appealed to by Hayek in his account of the ‘spontaneous 
orders’ of the market and society. 
 
Kant agreed with Hume that our knowledge of the physical world was dependent on 
sensory experience and that the ‘causes’, on which physicists depended in their 
accounts of the laws of nature, were not given to us in such experience.  He 
disagreed, however, with Hume’s view that knowledge of causes was impossible and 
that pursuit of such knowledge was an exercise in the futility of metaphysics.  Kant 
held rather that the human tendency to engage in metaphysics was inescapable; the 
problem to this point in history, he argued, was that this tendency had been 
misapplied to vain quests such as the one to penetrate the phenomena of empirical 
experience and thus to attain the noumena of the real world, to see beyond a natural 
sequence of events to its underlying causes, for example.  According to Kant the 
right and proper way to apply this inescapable human tendency was to use it to 
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determine the limits of reason and thus avoid falling into claims to know the 
unknowable.   
 
The limits of reason, Kant held, were defined by what he called the a priori 
structures of the mind.  Where our knowledge of the empirical world was concerned, 
these structures, he believed, rendered intelligible the raw a posteriori data of 
experience, the data given by the senses.  The senses, Kant agreed, give us natural 
sequences of events.  For Hume, the furthest we could go in rendering these events 
intelligible was to rely on the expectation that past sequences of natural events would 
repeat themselves13.  Since sensory data and the memories of them were our sole 
sources of knowledge of the world, and these sources provided us with no ground for 
believing that these sequences need necessarily in all cases be followed, we were 
justified only in having a psychological disposition to expect that these sequences 
would continue to be followed.  For Kant, however, we could go much further in 
rendering these sequences of events intelligible.  We were justified in expecting that 
these sequences needed necessarily in all cases be followed because the mind was so 
structured that it rendered such sensory sequences intelligible precisely by bringing 
the elements of necessity and universality to bear on those sequences.  Thus, for Kant 
causes could be known, not just confidently expected, as they were for Hume. 
 
For Kant, the necessity and universality provided by the a priori structures of the 
mind were the key to our understanding of the physical order of the world.  But he 
also believed that there was a moral order in the world.  Thus, he faced the question 
of the source of the necessity and universality that governed the moral order.  In the 
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Europe of Kant’s time, morality had traditionally been grounded in the so called 
‘natural law’.  Originally developed by Aristotle but incorporated into Christian 
theology by Aquinas in the Europe of the Middle Ages, this theory claimed the 
existence of a law that directs humans naturally toward the good, which can be 
discerned by what Aquinas termed ‘right reason’.  Kant rejected this basis of 
morality on the ground that the foundation for a necessary and universal moral 
obligation could not be a contingent empirical reality like human nature operating in 
the changing circumstances of human life.  He wrote: ‘the basis of obligation must 
not be sought in human nature or in the circumstances of the world in which he 
(man) is placed, but a priori simply in the concepts of pure reason’ (Kant 1950, p. 
389)}.  The good, to which, according to natural law theory, human beings were 
naturally directed, was in Kant’s view mistakenly located in human nature.  The only 
possible unqualified source of the good, he held, was in the human will because the 
will was for Kant an a priori element of the structure of reason.  As an a priori 
element of reason, this aspect of the will provided the necessity and universality 
needed to govern the moral order.  What was the nature of the necessity and 
universality provided by the will? 
 
Given that human beings were free, the form of necessity governing the moral order 
had to be one of moral obligation.  In Kant’s terms, the a priori element of the will, 
from which moral necessity came, was a structure requiring obedience to the moral 
law.  This structure took the form of a command to the rational individual, which 
Kant called the ‘categorical imperative’.  As an a priori structure, this command was 
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not subject to change according to the contingencies of circumstances; it bound the 
rational individual independent of such circumstances.  
 
The universality needed to ground a moral order also came from the will.  The 
‘categorical imperative’ commanded that the rational individual should will only 
what he or she could will should be binding on all individuals in like circumstances.  
The moral law was universal, in other words, not because some set of universal 
moral laws could be deduced from some set of first principles, or because there was 
some objective good to the doing of which human beings were naturally directed by 
‘right reason’.  Kant did not believe that the content of the moral law could be 
deduced from any first principles, far less from any theory of human nature.  The 
moral law was universal only because the individual obeying the ‘categorical 
imperative’ was willing something that he or she could will for all in like 
circumstances.  
 
Hume had made the distinction between fact and value but Kant had made the will 
the source of value.  Kant had done this as part of his project of defining the ‘limits 
of reason’, and, according to Janik and Toulmin, ‘This theory of “the limits of 
reason” …was the starting point of the whole debate about language and values, 
which came to a head in the Vienna of 1890-1914’ (Janik and Toulmin 1973, p. 148).  
It was in this Vienna that the ‘subjective theory of values’ was developed, and 
Hayek’s notion of ‘spontaneous orders’, while the metaphor is drawn from physics, 
is thus but an application of Kant’s axiology to the operation of capitalist societies.   
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Capitalist societies are societies dominated by their economic systems.  Their 
economic systems are market exchange systems.  Such systems depend on the 
assumption that there can be no objective basis, such as a ‘just price’, for exchanges 
between buyers and sellers of goods and services.  Rather, it is assumed that the only 
possible basis for such exchanges is the free agreement of buyer and seller.  Since the 
notion of a ‘just price’ had been notoriously controversial even during the Scholastic 
period, the appeal of the argument that price had no other basis than the free 
agreement of buyers and sellers was therefore strong.  And if such agreements were 
accepted as the basis for economic life, the claim that freedom was the only basis for 
any human exchange became hard to resist.  On this Kantian reasoning, there were 
no natural bonds, save those of a purely biological nature, which could provide an 
objective basis for free societies.  Hayek’s attribution of the source of the social and 
moral order of such societies to the free rational will was no more and no less than an 
application of Kant’s ethical theory to these domains.  Hayek’s insistence upon 
individual freedom as the source of those orders is also explainable by his debt to 
Kant’s account of the role of freedom in human life. 
 
Kant was committed to the belief that the world and the situation of human beings 
within it was intelligible, and that its intelligibility was due to the presence in that 
world of orders characterised by necessity and universality.  In relation to physical 
order, human beings, he held, were heteronomous, that is, they were subject to the 
laws of nature.  The a priori structure of reason was needed only to render 
intelligible the sequences of sensory events manifesting the laws of nature in 
operation.  The relevant structure was not itself the source of these laws.  In relation 
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to the moral order, however, they had, according to Kant, to be autonomous, that is, 
human beings had to be subject only to their own individual wills.  The reason for 
this was that in the moral order, on Kant’s theory, the relevant a priori structure of 
reason was also the source of the moral law.  Because moral decisions were made in 
the world governed by the laws of nature, the difficulty necessarily arose for Kant of 
how decisions made under this regime of determination could also be free and 
autonomous.  Although he believed that free will could not be demonstrated, Kant 
argued that, since in practice human beings could not live morally (respond to 
conscience) unless they assumed free will and since the impossibility of free will 
could not be demonstrated, this assumption was justified.  Having made the moral 
law an a priori structure of individual reason, the only possible source of moral order 
for Kant was thus the free individual will.  In asserting that the orders of the market 
and society are the spontaneous creations of countless individual wills, Hayek is 
simply applying Kant’s moral theory to the economy and society at large. 
 
From the standpoint of this thesis, the important question is whether this Kantian 
epistemology and axiology, which underpin Hayek’s ‘subjective theory of values’ 
and his notion of ‘spontaneous order’, can sustain a society that wants to be just.  
Presumably Hayek himself would regard it as unjust for any so called free society to 
exclude particular ethnic or religious groups from participating in its ‘free’ market.  
Yet to universalize a command to exclude such groups would involve no 
contradiction.  Thus, for example, I can, without contradiction, will to exclude all 
Jews (or Koories or Catholics) from participation in the market, and be insistent that 
others in similar situations ought to do likewise.  In short, if morality has no other 
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basis than my ability to will that the same command should apply to all in like 
situations then the kind of ethnic cleansing that we have witnessed in recent times in 
the former Yugoslavia, and discriminatory applications of other forms of treatment 
are admissible in a society guided by this Kantian moral norm.  Furthermore, if the 
relevant society did want to condemn such discriminatory treatment as unjust, and 
therefore to dissuade me from such behaviour, that society will have to appeal to 
standards other than my ability to will that all in similar circumstances should 
discriminate in like manner.  And of course such an appeal would be a concession of 
the need for a standard of justice other than this Kantian norm of morality. 
1. The market and knowledge communication, and ‘conjectural history’ 
 
Hayek is inveighing against an economic and political system that allowed no role 
for individual freedom by arguing that the orders that characterised these systems in 
free societies were the product of nothing other than the exercise of individual 
freedom.  The socialist distribution systems of the Soviet empire, against which he 
was inveighing, unquestionably did err in denying any role in these systems to 
human freedom.  In his defence of free markets, Hayek, I believe, has succeeded in 
explaining an important aspect of the knowledge involved in their operations, 
namely, how such knowledge is exchanged.  He has shown that since no single mind 
could have the knowledge necessary to balance supply and demand in any modern 
economy, serious interference with the knowledge exchange process would 
jeopardise the process of wealth creation that this exchange engenders.  Socialism of 
the Communist kind has lost much of its credit since the collapse of the Soviet 
empire, but that collapse has not moved Hayek to mitigate his claims for human 
freedom against the attempts of modern liberal democracies to create just societies.  
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Hayek’s notions of the spontaneous orders of the market and society are expressions 
of a (Kantian) claim that the exercise of free individual wills is the sole source of 
these orders.  This claim is, I believe, open to challenge. 
 
My first challenge to Hayek’s claims about the source of these orders is that from the 
fact that knowledge is exchanged in this way in free markets, it does not follow that 
all knowledge is reducible to what he calls ‘rule-guided individual behaviour’14.  
Although it is coupled by Hayek with some cultural evolutionary theory, this view of 
knowledge is basically Kantian.  In order to sustain this challenge, I need to 
adumbrate a little its Kantian roots. 
 
According to Kant, the source of the good is not, as groups like the socialists believe, 
something objective like the laws of history or human nature but an a priori structure 
of reason, the individual human will.  Rules of behaviour can only come, on Kantian 
theory, from the determinations of the individual free will.  For Kant as for Hayek, 
there is no nature shared by all, which can be the source of knowledge of the needs 
of others as well as our own.  It follows that we are thus all responsible for assessing 
and expressing our own needs.  If morality, for Kant, had to be defined in terms of 
the freedom to determine our wills in the way he prescribed, in Hayek’s application 
of Kantian theory to social life morality was defined in terms of the freedom to carry 
out tasks such as the assessment and expression of needs.  Since, on this 
Kantian/Hayekian theory, societies are nothing more than groups of human 
individuals freely cooperating for their mutual benefit, their survival depends upon 
the preservation of the freedom of these individuals to persevere in this cooperation. 
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 Since Hayek’s definition of knowledge (derived from Kant) as ‘rule-guided 
individual behaviour’ is, on his own admission, prescriptive as well as descriptive, it 
follows logically that evidence of other ways of describing knowledge together with 
good reasons for preferring such descriptions count against Hayek’s prescription.  
Let me point to some such evidence.  First, members of society, while conscious of 
their individual ends when participating in markets, also express consciousness of 
ends that relate to the good of the society as a whole.  Thus, people generally do not 
regard being unemployed, or poor, or disadvantaged in other ways as matters of 
concern to the relevant individuals only but rather to society as a whole.  Social 
services to remedy or relieve those citizens in these situations are generally regarded 
as constitutive elements of a good society, not protections of individual beneficiaries 
of free markets from rebellion on the part of losers in those markets.  In short, Hayek 
neglects the fact that the same citizens who pursue their individual ends in free 
markets seem to claim consciousness of common ends such as the building of a good 
society.  Indeed, it is fair to argue that consciousness of those common ends is what 
motivates such citizens to require their governments to participate in market 
processes to the extent necessary to achieve those ends15.   
 
Second, the rule that governs market behaviour, according to Hayek, is to act in 
one’s individual self-interest.  But in prescribing this rule to myself in these 
circumstances I am also asserting a belief that I, and others in the same 
circumstances, will adhere to other values necessary to produce the market order.  
Dishonesty, for example, in market behaviour will always disrupt the market order to 
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some extent and if it is widespread may even overturn that order.  Yet such 
dishonesty can be consistent with my self-interest provided only that I do not get 
caught and that my dishonesty does not threaten the system as a whole.  The order 
that Hayek’s Kantian theory says is dependent only upon the free exercise of 
individual wills in the pursuit of self-interest turns out in fact to be dependent upon 
the knowledge of and adherence to other values that are not the product of individual 
wills.  Herman E Daly and John B. Cobb (jr.) identify these values: 
However much driven by self-interest, the market still depends absolutely on a community 
that shares such values as honesty, freedom, initiative, thrift, and other virtues whose 
authority will not long withstand the reduction to the level of personal tastes that is explicit in 
the positivistic, individualistic philosophy of value on which modern economic theory is 
based.  If all value derives only from the satisfaction of individual wants, then there is 
nothing left over on the basis of which self-interested, individualistic want satisfaction can be 
restrained (Daly and Cobb 1994, p. 50-1). 
Indeed, Daly and Cobb point out that without restraint by values other than self-
interest markets will be destroyed by the pursuit of that self-interest.  Later in the 
paragraph quoted above, Daly and Cobb remark: ‘The market does not accumulate 
moral capital; it depletes it’ (Daly and Cobb 1994, p. 51).  While free individual wills 
pursuing self-interest have a role in creating the orders of markets and societies, 
those wills are not, as Hayek (following Kant) suggests, laws unto themselves.  And 
if they are in fact dependent upon values not created by individual human wills, these 
orders are not, as Hayek claimed, spontaneous. 
 
Hayek’s prescription that knowledge ought to be seen as ‘rule-guided behaviour’ 
appealed also to the claim that ‘by following the spontaneously generated moral 
traditions underlying the competitive market order …, we generate and garner 
greater knowledge and wealth than could ever be obtained or utilised in a centrally-
directed economy…’.  The assessment of such expansive historical claims is difficult 
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because amongst other reasons the volume and complexity of the relevant evidence 
is large, and because of the necessary insufficiency of the evidence.  However, I 
believe that there is a considerable body of counter evidence to Hayek’s claim. 
 
The advent of globalisation16 has provoked a rebound of the communal tradition of 
morality that Hayek claims has been superseded17.  The power of individuals united 
in transnational corporations responsible to virtually no one, given their shifting 
shareholder base, to wreck national economies and impoverish the citizens of the 
relevant nations has provoked a worldwide protest movement against what protesters 
see as the irresponsible use of power.  When the free market principle is applied 
globally, even capitalist governments lack confidence that it can deliver in practice 
what it promises in principle.  Moreover, even those governments that are pushing 
for free trade are doing so to advance national interests, not to assert the principle of 
individual autonomy.  According to Daly and Cobb, the very principle of 
‘comparative advantage’18, that underpins the case for free trade, assumes national 
boundaries: 
…as Ricardo recognized, it is only when national boundaries play an important role (limiting 
capital and labor mobility) that the principle of capital advantage replaces absolute 
advantage.  It will not do to advocate every move toward setting aside national boundaries in 
the economic order in the name of a principle (comparative advantage) that itself depends on 
the functioning of these very boundaries (Daly and Cobb 1994, p. 218).
Both governments and many citizens of the world fear, in other words, that the 
operation of the individualist market system without the adoption of some measures 
to forestall or counter its worst effects will devastate nations and individuals.  Indeed, 
Daly and Cobb (Daly and Cobb 1994, pp. 219-29) argue that the division between 
winners and losers in the free trade game is replicated within nations: it is not nations 
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as a whole who profit from free trade, but only the capitalist class within the winning 
nations.   
 
It seems to me that the ‘best possible distribution of wealth for all’, supposedly to be 
delivered by free trade, is instead likely to undermine the order of cooperation 
needed to deliver that distribution.  The effect of leaving the welfare of so many 
people and nations to the mercy of the market is, on the evidence of the present 
unequal distribution of the benefits of economic globalisation19, to erode the faith of 
increasing numbers of people around the world in the ability of Hayek’s individualist 
tradition of morality to sustain free societies.  If Hayek’s conjectural history had 
taken full account of such evidence, I contend, it could quite plausibly have drawn 
another conclusion about which moral traditions the evolutionary process had 
bequeathed to free societies.  That process, it could be argued, has demonstrated the 
dependence of the market orders upon values that transcend the self-given rules 
exalted in Hayek’s individualist tradition of morality. 
 
The superiority of the capitalist system and its underpinning system of morality was 
also demonstrated empirically, according to Hayek, by ‘the fact that those groups 
following its underlying rules increased in numbers and wealth relative to other 
groups’ (Hayek, F. A. 1988, p. 70).  As Ulrich Witt (Witt 1994, p. 184) points out, 
however, this is empirically not the case.  In fact, the fastest growing populations are 
in the poorest countries of the world where those rules are least likely to have been 
followed. 
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These criticisms of Hayek’s account of wealth distribution systems in free societies 
have consequences for his dismissal of the notion of social justice as meaningless.  
Before proceeding to a consideration of his account of justice itself, I need to spell 
out these consequences.  
2. Hayek's assumption that ‘social justice’ necessarily implies 
imposition on society of rationally constructed command order 
threatening ‘civilisation’  
Hayek rejected the notion of ‘social justice’ as ‘meaningless’ (Hayek, F. A. 1976, p. 
xi) because justice (or injustice), on this notion, was attributable to an ‘impersonal 
process’ (the market) (Hayek, F. A. 1976, p. 70), whereas it was properly attributable 
only to ‘persons’ or ‘organizations’.  Hayek’s argument rests on the assumption that I 
have just attempted to refute, namely, that market orders and indeed the order of 
society itself are spontaneous.  If that attempt has been successful, it follows that the 
market order is not just an ‘impersonal process’ driven by many individual wills but 
rather a process that depends for its operation upon members’ acceptance of certain 
communal values.  It also follows that justice need not be considered as ‘the rules of 
just individual conduct’, as Hayek asserts, but may be regarded as one of those 
values upon which the successful operation of the market depends.  In other words, it 
could at least be argued that among those communal values that, as I have argued 
above, transcend the wills of individual members of these orders is a conception of 
justice according to which a reasonably equal distribution of the goods of living in a 
free society is part of the notion of such a society.  If the market order is produced by 
the cooperation that depends upon respect for individual freedom, that cooperation 
must also be recognised to depend upon an acceptable level of equality of wealth 
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distribution.  After all, why should those who are likely to be losers cooperate in a 
system that makes them so?  
 
But Hayek has a further complaint about attempts at achieving social justice.  His 
criticism (see previous section) of Rawls’s proposal for such justice is that even a 
Rawlsian redistribution must stultify the knowledge exchange process necessary to 
balance supply and demand in a free market: ‘In such a world we would be deprived 
of those signals that alone can tell each what, as a result of thousands of changes in 
the conditions in which we live, we must now do in order to keep the stream of 
production flowing and, if possible, increasing’.  It is not by imposing a total 
command order that this stultification is produced in a Rawlsian world, but, 
according to Hayek, ‘by repressing differentiation due to luck’.  By this, I take him to 
mean that the inequalities due to luck function in catallaxies as the triggers of the 
signals to other participants of the need to change their behaviour if the catallaxies 
are to balance supply and demand.  But Rawls’ second principle would eliminate 
those inequalities, and thus remove the signals from the catallaxy.  A Rawlsian 
world, on Hayek’s notion of a catallaxy, would thus eliminate the social mechanism 
necessary for balancing supply and demand, that is, the free market.  And since the 
free market is, on Hayek’s theory, the foundation of civilization, the undermining of 
the free market is also the undermining of civilisation. 
 
I have already argued that the operation of free markets depends upon the acceptance 
by participants of a number of values that transcend their individual wills, values that 
include an equitable distribution of wealth to all.  Neglect of this value will therefore 
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also undermine the operation of free markets.  Although this is not to say the 
signalling function of market consequences can be dispensed with, the force of 
Hayek’s point should not be exaggerated.  Provided that the redistribution takes place 
after market processes have been completed, the signalling function of inequalities 
produced in the catallaxy need not be unduly affected20.  Thus, to the extent that free 
markets do underpin civilisation, that underpinning is not interfered with by 
respecting values essential to the working of markets themselves, and indeed the 
existence of such values shows that markets are not just catallaxies, that is, games 
whose results must be determined by skill and chance.  In their demand for equitable 
distributions of wealth members of free societies seem to be asserting the belief that 
justice consists in more than rules prescribed by the individual will and that it 
includes respect for values that, because they imply communal bonds, may properly 
be described as social.  And if this judgment is correct, it can indeed be meaningful, 
contrary to Hayek’s assertion, to speak of ‘social justice’ in relation to distributions 
of wealth. 
 
Hayek might respond to this criticism of his characterisation of social justice as 
follows.  The appeal to so called ‘social’ values such as equity of wealth distribution, 
especially when the validity of such values is disputed, sounds like a call to the state 
to impose such values on society at large.  For the state to comply with such a call 
would be tantamount to the imposition of a command order on the relevant society.  
Such a violation of individual freedom could only serve to undermine the order upon 
which, according to Hayek, the very survival of the free society depends (Hayek, F. 
A. 1988, p. 7). 
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 This objection turns upon the claim that the order of society is spontaneous.  I have 
already argued that the market order depends upon values that transcend any rules 
prescribed by individual wills.  I would argue that a fortiori the order of society 
depends upon such values.  I argued earlier that no society could be just that allowed 
racial or other forms of discrimination.  Yet, I pointed out, there was no contradiction 
involved in prescribing for myself that I treat all persons equally except those of a 
particular race, and willing that all citizens should observe this rule.  If such injustice 
is to be avoided in any society, it follows that its order of justice must be built upon 
values that transcend prescriptions of individual wills.  Moreover, being bound by 
such transcendent values, even when they are imposed by the law of the state, need 
not mean total loss of individual freedom to a totalitarian state.  Rather it might 
simply mean a recognition of legitimate limits upon such freedom, limits that are 
necessary for its proper exercise for the common good21. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have argued that the difficulty with Hayek’s objection to social 
justice as a wealth distribution system in a free society is that objection’s dependence 
upon a Kantian account of morality.  According to that account, morality has no 
other source than the individual will.  Provided those prescriptions can be willed 
without contradiction for all individuals in like circumstances, they achieve the 
universality and necessity required for the foundations of a moral order.  The 
problem with this account of morality, and the notions of the spontaneous orders of 
the market and society built on it by Hayek, is that there are some common values 
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upon which markets and society depend that transcend individual wills, values such 
as equity in the distribution of wealth and equality in the treatment of all races.  
Hayek’s contribution to my quest for a theory of justice has been to show the 
importance of individual freedom in the operations of the market and the wider 
society.  For all their ills, capitalist economies have demonstrated a hitherto unknown 
ability to generate wealth.  Thus, for governments to interfere unduly with the 
signalling system on which capitalist markets depend - negotiation on price between 
free individuals - would be to jeopardise that system.  I must also acknowledge 
Hayek’s point about the impact of the ethic of individual freedom upon the 
communitarian ethic and its underpinning sense of community.  If my quest is to be 
fulfilled and social justice is to be possible, the theory I am seeking as its basis must 
be able to define a role for individual freedom in the market place and in the wider 
society.  Having acknowledged to this extent Hayek’s case for individual freedom, I 
remain none the less convinced that the burdens he imposes upon that freedom by 
making it the sole source of the moral underpinnings of market and social orders are 
more than it can bear.  Indeed, I have tried to show in this chapter how individual 
freedom in both these orders depends for its flourishing upon the acknowledgment of 
values that transcend individual human wills.  If Kantian roots have given rise in 
Hayek’s case to a form of liberalism that rejects the possibility of social justice, that 
rejection may not be entirely due to nature of the roots themselves.  John Rawls 
acknowledges similar roots, but proposes a form of liberalism that he defines as a 
theory of social justice.  Since the kind of society for which I am seeking a theory of 
social justice is one in which the claims of liberal individualism and 
communitarianism are seeking accommodation, I need to balance my assessment of 
 - 60 -  
the Hayekian version of liberalism with the latter version.  In the next chapter, 
therefore, I turn to the Rawlsian version of liberalism. 
 
                                          
Notes to chapter one 
1  Cubeddu (1993) interprets the School’s purpose thus: ‘What was at stake [in the debate against 
‘historicism’ and ‘scientism’] was the ‘restoration’ of the liberal political philosophy - the principal 
goal of both Mises’s and Hayek’s strivings, as they sought to free it from what they saw as the bonds 
of a mentality that in one way or another was connected with historicism and positivism’ (Cubeddu 
1993, p. 29). 
2  For comment on the different uses of the German term ‘historismus’ and its English translations 
‘historicism’ and ‘historism’, see note to this quotation (105). 
3  See for example his criticism of the so called economic and other rights upheld in the 
Universal Declaration of human Rights (1948)by the United Nations (Hayek, F. A. 1976, pp. 103ff.). 
4  This is not to say that Hayek holds that such contracts solve all problems with the operation of free 
markets.  Indeed, he points out in another work that this is not the case:  
As far as the great field of the law  of  property and contract are concerned, we  must ... above all 
beware of the error that the formulas “private property” and “freedom of contract” solve  our 
problems.  They are not adequate answers because their meaning is ambiguous.  Our problems begin 
when we ask what ought to be the contents of property rights, what contracts should be enforceable, 
and how contracts should be interpreted or, rather, what standard forms of contract should be read into 
the informal agreements of everyday transactions (Hayek 1949, p. 113). 
5  Nigel Pleasants calls this the ‘epistemological argument’ against socialism, an argument he 
attributes also to Anthony Giddens.  Pleasants presents a provocative critique of this argument from a 
Wittgensteinian perspective.  Pleasants asserts that the argument relies on the notion of ‘tacit 
knowledge’, a notion, he argues, Wittgenstein rejected.  Pleasants concludes this section of his article 
in somewhat acid terms: 
Giddens and Hayek do not just describe an epistemic state of affairs, they place a moral premium on 
not intervening in the spontaneously expressed preferences and desires of individuals – their 
‘knowledge in use’.  Thus, ‘tacit knowledge’ is not just epistemically privileged, it is also, at the same 
time, normatively sovereign.  However, if this ‘autonomy’ is represented as personal knowledge to 
which individuals should enjoy inalienable rights, but as more or less arbitrarily indoctrinated desires, 
then the case for non-intervention has little moral purchase (Pleasants 1997, p.37 emphasis in 
original). 
If ‘deliberative democracy’ is regarded as the alternative to Hayek’s and Giddens’ free market 
capitalism for modern political economies, a cautionary note is sounded by Joseph Femia about ‘the 
incalculable complexity of modern society’ (Femia 1996). 
6 Thus far, Hayek’s case for regarding the free market as a ‘spontaneous order’ is critical rationalist in 
character, that is, his case is based on criticisms from reason of socialism as an alternative economic 
system.  In his later works, however, Hayek links this case to a thesis about the free market’s 
evolutionary origins and he often fails to distinguish the one form of argument from the other.  He 
appeals to both forms of argument to support his claim that ‘civilisation’ depends for its survival 
unpin the preservation of the market order and the moral traditions which underpin that order.  Since 
the moral traditions to which he refers are the individualist ones whose validity I wish to deny, it is 
important for me to consider both the critical rationalist and evolutionary strands of his defence of 
them.  These strands are interwoven in Hayek’s account of the sources of the ‘spontaneous order’ of 
the free market summarized in the following section. 
 
7  Since society can have no common ends such as social justice, the function of Hayek's rules 
of just individual conduct has to be to ensure the freedom of individuals to pursue their ends.  This 
does not mean the protection of individual freedom from all interference (anarchy), but the protection 
of the freedom of all by the amount of interference necessary for that protection.  Their function of 
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protecting the freedom of individual choice rather than any common good means that the content of 
the rules governing a free society is negative  
in the sense that they prohibit rather than enjoin particular kinds of actions, that they do so in 
order to protect ascertainable domains within which each individual is free to act as he 
chooses, and that the possession of this character by a particular rule can be ascertained by 
applying to it a test of generalization or universalization (Hayek, F. A. 1976, 36, omitting 
notes 6, 7 and 8). 
The rules of just conduct are negative because it seems that, according to Hayek, positive rules are 
more likely to imply dependence upon some end or good such as desert or need.  
The freedom protected by the rules of just conduct would of course be illusory if those rules did not 
apply equally to all.  The test prescribed by Hayek to determine whether a particular rule is just is 
whether that rule is universalisable: ‘the possession of this character by a particular rule can be 
ascertained by applying to it a test of generalization or universalization’.  If a particular rule fails this 
test, we may take Hayek to be saying, it cannot be just because it does not uphold that equal freedom 
of all upon which a capitalist society depends.  Not surprisingly, the content of that domain to be 
protected by the rules of just conduct will, on Hayek’s conception of justice, include the pillars of a 
capitalist society, that is, 
... what David Hume called ‘the three fundamental laws of nature, that of stability of 
possession, of its transference by consent, and of the performance of promises', or, as a 
modern author sums up the essential content of all contemporary systems of private law, 
‘freedom of contract, the inviolability of property, and the duty to compensate another for 
damage due to his fault’ (Hayek, F. A. 1976, p. 40, quoting Hume and Leon Duguit, notes 
22, 23). 
 
8  Hayek acknowledges that by so closely associating morality and economic theory, he has 
invited the accusation ‘... of ‘pan-economism’, a tendency to see everything from the economic angle, 
or, worse, wanting to make ‘economic purposes’ prevail over all others’ (Hayek, F. A. 1976, p. 113, 
note 13 lists sources of this accusation).  His reply is that the economic activities of individuals are 
always directed to the service of competing purposes, which are ultimately ‘non-economic’ (Hayek, F. 
A. 1976, p.113).  It is economic striving which, on his view, constitutes that human engagement with 
the conditions of our existence which over the centuries of social evolution generated the adaptations 
of the rules of conduct necessary for the attainment of our ‘non-economic ends’.  Like ‘civilisation’, 
individuals have no ultimate end that could constitute a ‘terminus’ to that engagement with life.  As 
Kukathas points out, Hayek sees no ‘terminus’ in ‘happiness’ or ‘pleasure’ but only the continuity of 
enjoyment of intelligence  
for it is in the ‘living in and for the future in which human intelligence proves itself’; it is ‘in 
the process of learning ... that man enjoys the gift of his intelligence’ (Kukathas 1989, p. 
136) quoting  (Hayek, F. A. 1960, p. 41).   
An understanding of this aspect of Hayek's thought holds the key to the understanding of his claim 
that socialism threatens ‘civilisation’ itself. 
 
9  The source of the market and social orders and the ‘...spontaneously generated moral 
traditions underlying [it]’ (Hayek, F. A. 1988, p. 7) is, according to Hayek, the ‘process of evolution’ 
referred to in the foregoing passages.  The rise of the behaviours producing those orders and reflecting 
those traditions requires some explanation.  The rise of these behaviours, he argues in The Fatal 
Conceit (chapter 1), is to be explained in the tension between ‘instinct’ and ‘reason’.  In an earlier 
‘tribal’ phase of the evolution process, Hayek believes, human morality was ‘instinctual’, and the 
human instinct was directed towards the securing of common ends.  In time, however, new 
circumstances arose requiring adaptation of this instinctual, common end oriented behaviour to 
behaviour oriented to individual purposes.  This was the phase of ‘reason’.  The power of ‘reason’, on 
Hayek's conception, is, however, limited to adapting rules of behaviour inherited from the 
evolutionary process to new circumstances.  Hayek rejected entirely the conception on which ‘reason’ 
could create such rules anew, the conception he attributed to rational constructivists like socialists.  
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The latter conception of ‘reason’, he held, reflected a reversion to the instinctual morality of the tribal 
phase of human existence, a reversion which threatened ‘civilization’ as we know it: 
The prevailing moral tradition, much of which still derives from the end-connected tribal 
society, makes people often regard this circumstance [the lack of common ends] as a moral 
defect of the Great Society which ought to be remedied.  Yet it was the very restriction of 
coercion to the observance of the negative rules of just conduct that made possible the 
integration into a peaceful order of individuals and groups which pursued different ends; and 
it is the absence of prescribed common ends which makes a society of free men all that it has 
come to mean to us (Hayek, F. A. 1976, p. 110).   
Thus, for Hayek this passage sums up what socialists and rational constructivists fail to understand 
about the wealth distribution system proper to free societies:  that the market order is the foundation 
for the order of civilised society and both orders are dependent upon an underpinning individualist 
tradition of morality.   
 
10  Consistent with the ordinary sense of the term ‘civilisation’, Hayek's use of it implies 
‘progress’ in our society’s way of life from ‘past ages of barbarism’ (Hayek, F.A. 1944, p. 10) to a 
present characterised by features considered more desirable.  Hayek refers to the present, civilised 
society as ‘the Great Society’ (Hayek, F. A. 1976, p. 112), ‘the Good Society’ (Hayek, F. A. 1976, p. 
132) and ‘the Open Society’ (Hayek, F. A. 1976, p. 146-7).  The features which characterise this 
society include ‘greater freedom, justice and prosperity’ (Hayek, F.A. 1944, p. 10) than in earlier 
societies.  Part of what distinguishes Hayek's conception of ‘civilisation’ from the ordinary 
understanding of the term is the evolutionary framework he uses to interpret it.   
On Hayek’s conception, ‘civilisation’ is ‘the product of social evolution …’ (Hayek, F. A. 1988, p. 
74).  Social evolution is the process in which human beings learnt to adapt their common end oriented 
economic and moral rules of conduct to rules oriented to diverse individual ends.  It is the freedom to 
pursue individual ends that constitutes the dynamism of the evolutionary process, and produces 
‘civilisation’.  This freedom, which originated, according to Hayek, in barter and trade, enabled 
human beings to develop the unique system of knowledge and wealth generation that we know as the 
market order.  ‘Progress’, which, as Kukathas points out (Kukathas 1989, p. 136), Hayek equates with 
civilisation, is evidenced by the generation of such knowledge and wealth but does not terminate in it.  
For Hayek, ‘the Great Society’ is not the ‘terminus’ of civilisation because the survival of civilisation 
depends upon the continuation of ‘progress’.  
 
11  In Hayek’s own words, ‘Civilisation is not only a product of evolution - it is a process; by 
establishing a framework of general rules  and individual freedom it allows itself to continue to 
evolve’ (Hayek, F. A. 1988, p. 74).  If one interferes with that individual freedom by applying rules 
directed to a common end, Hayek believes one interferes with the evolutionary process itself, which 
he equates with ‘civilisation’ in this passage.  It is of course possible to distinguish the value of what 
is produced by the evolutionary process from the value of the process itself.  Hayek is at least 
claiming that interference with the process will stifle production of valuable rules and institutions for 
civilisation.  It must be admitted therefore that his argument is to this extent an evolutionary one. 
12  For my account of this thought I am indebted to (Janik and Toulmin 1973).  My 
interpretation of Kant owes a debt to Frederick Copleston (Copleston 1964). 
13  What Terence Penelhum calls the ‘associative laws of the imagination’ (Mautner 1999, p. 
258).   
14 For Hayek, ‘... what we call knowledge is primarily a system of rules of action...’ (Hayek, F.A. 
1978, p. 41).  Where distribution systems are concerned, the rules of action we need to know are those 
for allocating moderately scarce resources most efficiently for ‘... the satisfaction of human needs’ 
(Hayek, F. A. 1988, p.95).  Since human needs are known only to individuals, the most efficient rules 
of action for satisfying those needs will be those which communicate the needs most effectively to 
others capable of satisfying them.  A centrally planned distribution system will be unable to match 
knowledge of what to produce (supply) to knowledge of what is needed (demand) because by 
definition such a system requires possession of the knowledge of these two things by ‘a single 
authority’, knowledge which no such authority could possibly possess.  However, the very nature of 
the free market system of rules is such as to enable individuals to exchange such knowledge across an 
entire society.  It therefore follows logically as well as empirically, according to Hayek, from the very 
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nature of this system that it alone of the two can ‘generate and garner’ the knowledge and wealth 
necessary to continue to meet human needs.  Socialist attempts to construct a distribution system 
based on a rational standard like merit or need may thus be justly dismissed as remnants of a 
superseded ‘instinctual’ phase of moral evolution.   
 
15 That there are common ends, which it is the role of governments in free societies to pursue, even by 
intervention in free markets, is exemplified in the writings of economist and former Deputy Prime 
Minister of Canada, Paul Hellyer (Hellyer 1999). 
In a section on the problem of unemployment, Hellyer argues that low aggregate demand was the 
cause of high unemployment levels in developed economies during the 1980s and 1990s.  The so 
called ‘monetarist’ policies of Milton Friedman, a former disciple of Hayek, had encouraged the 
accumulation of debt by governments to unrepayable levels, and in many countries this debt had led to 
economic stagnation due to high interest rates.  The problem with these policies, according to Hellyer, 
was that they surrendered control of the creation of money from governments to private banks.  The 
solution, he argues, is for governments to resume that control so that aggregate demand, which is 
dependent on lending, can be managed at interest rates close to zero.  This was the solution used by 
Allied governments to finance their war efforts and in doing so to revive their economies that had 
been flattened by the Great Depression.  Referring to the policy followed during that period, Hellyer 
writes: 
You would think that economists would take a leaf from history and recommend the creation 
of limited amounts of zero cost money to help finance urgent needs of various sorts.  
Especially in underdeveloped countries where health, educational, social and environmental 
needs are acute, or worse (Hellyer 1999, p. 81). 
In short, Hellyer identifies two factors in the social context in which markets operate that warrant 
government intervention in their processes.  One is the social and moral purpose which markets are 
supposed to serve, namely, providing inter alia work for the citizens of the society in which the 
markets operate.  The other is to free up markets that stagnate for the reasons he identifies above. 
 
16  For a recent defence of the possibility of social justice through globalisation, see (Kitching 
2001).   
17  Admittedly, Hayek recognises that this tradition, which he terms ‘instinctual’, lingers in 
some quarters but the extent of protests against globalisation throughout the world in the last decade 
shows that the re-assertion of this tradition is more than a lingering death. 
18  The Penguin Dictionary of Economics defines comparative advantage as follows:  ‘The idea 
that economic agents are most efficiently employed in activities in which their relative  efficiencies 
are superior to others’ (Bannock, Baxter et al. 1998). 
19  Ulrich Beck, for example, claims that ‘[w]e are approaching a capitalism without work, in all 
the post-industrial countries of the world’.  He explains this trend by reference to three myths: 
first, everything is much too complicated anyway (the unfathomability myth); 
second, the coming upturn in the service sector will save the work society (the 
services myth); and third, we have only to drive down wage-costs and the problem 
of unemployment will vanish (the costs myth) (Beck 2000). 
Jan Aarte Scholte also assesses the effects of globalisation on employment as on balance negative.  
Commenting first of all on job security, he writes: ‘the globalizing economy has thus far reduced 
certainty of job tenure for most people in work, and the new geography has to date come nowhere 
close to generating the positions needed to address structural deficits in world employment 
opportunities’ (Scholte 2000).  In his discussion of the effects of globalisation on working conditions, 
Scholte refers to the phenomenon of ‘flexibilization’ which he explains thus: ‘The ‘flexible’ worker 
lacks a job for life, but instead moves and retrains to meet altered market demands’ (Scholte 2000).  
He expresses his judgment on ‘flexibilization’ thus: ‘In sum, despite some middle countervailing 
measures in recent years to enhance labour standards, on the whole flexibilization through 
globalization has had substantial adverse repercussions for security in work’ (Scholte 2000).  For an 
account of the effects of neo-liberal economic policies responding to ‘integrated global economic 
processes’ on work in Australia, see (Boreham 2000). 
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20  That such a redistribution process is possible is argued by Steven Lukes.  Lukes’ case, 
however, accepts the Hayekian premise that I have rejected, namely, the market orders are 
spontaneous.  Lukes believes in the possibility of a form of social justice, which respects the 
autonomy of the individual will.  He engages in an interesting debate on this possibility with Edward 
Feser, the main elements of which are summarised here. 
Lukes holds that social justice policies can be shaped to achieve redistributions of income and 
property without reference to ideals such as merit or need: 
For redistributive policies can take the form of modifying the shape of an income or property 
distribution without any mention of merit or occupation, or any reference to specific groups 
or individuals, by using such policy instruments as taxes (positive and negative), social 
security payments, and the laws of property and inheritance (Lukes 1997, p. 78). 
Because such redistributions take place by definition after individuals have exercised their freedom in 
the market, Lukes points out, the redistributions cannot constitute ‘arbitrary interference’ with the 
exercise of that freedom.  Indeed, Lukes argues, these policy instruments can be employed to achieve 
redistributions according to a whole range of criteria including one suggested by Hayek himself: to 
enable individuals ‘to use their knowledge for their own purposes’ (Lukes 1997, p. 78).   
Because such redistributions take place by definition after individuals have exercised their freedom in 
the market, Lukes points out, the redistributions cannot constitute ‘arbitrary interference’ with the 
exercise of that freedom.  Indeed, Lukes argues, these policy instruments can be employed to achieve 
redistributions according to a whole range of criteria including one suggested by Hayek himself: to 
enable individuals ‘to use their knowledge for their own purposes’ (Lukes 1997, p. 78).   
Edward Feser tries to counter this argument by claiming that such redistribution ‘precisely because it 
is redistribution...’ is not enough to count as social justice: 
Given the way the original distribution was determined, the redistribution, however else it 
may or may not be justified, cannot, if Hayek is right, be justified on the grounds that it is the 
correction of an injustice (Feser 1997, p. 586). 
 
Since the original distribution was by impersonal market forces, and justice (on Hayek's account) can only be attributed to the deliberate actions of persons, 
Feser is arguing, the original distribution was neither just nor unjust.  Any subsequent redistribution cannot therefore be justified - if it can be justified at all - 
on the ground that it corrects an injustice in the original distribution as any redistribution in the name of social justice would require.  Since mere 
redistribution cannot count as social justice, such justice, if it is to be achieved, must take the form of the deliberate imposition upon society of an alternative 
distribution system, that is, of a command system  
 
Feser’s counter turns on the assumption that justice or injustice is properly attributable only to the 
deliberate actions of individuals, the assumption that I have tried to refute in this chapter.   
 
21  David Johnston tries to meet this objection without admitting limits to the autonomy of the 
individual will.  He points out that Hayek’s argument against alternatives to the socialist conception of 
social justice (Johnston conceives it as social equality) does not sit easily with his defence of a market 
order.  Firstly, Hayek defends a market order on two grounds: (1) that it is the kind of order - 
spontaneous - that enables individuals to cooperate in achieving their own ends without the need for 
them to agree on a common end; and (2) that it ‘...generates greater aggregate wealth than any 
alternative economic order...’ (Johnston 1997a, p. 87).  But, Johnston argues, (2) does lay down an 
end or goal by which the market order might be judged, and by doing so opens the door to arguments 
for alternative goals ‘such as the egalitarian goal of ‘social justice’’ (Johnston 1997a, p. 87). 
Secondly, Johnston argues, the freedom of individuals to decide and pursue their own ultimate ends 
need be no more curtailed by a society’s democratic commitment to social justice understood as social 
equality than it is by a Hayekian society’s commitment to the generation of maximum wealth.  
Because the goods to be distributed in either society are only means to ends, the rules for their 
distribution or redistribution do not determine the ends to which their possessors will apply them.  
Since a commitment to social justice may be conceived as a commitment only to a set of rules for 
redistribution i.e. after free exercise of knowledge in the market has taken place, it is a commitment to 
a division of means, not to particular ends.  Johnston concludes: ‘The choice between these two social 
goals - the maximisation of aggregate wealth and the equalization of its distribution - must ultimately 
be made on normative grounds’ (Johnston 1997a, p. 88, note omitted), i.e. on the basis of the ultimate 
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ends to which either of these options might be the means.  Since normative grounds are rational 
grounds, on Johnston’s argument, Hayek's choice of social goal will be no less dependent upon reason 
than that of defenders of social justice.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
Rawls’ thesis: justice, not the good, the foundation for order in a free 
society  
Introduction 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter Hayek's version of liberalism denied the possibility of 
social justice on the ground that theories of social justice were exercises in ‘rational 
constructivism’, and as such were threats to the bases of ‘civilisation’ produced by the 
process of cultural evolution: the market order and its underpinning morality, the rules 
of just conduct.  Social justice, as Hayek conceived it, would consist of a system of rules 
directed to some common end or good, producing a ‘made order’ which he termed an 
‘organisation’.  An ‘organisation’ was incompatible with the so called ‘spontaneous 
order’ of the market which he called a 'catallaxy'.  Since a 'catallaxy' was created by 
participants pursuing their own individual ends or conceptions of the good, justice, on 
Hayek's theory, had to be conceived in terms of the rule of law assuring the equal 
freedom of all citizens to pursue those conceptions.  Equal freedom for all could only be 
secured, he argued, if society's laws were the same for all.  Indeed, government 
interventions in the processes underpinning the 'catallaxy' to secure particular 
distributions so infringed human freedom that they set society on the slippery slope to 
totalitarianism.  The objection posed in the previous chapter to this notion of justice was 
that it exalted the good of individual freedom above all other human goods, and in doing 
so neglected the dependence of individuals on their relationships with their fellow 
citizens for the attainment of their good and on the communal values arising from those 
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relationships.  I am searching for a conception of justice that acknowledges that 
dependence on one’s fellows and the consequent limits on individual freedom posed by 
their needs.  
 
John Rawls also offers a liberal account of justice, but one which goes a considerable 
way towards remedying these defects in Hayek’s account.  In his account, Rawls 
emphasises the value of equality as much as that of freedom, so much so that he defines 
justice as ‘social justice’.  However, Rawls agrees with Hayek that no particular version 
of the common good can, in a free society, be the common good of all, and consequently 
that social justice in its traditional conception as a distribution of society's goods to 
citizens according to their needs or deserts as defined in some comprehensive account of 
the common good is not possible.  In his solution to this problem, Rawls shows a much 
fuller appreciation than Hayek of the importance of social bonds, and of the threat to 
them posed by religious, cultural and ideological diversity, in the formation and 
maintenance of a free society.  The theory of justice he proposes for free pluralist 
societies he terms ‘political’ rather than ‘metaphysical’ liberalism, that is, a form of 
liberalism that, he argues, is compatible with many ‘comprehensive doctrinal systems’ 
but dependent upon none.  Rawls’ acknowledgement of the value of equality, and thus 
of the need for a strong redistribution system, in free societies offers an element to the 
understanding of social justice I am seeking.  I have, however, two concerns about 
Rawls’ theory of justice.  The first is whether the political understanding of the common 
good on which it is based will be sufficient to generate the social solidarity necessary to 
support that system.  The second is whether he succeeds in overcoming the problem 
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posed by the plurality of comprehensive doctrinal systems in modern liberal 
democracies by producing a genuinely political rather than metaphysical conception 
justice.  In section one I outline the content of Rawls’ theory of justice, and in the second 
section I appraise the theory from the standpoint of my quest for a theory of social 
justice based on some form of social solidarity. 
 
Rawls’ theory of social justice 
The purpose for which Rawls wants a theory of justice is to provide the rules needed to 
form and maintain a society.  For Rawls, society is not a structure to which human 
beings are ordered by nature, as in the Aristotelian conception, but a structure into which 
individuals contract voluntarily.  Society, in his conception, is  ‘a system of social 
cooperation …’ based on ‘the traditional conception of the social contract’ (Rawls, John 
1972, p. 3).  Social cooperation enables individuals to achieve ‘a better life for all than 
any would have if each were to live solely by his own efforts’ (Rawls, John 1972, p. 4).  
In conditions of abundance, there would be no need for rules of justice because there 
would be enough for everyone.  In conditions of moderate scarcity, however, citizens 
‘have a conflict of interests since persons are not indifferent as to how the greater 
benefits produced by their collaboration are distributed, for in order to pursue their ends 
they each prefer a larger to a lesser share’ (Rawls, John 1972, p. 4).  Rawls’ principles of 
justice are thus designed to ‘provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic 
institutions of society and … [to] define the appropriate distribution of the benefits and 
burdens of social cooperation’ (Rawls, John 1972, p. 4).  But what kind of rules would 
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be appropriate for this purpose would depend upon the kind of society Rawls has in 
mind.  For rules for distributions in an aristocratic society, for example, would be very 
different from those for a liberal democracy. 
 
The kind of society Rawls has in mind is, of course, a liberal democracy.  In such a 
society, as we have already seen in the previous chapter, the good that social cooperation 
is meant to foster is individual freedom.  But Rawls is also of the view that the value of 
‘democratic equality’ (Rawls, John 1972, p. 75ff.) is an essential condition of social 
cooperation.  Rawls’ principles of justice are designed to treat ‘everyone equally as a 
moral person , and …not [to] weight men’s share in the benefits and burdens of social 
cooperation according to their luck in the natural lottery …’ (Rawls, John 1972, p. 75).  
According to Rawls, it would be rational for free and equal citizens of a democracy to 
choose as their conception of justice1 one which was social in the sense that it made 
equality as well as freedom a basic condition of their social cooperation: 
Our topic is that of social justice. For us the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of 
society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental 
rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation (Rawls 1972, 
p. 7). 
If the purpose of his conception of justice is to provide the rules necessary for social 
cooperation, and the values it is to uphold are those of freedom and equality, Rawls 
makes it clear in this quotation to what exactly this conception is to be applied.    
 
The ‘primary subject of justice’, according to Rawls, is ‘the basic structure of society’ 
by which he means the laws and institutions governing the relevant society (Rawls, John 
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1972, p. 3).  Rawls recognises that within ‘well ordered societies’ the different 
component groups ‘understand the need for, and … are prepared to affirm, a 
characteristic set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining 
what they take to be the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social 
cooperation’ (Rawls, John 1972, p. 5).  Justice, thus understood, is for Rawls ‘the first 
virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought’ (Rawls, John 1972, p. 3).  
That is to say, just as error, however, attractive, must be revised in the name of truth, so 
too injustice in its rules and institutions, whatever its benefits to ‘the welfare of society 
as a whole …’, must be rectified in the name of justice (Rawls, John 1972, p. 3).  Justice 
will thus in some way limit the range of goods that may be pursued in such societies, or 
the circumstances under which they may be pursued.  Rawls claims that his conception 
of justice is the one which it would be rational for citizens in a liberal democracy to 
choose.  Why would this be so and how do we know that it is so? 
 
Rawls’ answer to these two questions is that the application of what he calls an 
‘expository device’  will generate a choice of principles that will accord with our 
‘intuitive notion’ of the nature of justice (Rawls, John 1972, p. 21).  This device is meant 
to show what principles of justice a representative group of people would rationally 
choose in a process of deliberation for application in their liberal democratic society, and 
thus to persuade members of such societies of the appropriateness of this conception for 
them.  This process of deliberation takes place in what he calls the Original Position 
(Rawls, John 1972, p. 17, 118-183), an imaginary situation in which representatives of 
the groups composing the relevant society choose their society’s principles of justice.  
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These deliberators operate behind a so called Veil of Ignorance (Rawls, John 1972, pp. 
18-9), that is to say, under conditions that allow them knowledge of the kind of society 
theirs is, but not of their positions in it.  Under these conditions, according to Rawls, it 
would be rational for the deliberators to choose the following principles of justice: 
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible 
with a similar liberty for others. 
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) 
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and 
offices open to all (Rawls, John 1972, p. 60). 
Since, as we observed above, there can be no single conception of the good that is the 
good of all, these principles are not meant to govern distributions according to some 
conception of the common good.  Rather they are intended to govern distributions of 
what Rawls terms the ‘primary goods’: ‘rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, 
income and wealth’ (Rawls, John 1972, p. 62).  Rawls describes these as ‘goods that 
every rational man is presumed to want’ because they ‘normally have a use whatever a 
person’s rational plan of life’ (Rawls, John 1972, p. 62).  But the question remains of 
why it would be rational for representatives in the Original Position to choose these 
principles of justice rather than the utilitarian or intuitionist alternatives. 
 
Rawls argues that these representatives choose rationally when, faced with these 
alternatives, they rank them in order of preference: ‘It is clear, then, that I want to say 
that one conception of justice is more reasonable than another, or justifiable with respect 
to it, if rational persons in the initial situation would choose its principles over those of 
the other for the role of justice’ (Rawls, John 1972, p. 17).  But what would lead 
representatives to rank Rawls’ principles first in this process?  He explains that each 
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party is assumed to try ‘as best he can to advance his [sic] interests’ (Rawls, John 1972, 
p. 142).  However, since under the conditions of the Original Position, the parties cannot 
know what their conception of the good is, they can therefore know only that they have a 
‘rational plan of life’, not its content.  They have a difficulty therefore in knowing which 
principles will advance their interests.  Rawls’ solution to this problem is for the parties 
to ‘assume they would prefer more primary social goods rather than less’ (Rawls, John 
1972, p. 142).  Given this assumption, it would be rational for representatives behind the 
Veil of Ignorance to choose principles of justice that would insure them against 
disadvantage if their positions in society should turn out to be among the less well off.  
Justice would thus function in a Rawlsian society as the rules governing distributions of 
social benefits and burdens whatever goods (or ends) they may choose.  This account of 
what it would be rational to choose in the Original Position was deployed by Rawls in 
his first account of his theory of justice (Rawls, John 1972).  It met with some criticisms 
that led Rawls to modify aspects of it in his later account (Rawls, J. 1996).  I shall 
briefly state those criticisms before moving to Rawls’ later account. 
 
In the above account of what it would be rational to choose in the Original Position, 
Rawls is implying that individuals choose their own conceptions of the good, and base 
their plans of life upon those conceptions.  While it is consistent with his denial of the 
possibility of a single conception of the good for all, this implication leads him to a more 
controversial theory of the relationship between the self and its aims: 'Human good is 
heterogeneous because the aims of the self are heterogeneous' (Rawls 1972, p.554).  The 
latter theory was controversial because it implied a denial of some communitarian 
74  
theories according to which the self discovers rather than chooses its aims.  Justice, on 
the latter theories, functions not as Rawlsian principles guiding the self in its choice of 
aims, but as rules of distribution according to the conception of the good discovered by 
the self.  Rawls’ reliance on this moral anthropology and its attendant view of justice 
thus exposed him to the criticism that his theory was not just one about 'the basic 
structure of society'2 but a metaphysical moral anthropology3 according to which the 
self’s aims cannot in any sense be given to it.  Insofar as criticisms of that anthropology 
were valid, his basic principle that the right is prior to the good was undermined 
because, if the self is not, as Rawls holds, prior to its ends, it does not choose its ends.  
And if the self does not choose its ends, the right does not function as its guiding 
principle in so choosing.  These criticisms led Rawls to modify this aspect of his account 
of justice.  
 
In his Political Liberalism  (1996, 1st edn 1993), Rawls characterises his interpretation 
of the liberal tradition as 'political' rather than 'metaphysical'.  A 'metaphysical' 
liberalism, on Rawls’ theory, denies not only the possibility that some notion of a 
'common good' might serve as the basis of political and economic order, but also that 
any such notion might be valid.  His 'political liberalism', however, denies only the first 
possibility and thus purports to remain compatible with most comprehensive doctrinal 
systems which include a conception of a common good (Rawls 1996, pp. 12-13).  Given 
a commitment on the part of citizens to fair terms of cooperation in the life of a free 
society, Rawls argues, it should be possible to set aside disagreements about the nature 
of the good in this ‘metaphysical’ sense, and establish agreement on the nature of the 
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‘political’ good conceived in terms of such things as ‘... liberty and equality together 
with a guarantee of sufficient all-purpose means (primary goods) ...for citizens to make 
intelligent and effective use of their freedoms’ (Rawls, J. 1996, p. xli).  Agreement on 
such a ‘political’ conception of the good should, according to Rawls, render possible 
accord among citizens on a system of justice which will be at least compatible with their 
various ‘metaphysical’ conceptions of the good and capable of giving effect to their 
commitment to the terms of cooperation in a free society.  Rawls terms his theory of 
justice 'justice as fairness' because it lays down the rules for social cooperation between 
citizens who are divided on conceptions of the good but committed to the liberty and 
equality of all.  It is time now to move to an appraisal of Rawls’ theory of justice. 
 
Appraisal of Rawls’ theory of justice 
My quest is for a theory of social justice capable of generating and sustaining the social 
solidarity necessary to sustain the distributions of benefits and burdens appropriate to a 
polity that sees itself as a community rather than as a voluntary cooperative of 
individuals.  Rawls’ theory of justice aids my quest by making equality between citizens 
a fundamental condition of the social contract as he understands it.  I believe he has 
correctly identified ‘equality as citizens’ as a human value to be fostered and protected.  
Unlike Hayek’s, Rawls’ version of liberalism sees the role of the free market as part of 
the system of social cooperation that must be negotiated under the social contract.  As 
part of his explication of that contract, Rawls even speaks of government as being 
divided into four branches ‘charged with preserving certain social and economic 
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conditions’ (Rawls, John 1972, p. 275).  One of these branches, which he calls the 
‘transfer branch’, has the responsibility of providing ‘the social minimum’ (Rawls, John 
1972, p. 276).  Free market economics, Rawls also insists (Rawls, John 1972, pp. 
265ff.), are not incompatible with socialist ownership schemes.   
 
Furthermore, Rawls’ principles of justice would amount to a much stricter application of 
the value of equality than is found in liberal democracies today.  There are several 
consequences of this that are attractive to me in my quest.  First, the distribution of 
burdens in society could not be dismissed as the responsibility of the relevant individuals 
and not of the society as whole.  An equal right to access to work would make its 
provision a responsibility of the relevant society.  Rawls does not, of course, pretend that 
any society can guarantee immunity from unemployment4 but he does insist that the 
right to equal opportunity for employment and relief in its absence is claimable under 
the terms of the social contract.  Second, access to basic services such as health care, 
housing and education is a right of citizenship to be enforced by state power, not a 
consequence of one’s fortunes in the markets for these goods5.  
 
Above all, the requirements of Rawls’ ‘difference principle’ would entail a redistribution 
of benefits and burdens in societies like Australia’s that would be considered quite 
onerous.  In his later work6, Rawls expresses the ‘difference principle’ as a second 
condition of his second principle of justice: 
b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to 
be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity, and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged 
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members of society  (Rawls 1996, p. 5-6; italics added to the difference principle). 
Since the re-emergence of economic liberalism as the economic orthodoxy of modern 
economies, one of the prevailing doctrines7 has been that differences between incomes 
are unimportant provided that minimum incomes are at a subsistence level.  The 
‘difference principle’ would deny that doctrine and prohibit the inequalities it permits.  
Three of Australia’s most prominent economists have recently argued that Australia now 
faces a social crisis in the midst of economic buoyancy, a crisis evident in such signs as 
‘manifest inequalities in entry to, and rewards from, economic activity to increasing 
demand on emergency relief agencies, public hospital casualty wards, crisis centres and 
services for the homeless’ (Borland, Gregory et al. 2001, p. 2)8.  These authors argue 
that this crisis is due to the kinds of inequalities that would clearly be prohibited by 
Rawls’ ‘difference principle’: 
The first of these is increased inequality in earnings in the different types of jobs that are 
available, and in particular within full-time jobs.  The second is in the continuing change 
in the types of jobs available , especially the rise of part-time casual jobs, and the 
increasingly unequal distribution of  better paid jobs.  The third is the growing 
polarisation of households into work rich and work poor, with many couples having 
access to several jobs and working long hours in total, while an increasing proportion of 
couples have little or no work (Borland, Gregory et al. 2001, p. 4)9. 
The constitutional prohibition on such inequalities within the limits acknowledged by 
Rawls would be the kind of protection that I am seeking for citizens against neo-liberal 
economic measures currently being invoked in Australia and elsewhere to justify the 
kinds of inequalities referred to by these authors.  However, I do not think Rawls’ 
principles of justice will permit recognition of a moral debt inherited from the past of the 
kind I have argued is owed to Australia’s indigenous peoples.  For Rawls’ equality is 
conferred by the present social contract.  It thus presumes that all citizens, including 
Australia’s indigenous peoples, enjoy under its terms the same rights and liberties.  Nor 
78  
do his principles enjoin any particular policies in regard to outsiders.  The beneficiaries 
of the contract are the citizens of the relevant society, and presumably, for Rawls, they 
have the right to determine to whom that citizenship is extended beyond those born in 
the relevant society10.  A less contingent basis for solidarity is needed than a voluntary 
contract based on the values of liberty and equality if what I have suggested is justice for 
these two groups of people is to be achieved in societies like Australia’s. 
 
A less contingent basis would of course be an absolute conception of the good, which, as 
George Grant points out, Rawls denies we can have knowledge of (Grant 1985, 1st edn. 
1974, p. 38).  Since an absolute conception of the good of which we could have 
knowledge would be the definitive answer to my quest, it is essential to my appraisal of 
Rawls’ theory as an answer to that quest that I examine his case for this denial.  I turn 
now to that task. 
 
Rawls on the inevitability and intractability of pluralism 
Rawls’ theory of justice was constructed as a response to the pluralism of conceptions of 
the good found in modern free societies.  In his earlier book, Rawls wrote: 'Human good 
is heterogeneous because the aims of the self are heterogeneous' (Rawls 1972, p.554).  
He thus implied that such pluralism was inevitable in principle because the good was the 
creation of the will of the individual.  In his later book, however, he spoke of such 
pluralism rather as a ‘practical’ inevitability (Rawls, J. 1996, p. 63) in free societies.  It 
is open to question whether the later - in practice - version of this claim implied a 
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renunciation of the former - in principle - version.  The answer to this question is 
important for our appraisal of Rawls’ ‘inevitability’ claim for several reasons.  First, if 
the claim is that pluralism is only a practical inevitability, it is no longer vulnerable to 
the objections levelled at the ‘in principle’ version by major critics such as Sandel (1998 
2nd edn), MacIntyre (1981; 1988) and Shapiro (1986, p. 223), but it is open to challenge 
by evidence of the tractability of disputes between competing conceptions of the good, 
and to the possibility of alternative responses to the one proposed by Rawls.  Second, if 
Rawls’ claim is that pluralism is inevitable ‘in principle’, it remains vulnerable to both 
sets of criticisms, and to the additional criticism that such a claim, being dependent upon 
a metaphysical assertion about the nature of the good, reduces his ‘political liberalism’ 
to the very ‘metaphysical liberalism’ he was trying to avoid.  Although it is true that in 
his later work (Political Liberalism) Rawls speaks of such pluralism being inevitable ‘in 
practice’, there is evidence even in this work that he retains his belief in the in principle 
inevitability of ‘reasonable pluralism’ in a free society.  Since Rawls’ explicit view in 
his later work is that such pluralism is inevitable ‘in practice’, it is only fair that I begin 
my critique of his ‘reasonable pluralism’ with a consideration of that view. 
(i) Pluralism inevitable ‘in practice’ 
The traditional method, alluded to in the above quotation from Grant, of justifying a 
theory of justice is to base it on some theory of the good11.  Rawls defends his 
abandonment of this method by arguing that in a free society the method leads to 
inevitable failure.  In a number of passages of his works Rawls argues that in a free 
society a plurality of irreconcilable comprehensive systems of doctrines, some with their 
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own conceptions of the good, is inevitable.  In the first chapter of his Political 
Liberalism (1993, 1996 2nd edn), for example, he points to the '...diversity of opposing 
and irreconcilable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines' (emphasis added) of 
democratic societies, and comments: 
Some of these are perfectly reasonable, and this diversity among reasonable doctrines political 
liberalism sees as the inevitable long-run result of the powers of human reason at work within the 
background of enduring free institutions (Rawls 1996, p. 4). 
So inevitable is this outcome of the operation of human reason against the background 
of free institutions that only coercion, according to Rawls, can prevent it: 
... a continuing shared understanding on one comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral 
doctrine can be maintained only by the oppressive use of state power (Rawls 1996, p. 37). 
 
And he hastens to forestall any temptation to imagine that pluralism might only be a 
temporary phenomenon.  Speaking of the present '... pluralism of comprehensive 
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines...' in modern democratic societies, he 
asserts: 
No one of these doctrines is affirmed by citizens generally.  Nor should one expect that in the 
foreseeable future one of them, or some other reasonable doctrine, will ever be affirmed by all, or 
nearly all, citizens (Rawls 1996, p. xvi). 
He also repudiates any notion that ‘pluralism’ is a regrettable condition inflicted upon us 
by contingent historical events.  Rather pluralism is a condition which, because it flows 
inevitably from the exercise of 'free human reason', is not to be appraised negatively: 
Thus, although historical doctrines are not, of course, the work of free reason alone, the fact of 
reasonable pluralism is not an unfortunate condition of human life.  In framing the political 
conception so that it can, at the second stage, gain the support of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines, we are not so much adjusting that conception to brute forces of the world but to the 
inevitable outcome of free human reason (Rawls 1996, p. 37, note omitted). 
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We note here that the kind of doctrinal pluralism that Rawls claims is inevitable is not 
the pluralism that might result from some combination of political forces but 'reasonable 
pluralism', a notion he is at pains to clarify. 
 
Rawls insists that the notion of 'reasonable pluralism' is not to be equated with the 
epistemological thesis of skepticism: that we cannot know whether any comprehensive 
doctrine, and thus any theory of the good, can be true.  He is anxious to correct any such 
misinterpretation of his notion:  'Observe that here being reasonable is not an 
epistemological idea (though it has epistemological elements)' (Rawls 1996, p. 62).  
Rawls is asserting rather '... the practical impossibility of reaching reasonable and 
workable political agreement in judgment of the truth of comprehensive doctrines ...' 
(Rawls 1996, p. 63, emphasis added).  Recognising that epistemological skepticism 
would, by doubting the whole content of all conceptions of the good, undermine also 
those parts of those conceptions which underpin 'the overlapping consensus' of their 
holders in favour of his 'political' theory of justice, Rawls writes: 
Political liberalism does not question that many political and moral judgments of certain 
specified kinds are correct and it views many of them as reasonable.  Nor does it question the 
possible truth of affirmations of faith.  Above all, it does not argue that we should be hesitant and 
uncertain, much less skeptical, about our own beliefs (Rawls 1996, p. 63). 
'Being reasonable', for Rawls, refers rather to his notion of  'reasonable persons' and to 
the 'reasonableness' of their sources of disagreement. 
 
Rawls recognises that disagreements can arise from unreasonable causes such as narrow-
mindedness, lack of intelligence and even irrationality.  But these are not the causes of 
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pluralism with which he is concerned: 'We want to know how reasonable disagreement 
is possible ...' (emphasis added, Rawls 1996, p. 55).  The first element in his account of 
`reasonable disagreement' is that it is '... disagreement between reasonable persons: that 
is, between persons who have realised their two moral powers to a degree sufficient to 
be free and equal citizens in a constitutional regime, and who have an enduring desire to 
honor fair terms of cooperation and to be fully cooperating members of society' (Rawls 
1996, p. 55).  The two `moral powers' to which Rawls is referring here are defined thus: 
... a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the good.  A sense of justice 
is the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from the sense of justice which characterises the 
fair terms of social cooperation.  Given the nature of the political conception as specifying a 
public basis of justification, a sense of justice also expresses a willingness, if not the desire, to act 
in relation to others on terms that they also can publicly endorse.  The capacity for a rational 
conception of the good is the capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of 
one's rational advantage or good (Rawls 1996, p. 19). 
There are two points here that, because they suggest Rawls has not renounced his ‘in 
principle’ view of the matter, I will have to consider when I come to assess Rawls’ 
assertion of the ‘practical impossibility’ of achieving agreement upon the (metaphysical) 
good.  First, the good, on his view, has no existence independent of, and is indeed 
formed by, the human mind and will.  Second, human rationality for him consists in the 
'capacity to pursue one's rational advantage...'.  The capacity of individuals to form their 
own conceptions of the good and to pursue them is the first element of Rawls’ account 
of why reasonable disagreements about the nature of the good are inevitable in a free 
society. 
 
The other element of his account '... of disagreement between reasonable persons...' 
(Rawls 1996, p. 55) concerns the sources of such disagreements, sources which Rawls 
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refers to as 'the burdens of judgment'.  These burdens include not only apparently purely 
epistemological factors such as complex and conflicting evidence, assignment of 
different weights to elements of evidence, and the indeterminacy of some of our 
concepts, but also social and psychological factors such as the influence of diversity of 
individual and cultural experience, and values upon our judgments (Rawls 1996, p.56-7).  
The number and complexity of these 'burdens of judgment' indicate the sophistication of 
his understanding of the epistemological issues raised by his thesis of 'reasonable 
pluralism'.  It is perhaps his concern to avoid epistemic skepticism which leads him to 
stop short of developing his account of those 'burdens' into a coherent epistemology.  
The lack of such an epistemology, however, means that this second element of the 
sources of ‘reasonable disagreement’, because it leaves open a relativist interpretation, 
renders ambiguous Rawls’ position on whether reasonable pluralism is inevitable in 
principle as well as in practice.  However, that he is in fact committed to an in principle 
view of reasonable pluralism is, I shall argue in the next section, evident from the view 
of the good we noted in the previous paragraph. 
 
(ii) ‘Reasonable pluralism’ inevitable in principle? 
As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, Rawls’ held in his earlier work that 
‘Human good is heterogeneous because the aims of the self are heterogeneous’.  His 
characterisation of the good in his later work as the creation of individual choice seems 
entirely consistent with his earlier view.  We may therefore wonder how agreement upon 
the good can be only a ‘practical impossibility’ if the good is by nature the creation of 
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individual choice (and for that reason probably also heterogeneous).  It is the nature of 
the good, not some practical difficulty in understanding that nature, which, on Rawls’ 
understanding of the good as expressed in both his works, renders universal agreement 
on any particular conception of the good impossible in a free society12.  And 
disagreements springing from the nature of the reality in dispute are in principle 
disagreements.  This characterisation of the nature of the good as the product of the 
individual will is the ground of my doubt that Rawls has genuinely qualified his original 
‘metaphysical liberalism’ to a ‘political liberalism’13.  Rawls’ thesis on the ‘fact of 
reasonable pluralism’ is born of his interpretation of modern European history.  The kind 
of society that is possible today is determined by the legacy of that history.  Since my 
doubt about the appropriateness of Rawls’ theory of justice as the answer to my quest is 
largely related to my disagreement with his interpretation of that legacy, I need to devote 
some space to its appraisal here. 
 
The clash between Catholicism and Protestantism in the Reformation demonstrates for 
Rawls the impossibility of avoiding 'reasonable pluralism'.  In his Political Liberalism 
(Rawls, J. 1996, p. 63), he refers to reaching agreement on clashes between 
comprehensive systems of doctrines as a 'practical impossibility'.  However, his account 
of the Reformation clash in general and his characterisation of the differences as 
‘irreconcilable’ strongly imply that avoidance of ‘reasonable pluralism’ in such cases is 
impossible in principle. 
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Rawls describes the Catholic and Protestant religions of the Reformation as 'salvation 
religions' because for both of them their doctrine of the good was 'the good of salvation' 
(Rawls 1996, p. xl).  But because for these religions this doctrine, in Rawls’ 
understanding, depended on authorities that were not only different but also 'conflicting', 
the clash between them was irreconcilable: 
But resting on the conflicting authorities of Church or Bible, there was no resolution between 
them, as their competing transcendent elements do not admit of compromise.  Their mortal 
combat can be moderated only by circumstance and exhaustion, or by equal liberty of conscience 
and freedom of thought (Rawls 1996, pp. xl-xli). 
 
Rawls’ phrase 'competing transcendent elements' is important because these elements 
are the basis of his claim that the Protestant and Catholic conceptions of the good are 
intractable.  The phrase is, however, a little obscure.  My interpretation of the passage 
and the phrase is as follows.  Rawls’ phrase ‘the conflicting authorities of Church or 
Bible’ is his shorthand for the Reformation dispute over whether divine authority to 
interpret the Bible, which was accepted by both Catholics and Protestants as the word of 
God, was reserved to the Church (hierarchy), or possessed by all the baptised 
(traditionally summarised as the sola scriptura or ‘Bible alone’ position).  The 
‘competing transcendent elements’ of these authorities would thus seem to mean 
Church, on the one hand, or Bible (alone), on the other, insofar as each purports to 
express the authority of God.  Adjudication between the two is impossible, Rawls seems 
to be arguing, because the authority of God which alone could perform that adjudication 
is accessible from no other source than those in dispute i.e. adjudication of the dispute is 
in principle impossible.  And if adjudication of the issue is impossible in principle, the 
only remaining means of settling the dispute are combat to the death or to exhaustion, or 
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respect for each's freedom to follow his or her own conscience in the matter.  These are 
the choices, Rawls submits, facing modern free societies. 
 
If modern liberal democracies are to live together in cooperative peace and concord, 
Rawls seems to argue, it is clear that attempts at restoration of agreement on religious 
and other conceptions of the good must give way to respect for differences on such 
conceptions within the framework of a 'political' conception of the good: 
A fundamental difficulty is that since under reasonable pluralism the religious good of salvation 
cannot be the common good of all citizens, the political conception must employ, instead of that 
good, political conceptions such as liberty and equality together with a guarantee of sufficient all-
purpose means (primary goods ...) for citizens to make intelligent and effective use of their 
freedoms (Rawls 1996, p.xli). 
For Rawls the foregoing example demonstrates the futility of attempts at founding 
theories of justice on comprehensive conceptions of the common good, and the 
consequent need to seek agreement on a conception of justice rather than the good as a 
foundation for political order in a modern liberal democracy.  Indeed, the inability of 
Reformation Catholics and Protestants to agree on a conception of the common good, 
and their consequent (in Rawls’ view) quest for agreement on a theory of justice as the 
basis for political unity is seen by Rawls as illustrative of the contrast between the 
ancient and modern preoccupations in political philosophy: 'For the ancients the central 
problem was the doctrine of the good and for the moderns the central problem was the 
conception of justice' (Rawls 1996, p. xl).  Rawls takes himself to have shown, firstly, 
that in a free society a 'reasonable pluralism' of irreconcilable doctrines is inevitable (a) 
in practice, and (b) in principle; and, secondly, that it follows from this so called ‘fact of 
reasonable pluralism’ of conceptions of the good that an effective foundation for public 
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order in such a society, and a fortiori for the social solidarity to underpin such order, can 
be found only in an appropriate conception of justice, not in any conception of the good.  
In the next section, I want to raise some doubts about both the so called ‘fact of 
reasonable pluralism’ and these inferences from it.  
Criticism of Rawls’ claim that ‘reasonable pluralism’ is inevitable in a 
free society 
(a) In practice 
Rawls, I think, is correct in his claim that there are wide differences between the various 
comprehensive conceptions of the good to be found in modern free societies.  I believe 
he is also correct in claiming these conceptions are unlikely to be reconciled in the 
foreseeable future to the extent necessary to provide a foundation for justice in free 
societies.  It does not, however, follow from these admissions that Rawls’ thesis of the 
‘fact of reasonable pluralism’ is therefore correct.  Indeed, I believe that he exaggerates 
the extent and the intractability of the pluralism that does exist.  This exaggeration is 
evident, I think, in his account of the differences between the Catholic and Protestant 
doctrinal systems which are his chief examples of irreconcilable systems.  Since there is 
little discussion in the critical literature of this aspect of Rawls’ account of the so called 
‘fact of reasonable pluralism’, my own criticism of this aspect should contribute to 
filling this important gap. 
 
While it must be admitted that there remain wide gaps between these systems, there is 
some evidence that they are not as irreconcilable as he claims.  Indeed, there is clear 
evidence in several features of contemporary relations between Catholic and Protestant 
88  
churches that reconciliation has in fact been achieved on some of the major doctrines on 
which they have been divided since the Reformation.  To a lesser extent there is also 
evidence in certain features of the relationship between the Christian and non-Christian 
religions and even with nonbelievers, which seems to erode rather than support Rawls’ 
claims about their irreconcilability.   
 
1. There is, as a matter of fact, a well established movement called the 'ecumenical 
movement' towards reunion between the very churches which he claims are 
irreconcilably divided.  This movement, which supposes agreement on ‘… the 
doctrine which is in accordance with true religion…’ (1 Tim. 6:3), existed for fifty 
years among the Protestant churches before the Catholic church made a decisive 
commitment to it in the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II) in 196414.  Vatican II 
launched a commitment of the Catholic church at the local, national and international 
levels to the restoration of unity between the Catholic and Protestant churches.  The 
fruit of those efforts has been acknowledged and Catholic commitment to their 
pursuit renewed in a recent Encyclical Letter from Pope John Paul II: 
I thank the Lord that he has led us to make progress along the path of unity and communion 
between Christians, a path difficult but so full of joy.  Interconfessional dialogues at the 
theological level have produced positive and tangible results: this encourages us to move forward 
(John Paul II 1995, No. 2). 
 
More recently, the World Council of Churches expressed similar enthusiasm to Pope 
John Paul II's for ecumenical progress in an important policy statement: 
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4.11 The Roman Catholic Church has been, since the Second Vatican Council, an active 
participant in the ecumenical movement and a valued partner in numerous ways with the WCC 
(especially through the Joint Working Group and participation in the Commission on Faith and 
Order)… It is inconceivable that either the WCC or the Roman Catholic Church could pursue its 
ecumenical calling without the collaboration of the other; and it is to be hoped that both will find 
ways to deepen and expand this relationship, particularly since the Roman Catholic Church has in 
recent years become part of a growing number of local, national and regional ecumenical bodies 
of which WCC member churches are also part (WCC, Central Committee 1997). 
 
There can therefore be little doubt of the belief in the possibility of, and commitment 
to, achieving Christian reunion on the part of the Catholic and mainstream Protestant 
churches, reunion which is always based on satisfactory resolution of doctrinal 
disagreements.  More importantly, there has been actual reunion between some 
Protestant churches.  Those churches formerly known in Australia as the 
Presbyterian, Methodist and Congregationalist churches came together in 1970 in 
what is now known as the Uniting Church.  Reunion between members of these 
traditions known by other names also took place in some other countries like 
Canada, for example.  More recently, the Lutheran and Reformed churches of the 
United States have reached an advanced stage in the progress towards unity, their 
Coordinating Committee recently agreeing upon a ‘Formula of Agreement’ on 
doctrinal matters15.  All this of course does not show that doctrinal differences are on 
an inevitable path to reconciliation or that consequent reunion is an imminent 
certainty.  It can be reasonably argued, however, that both the commitment of the 
Christian churches to reunion and the actual achievement of reunion between some 
of them are strong evidence that at least the kind of pluralism that divided them into 
separate churches in the first place is not as inevitable as Rawls claims. 
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2. The ecumenical movement is founded upon a rapprochement between the 
Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox and Anglican churches on some of the very doctrines 
which, according to Rawls, divided them irreconcilably16.  The driving force which 
launched and continues to propel this movement is the recognition on the part of all 
these churches of the authority of the Bible's teaching that Christ's church must be 
one17.  One of the fundamental doctrinal disagreements between Catholics and 
Protestants in the Reformation was whether ‘Scripture alone’ sufficed to reveal God 
to the faithful.  The foundation of the contemporary movement towards reunion 
between the Catholic and Protestant churches in particular on the words of Scripture 
is a deliberate acknowledgment of their unity in their belief in the authority of the 
Bible.  This unity is neglected by Rawls when, as we saw above (p. 85) he 
characterises this doctrine as an intractable cause of their original division.  Again, 
Rawls might argue that, while there has been movement on this doctrine, the dispute 
is still far from resolved and anyway even if it could be resolved there is no practical 
possibility of a ‘salvation good’ being accepted again by the diverse free societies of 
today.  Rawls would of course be right in this claim but the criticism nonetheless 
casts some doubt upon his central claim about the inevitability of doctrinal pluralism. 
 
Indeed, the ecumenical movement has now progressed to a stage where one 
Protestant commentator believes it is possible to speak of the emergence of an 
'ecumenical tradition', participation in which has become '... less and less of an 
option, more and more an inescapable "given"' (Bilheimer 1989, p. 217).  Hans 
91  
Kung, perhaps the most noted Catholic 'ecumenical theologian', summarises his 
formula for reconciling divisions between Protestant, Orthodox and Catholic 
Churches over the roles in Christian faith of Bible, Tradition and Church as follows:  
'The unconditionally reliable reality, to which men and women can hold fast for all 
time and eternity, is not the Bible texts, and not the Fathers of the Church, nor the 
Church's magisterium, but God himself, as he spoke for believers through Jesus 
Christ' (Kung, Hans 1988, p. 62).  In other words, mainstream Catholics, Protestant 
and Orthodox theologians are now reaching a consensus, according to Kung, that 
they have erred in the past in attributing too much authority to the institutional 
organs of witness and too little recognition to the fact that they are but witnesses to 
the reality of God himself.  If Kung is right, there is a convergence between the 
Catholic and some Protestant, and Orthodox churches on the second of the two 
conflicts which Rawls characterised as 'irreconcilable': the authority of the church 
and tradition18. 
 
Rawls might well reply that the Christian church since the Reformation has 
fragmented into several hundred different sects, and this convergence - to the extent 
that it exists - is taking place only between a few of the mainstream members.  He 
would of course be correct in such a reply but even this much convergence between 
the mainstream Christian churches provides ground for some doubt about his 
account of ‘reasonable pluralism’: at least some of the most irreconcilable doctrines, 
in Rawls’ estimation, seem to offer the prospect of reconciliation. 
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3. The most important counter evidence to Rawls’ claim that Catholic and 
Protestant doctrinal systems are irreconcilable occurred in 1999 with the release of a 
document titled Joint Declaration On The Doctrine Of Justification by the Lutheran 
World Federation and the Catholic Church (Federation and Church 1999).  As the 
authors of this document remark in its first paragraph, this doctrine was the most 
important cause of division between these two churches in the Reformation: 
From the Reformation perspective, justification was the crux of all the disputes. Doctrinal 
condemnations were put forward both in the Lutheran Confessions[3] and by the Roman Catholic 
Church's Council of Trent. These condemnations are still valid today and thus have a church-
dividing effect. 
The measure of reconciliation that has been achieved between the contending 
churches on the most divisive doctrine of the Reformation, one of the doctrinal 
differences which Rawls claimed were irreconcilable, has been assessed by these 
two churches as follows: 
5. The present Joint Declaration has this intention: namely, to show that on the basis of 
their dialogue the subscribing Lutheran churches and the Roman Catholic Church[9] are now 
able to articulate a common understanding of our justification by God's grace through faith in 
Christ. It does not cover all that either church teaches about justification; it does encompass a 
consensus on basic truths of the doctrine of justification and shows that the remaining differences 
in its explication are no longer the occasion for doctrinal condemnations. 
This Declaration, in other words, effectively, and authoritatively, since it comes not 
just from theologians but from the heads of the relevant churches, reconciles those 
churches on the primary doctrinal difference bequeathed to them by the 
Reformation.   
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Rawls might respond to this evidence by pointing out that in order to serve as a basis 
for justice any conception of the good must be agreed to by the members of the 
relevant society in their own time.  This reconciliation has come centuries too late for 
any common conception of the good to emerge from it as the basis for justice in the 
past and probably also in the present.  My point, however, is not that any such 
conception of the good can be drawn from these reconciled doctrines as a basis for 
use in today’s free societies.  I wish simply to show that again Rawls exaggerates the 
intractability of disputes about the doctrines underpinning what he terms 
‘metaphysical’ conceptions of the good. 
 
Rawls chose as his example of irreconcilable doctrines, and thus also as his key example 
of ‘reasonable pluralism’, those doctrines that divided the Catholic and Protestant 
churches in the Reformation.  On the evidence presented here, I submit, it is reasonable 
to conclude that these doctrinal divisions are not as intractable in practice as Rawls 
claims.  However, I find it difficult to see how in his account of ‘reasonable pluralism’ 
Rawls is not also committed to the much more controversial claim that such divisions 
are irreconcilable in principle.  Let me now turn to that claim. 
 
(b) In principle 
Rawls’ account of ‘reasonable pluralism’ asserts the authority of free human reason on 
doctrinal questions.  His account thus neglects the belief of both Catholics and 
Protestants in the existence of an authoritative divine revelation, a neglect that has gone 
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unnoticed in the critical literature.  In describing ‘the diversity of opposing and 
irreconcilable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines’ of democratic societies as 
‘…the inevitable long-run result of the powers of human reason at work within the 
background of enduring free institutions’ (Rawls, J. 1996, p. 4), he implies that doctrinal 
questions are matters of free enquiry like scientific questions.  But, again as critics have 
failed to remark, neither Catholics nor members of the Reformed tradition accept that 
view of doctrinal questions.  Doctrinal questions, as distinct from theological opinions, 
are by definition part of the body of beliefs which one binds oneself to accept by being a 
Catholic or a member of a Reformed church.  Mainstream Lutherans, Orthodox and 
Anglicans share this belief (Guthrie 1994, p. 20).  Referring to the sources of these 
doctrines, Shirley C. Guthrie, a Reformed theologian writes: ‘How can we tell the 
difference between what is Christian and what is only personal opinion?’, and answers 
that the Reformed tradition’s authoritative source is the Creeds of the Christian church 
(Guthrie 1994, p. 20).  Referring to the ‘task of elaborating the Christian vision and 
identity…’, a modern Catholic manual of systematic theology states:  ‘The interpretation 
of the Christian community’s past involves an interpretation of the authority of its 
tradition’ (Schussler Fiorenza 1991, p.71).  Like Guthrie, Schussler Fiorenza sees the 
interpretation of Christian doctrine not as a matter of personal opinion but of obedience 
to the authority of the Christian tradition.  The elements of that tradition are indicated in 
Schussler Fiorenza’s next sentence: ‘Within the context of the authority of the tradition, 
the role of Scripture and its relation to tradition are important issues that have become 
controverted since the Reformation’ (Schussler Fiorenza 1991, p.71).  In short, what 
both Rawls and his critics have neglected is that doctrinal differences between the 
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mainstream Catholic and Protestant churches are recognised by both as imposing an 
obligation of resolution rather than as evidence of the inevitability ‘in principle’ of a 
‘reasonable pluralism’ of Christian doctrines19.   
 
Possible replies to these criticisms 
‘Doctrines’ versus ‘free human reason’: Resolution of post-Reformation doctrinal 
differences between mainstream Christian Churches 
Rawls might object here that his very reason for regarding a ‘reasonable pluralism’ of 
Christian doctrines as ‘in principle’ inevitable in a free society is because their so called 
intrinsic binding power will be ineffective in the absence of coercion.  Individuals 
exercising their reason under conditions of freedom will inevitably, given the nature of 
reason itself, come to a diversity of conclusions about questions of Christian belief 
including questions about the good.  Declaring some particular answers to some of these 
questions ‘doctrines’ and therefore ‘binding’ is no more than a feeble attempt to relocate 
the coercive power of the institution of pre-Reformation times in the so called 
‘doctrines’ themselves.   
 
This objection goes to the heart of the difference between Rawls’ understanding of the 
good and Christian doctrines.  The intrinsic binding power of Christian doctrines stems 
from their claim to be in some sense divinely revealed.  Though their content cannot be 
opposed to reason correctly applied, reason in Christian belief is not the ultimate arbiter 
of their truth.  Indeed, in Christian belief the power to assent to their truth is ultimately a 
gift of God; not that God’s authority can compel belief even in the untrue, rather that the 
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truth revealed as such by God compels belief.  For Rawls, however, reason is the 
ultimate arbiter of all questions including these very beliefs.  It is this assumption that 
individual reason is the ultimate authority on all doctrines which is epistemologically 
‘primitive’ to Rawls’ claim that a pluralism of such doctrines, including their associated 
conceptions of the good, is ‘in principle’ inevitable.  In the previous section I presented 
evidence that his ‘paradigm case’ of such doctrinal pluralism, the clash between 
Catholicism and Protestantism in the Reformation, though far from resolved, offered 
some prospect of resolution.  Rawls might, on a detailed analysis of the various doctrinal 
questions, be able to argue that the convergences are more apparent than real.  Or he 
might even concede that his ‘paradigm case’ of ‘reasonable pluralism’ is severely 
weakened but argue the inevitability of such pluralism can be shown by more 
contemporary evidence: the pluralism of positions in both systematic20 and moral 
theology21 today, some of them quite heterodox by traditional standards.  Since my 
purpose is not to achieve a decisive refutation of his claims on these doctrinal matters, I 
do not need to consider any possible Rawlsian analysis of these doctrines here.  Indeed, 
lest it be thought that my purpose is to deny that Rawls has made a contribution to my 
quest for a conception of social justice appropriate to free societies, it is important to 
make that purpose clear now. 
 
In a pluralist society it will of course be necessary for holders of diverse substantive 
conceptions of the good to seek support from within those conceptions for some political 
conception of the good if they are to achieve the minimum solidarity necessary to 
function as a society.  Rawls’ notions of an ‘overlapping consensus’ and a ‘political 
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conception of the good’ are thus helpful in the search for this minimum basis for a 
society.  Rawls’ theory is however unhelpful in two fundamental respects.  First, he 
wants to exclude from “citizens’ reasoning in the public forum about constitutional 
essentials and basic questions of justice …” (Rawls, J. 1996, p. 10) the content of 
metaphysical conceptions of the good.  Second, the account of pluralism Rawls 
advances as the ground for excluding metaphysical conceptions of the good from the 
‘public forum’ is arguably itself a metaphysical one.  Since Rawls’ theory of justice is 
such an important one in contemporary debate on this issue, it is important for my quest 
to substantiate these two grounds for ultimately rejecting his theory as its answer.  This 
will be my task in the next chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
My purpose in this chapter has been to appraise Rawls’ theory of justice as an answer to 
my quest for a conception of social justice capable of generating the social solidarity 
necessary to sustain it in practice.  I found that Rawls’ conception of justice, his so 
called ‘political liberalism’, gave an appropriate weight to the value of equality, a weight 
denied in Hayek’s version of liberalism.  Rawls’ principles of justice, I concluded, 
imposed the kind of mutual obligations upon citizens that I believe would be necessary 
in a just society, obligations exceeding those imposed by current liberal democratic 
societies.  I acknowledged also the need in pluralist societies for holders of diverse 
conceptions of the good to look into those conceptions for grounds for assenting to a 
political conception of the good.  I raised doubts, however, about the capacity of Rawls’ 
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political liberalism to generate the social solidarity I have argued is necessary to sustain 
such a conception in practice in a pluralist society.  Despite his attempts to purge his 
version of the social contract of the ‘metaphysical anthropology’ detected in his original 
account, I have argued that Rawls’ account of the nature of the good in both his earlier 
and later works is metaphysical (in the sense defined by him on p. 74 above), and not 
just political.  In his Theory of Justice (1972), the metaphysical character of his account 
was explicit in his dictum: 'Human good is heterogeneous because the aims of the self 
are heterogeneous' (Rawls 1972, p.554).  In his Political Liberalism (1996), that 
character was implicit in his account of the so called ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’.  My 
criticisms of this aspect of Rawls’ theory were that he wanted to exclude from the public 
forum arguments from metaphysical conceptions of the good, and that he wanted to do 
so on the basis of a metaphysical account of the phenomenon of pluralism.  In the next 
chapter, I must sustain these criticisms and point to ways in which metaphysical 
conceptions of the good may be admissible to public forums in modern pluralist 
societies.  
 
 
 
Notes to chapter two
1  Rawls cites as the alternative conceptions of justice over which his ought to be preferred ‘the classical 
utilitarian and intuitionist conceptions … which have long dominated our philosophical tradition’ (Rawls, 
John 1972, p. 3).   
2  It is important to note here Rawls’ definition of ‘society’ as ‘... for our present purposes ... a modern 
constitutional democracy.  (I use ‘constitutional democracy’ and ‘democratic regime’, and other phrases 
interchangeably unless otherwise stated.)’ (Rawls, J. 1996, p. 11).  
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3  This criticism is made by Michael Sandel (Sandel, Michael 1998 2nd edn) and Alasdair MacIntyre 
(MacIntyre 1988) and their force is lucidly assessed by Mulhall and Swift (Mulhall and Swift 1992, p. 
171ff).  In the next chapter it will be argued that Rawls fails in this attempt to avoid metaphysical 
commitments. 
4  In fact, he even speaks of a government responsibility to ‘guarantee a social minimum either by family 
allowances or special payments for sickness and unemployment, or by such devices as a graded income 
supplement …’ (Rawls, John 1972, p. 275). 
5  Rawls acknowledges that the state may procure these services from private providers or itself act as 
provider (Rawls, John 1972, pp. 274-84).  
6  Rawls discusses the ‘difference principle’ at greater length in his earlier work (Rawls, John 1972, pp. 
75-83). 
7  On this see (Saunders 1996), (Bradbury 1999), (Duclos and Gregoire 1999), (Sen, Amartya 1973; Sen, 
Amartya Kumar 1975; Sen, Amartya 1981). 
8  The details of the nature and extent of poverty in Australia have been recently exposed in a 
comprehensive Report of an Australian Senate Committee (Senate 2004). 
9  On these inequalities see also (Parham, Barnes et al. 2000; Healey 2001). 
10  Intuitions about the nature of justice that Rawls himself invokes in relation to the principles of justice 
for a free society suggest that the relevant society’s immigration laws must also conform to those 
intuitions.  The intuitions he invokes are ‘that religious intolerance and racial discrimination are unjust’ 
(Rawls, John 1972, p. 19). 
11  Antony Flew quotes a classic text from Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, (Book V, 1131B 28-33) to 
remind us of this fact: ‘Justice in distributing common property … when a distribution is made from the 
common stock … will follow the same ratio as that between the amounts which the several persons have 
contributed to the common stock’ (Flew 1989, p. 89).  For a shorter but useful criticism of Rawls’ position 
on income distribution, see (Sheppard 1994). 
12  Here I am asserting that Rawls’ dictum the ‘the good is heterogeneous because the aims of the self are 
heterogeneous’ is an ontological proposition just as, according to George Grant, Kant’s ‘proposition that 
the good will is the only good without restriction is an ontological proposition’ (Grant 1985, 1st edn. 
1974, p. 31). 
13  George Grant seems to me to be interpreting Rawls’ position here in similar fashion to mine when, in 
his discussion of the influence of Kant on Rawls’ theory of justice, he remarks: 
The human species depends for its progress not on God or nature but on its own freedom, and the direction 
of that progress is determined by the fact that we can rationally give ourselves our own moral laws (Grant 
1985, 1st edn. 1974, p. 24). 
14  In their Decree on Ecumenism the bishops of that Council acknowledged that the 'discord' between the 
Christian churches '...openly contradicts the will of Christ, [and] provides a stumbling block to the 
world...' (Abbott 1966, No. 1, p. 341).  In convoking Vatican II, Pope John XXIII also established as part 
of the Vatican Curia a Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity.   
15  The following note gives some indication of the areas of consensus reached between these churches: 
Note on doctrinal consensus 
 
                        The Lutheran-Reformed Coordinating Committee, on February 3, 1997, called attention to 
the fact that A Formula of Agreement sets forth a fundamental doctrinal consensus that is based on and 
presumes the theological agreements of earlier Lutheran-Reformed dialogues, including the 1983 
statement: 
 
                        Our unity in Christ compels us to claim our strong affinities in doctrine and practice. Both 
Lutheran and Reformed traditions: 
                               a. Affirm themselves a living part of the church catholic. 
                               b. Confess the Nicene and Apostles' Creeds. 
                               c. Affirm the doctrine of justification by faith as fundamental. 
                               d. Affirm the unique and final authority of Holy Scriptures in the Church. 
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                               e. Affirm the real presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper. 
                               f. Affirm the priesthood of all believers and have interpreted this as our servanthood to 
God and our service to the world. 
                               g. Affirm the vocation of all the baptized, which is service (ministry) in every aspect of 
their lives in their care of God's world. 
                               h. Affirm that they are in faithful succession in the apostolic Tradition and that faithful 
succession in this Tradition is all that is necessary for mutual recognition as part of the church catholic. 
                               i. Share a common definition of a church in the apostolic Tradition: a community 
where the Word is rightly preached and the sacraments rightly administered. 
                               j. Identify a ministry of Word and Sacrament as instituted by God. 
                               k. Ordain once to a ministry of Word and Sacrament, and the functions of such persons 
are identical. 
                               l. Understand that ordination is to the ministry of the church catholic. Such ordinations 
in both traditions have usually been by presbyters. 
                               m. Have granted the appropriateness under some circumstances of one ordained person 
exercising episkope, oversight (under a variety of titles including that of bishop), but both traditions have 
ordinarily exercised the function of episkope collegially through such structures as presbyteries and 
synods. 
                               n. Affirm that the Church always must be open to further growth and reformation.  
Both traditions have been willing to be self-critical. Both traditions have become increasingly open to a 
historical-critical understanding of the history of the Church and of their respective traditions within the 
apostolic Tradition (An Invitation to Action, pages 2-3). 
 
                        Lutheran-Reformed Coordinating Committee (information available from Chief Executive 
at thomasj@ucc.org ) 
16  An up to date list of documents stating these agreements can be found on the Internet at 
‘http://www.bu.edu/sth/BTI/ecudocs/contents.htm’. 
17  The Decree on Ecumenism (no. 1) refers to 1 Corinthians 1: 13 where Paul condemns factionalism in 
the Corinthian church by exclaiming: 'Christ has been split up into groups!'.  Dr. Cavert, a Protestant and 
former convenor of the United States National Council of Churches, and one who played a leading role in 
the formation of this body and the World Council of Churches, wrote in his commentary on this Decree: 
    The commendation of 'cooperation among all Christians' and the suggestion that it be 'increasingly 
developed' in relation to the problems of modern society (Decree no. 12) is warmly welcomed.  Already 
there are concrete evidences that this is being translated into action, and we may rightly expect that, as we 
serve together in tasks to which Christ calls us both, we shall come to a greater awareness of our oneness 
in Him and so be prepared to deal with the differences that separate us in the realm of doctrine (Abbott 
1966, p. 368-9). 
 Both Dr Cavert and Pope John Paul II are echoing the words of John's Gospel (17; esp. 20ff): 'I do not 
pray only for them [the apostles], but also for those who believe in me because of their message.  I pray 
that they may all be one.  O Father!  May they be one in us, just as you are in me and I am in you'.   
18  Kung has been one the Catholic church’s most prominent theological leaders in the field of ecumenism.  
Among his most important works on this subject are (Kung, Hans 1966; 1967; Kuhn 1970; Kung, Hans 
1986; 1988).  See also his works on the church and authority: (Kung, Hans 1967; 1971).  Underlying all 
his theological works is Kung’s understanding of what it means to be a Christian expressed in a 
monumental work: (Kung, Hans, 1928- 1977). 
19  Even liberal Christians will recognise some constraints from the Christian tradition upon what they can 
assert as Christian belief.  Fundamentalist Christians will insist on the constraining authority not just of 
doctrines but of every word of the Scriptures in the case of evangelicals, and of pronouncements of the 
Magisterium as well in the case of Catholics. 
20  In systematic theology there has been in modern times a proliferation of heterodox interpretations of 
Christianity within the Christian churches, a phenomenon lending at least prima facie support to Rawls’ 
claim that the positions of the Catholic and Protestant churches on the nature of the 'good of salvation' are 
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irreconcilable.  The rise of so called 'atheistic Christianity', and the 'secularised Gospel' in the 'death of 
God' crisis reflect the influence of free institutions on human reason even when that reason purports to be 
interpreting a common tradition, part of the content of which is an injunction to doctrinal unity.  Indeed, 
the differences between the atheistic and theistic interpretations of Christianity might be regarded as a 
'paradigm case' of incommensurability because it is an example of two bodies of belief each purporting to 
interpret the same tradition but having conflicting views on the tradition's most basic assumption - the 
existence of the God to which the literal word of the tradition testifies.  If the doctrines of Christianity 
have, as mainstream Catholics and Protestants claim, intrinsic binding power derived from divine 
revelation, how can these heterodox versions of the ‘good of salvation’ flourish?  Must it not be because 
free human reason, not any doctrine, is the ultimate arbiter of such questions? 
Such heterodoxy demonstrates that the intrinsic binding power of Christian doctrines does not coerce the 
minds and hearts even of those who claim to be believers.  But this has always been acknowledged by the 
Christian churches; it takes faith to assent to these doctrines, and faith - the Scriptures tell us - is the gift of 
God.  It is the gift of the Holy Spirit, for example, which, according to Paul’s letter to the Galatians (4: 2), 
enables Christians to call God ‘Abba! Father!’.  (For fuller accounts of Christian belief about the nature of 
faith and revelation, see the essay by Catholic theologian, Avery Dulles SJ (Dulles 1991, ch. 2), and 
(Guthrie 1994, ch. 3)).  As a gift, faith cannot impose itself on anybody but will always be embraced by 
some and rejected by others, and held with varying degrees of intensity.  It is thus no surprise to Christians 
to see the significant impact of 'secularism' and atheism on systematic theology.  This impact should not, 
however, be exaggerated.  The mainstream Christian churches have not been overwhelmed by the 
influence of these phenomena.  The embrace of secular interpretations of Christianity has been confined to 
minorities of Christians, and indeed mainstream theology has been stimulated to develop effective 
critiques of such interpretations.  These influences are amongst the phenomena that pose challenges to the 
existing theological paradigm.  Such challenges precipitate theological crises but they need not signal 
theological disintegration.  Hans Kung discerns several such paradigm shifts in the course of Christian 
history (Kung 1988, p. 128), one of which is in progress now.  Of this latest shift, Kung writes: 
I am well aware that only the practical-theological implementation can decide about the 
effectiveness, convincingness, and truth content of this sort of new paradigm.  But amid all the 
problems and difficulties faced by theology, the Church, and society, I would like to hope that - 
despite all the differences - a path has been opened here to a basic consensus in theology: not a 
uniform theological school, not an all-comprehensive theory, not an exclusive method, but a 
theological paradigm that allows different methods, theories, schools, and theologies (Kung 
1988, p. 169). 
Current theological trends, on this assessment, give grounds for cautious optimism that the effects of the 
challenges of secularism and atheism on mainstream Christian theology will be to produce a legitimate 
pluralism of interpretations of doctrines rather than the kind of intractable doctrinal division Rawls 
alleges.   
Indeed, theological pluralism does not, as Rawls might be taken to imply, date from the Reformation.  
Such pluralism is evident even in the New Testament, and even more so in the Middle Ages.  Speaking of 
the ideas which underpinned an International Ecumenical Symposium at the University of Tübingen in 
1983 titled 'A New Paradigm of Theology', Hans Kung wrote:   
It was assumed in advance that, today as in the past, every paradigm of theology and the Church 
(understood as a unit) contains a plurality of divergent schools, divergent intellectual 
orientations, indeed divergent theologies.  This was, as always, an expression of creativity and 
vitality, but also of conflicts and disputes (Kung 1988, p. 124). 
During the Middle Ages in particular such pluralism was a source of tension within the church, but a 
tension which might be described as creative rather than divisive.  The most spectacular example of 
creativity arising from such tension was the synthesis by Thomas Aquinas of a number of conflicting 
traditions within a single, new tradition (see MacIntyre 1988, chs. x, xi).  This example also shows that 
conflicts between theological traditions are not, as Rawls seems to imply, a product of the conditions of 
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freedom brought about by the Reformation and the Enlightenment.  While Aquinas's synthesis drew 
criticism from within the church, it nonetheless prevailed eventually by force of his arguments, not 'by the 
oppressive use of state power'.   
It follows from this that holders of such comprehensive doctrines as Catholicism and Protestantism can 
admit a degree of theological pluralism in and between their systems without thereby conceding the ‘in 
principle’ irreconcilability of the two doctrines and thus cause for schism; that reconciliation between 
these two churches does not suppose the elimination of theological pluralism; and that the possibility of 
agreement upon a common conception of the good consequent upon such a reconciliation cannot be ruled 
out.  Note that I am not predicting the restoration of such an agreed conception.  My concern is rather to 
show  that Rawls’ case for dismissing a common conception of the good as a possible foundation for a 
political order is eroded to the extent that it relies on this example of alleged irreconcilability in 
systematic doctrines.  The heterodoxy referred to above, however, applied not only to systematic theology 
but also to moral theology.  We need therefore to consider below the support Rawls might draw - though 
he does not do so explicitly - for his ‘reasonable pluralism’ thesis from the phenomenon of ‘ethical 
pluralism’. 
 
21  On the evidence considered so far, it has to be said that the practical inevitability of a pluralism of 
irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines in a free society has not been demonstrated.  Stronger evidence for 
Rawls’ claim is, however, available in a phenomenon which Rawls does not explicitly consider, namely, 
in the distinction that some Christian churches now make between the ethical good and the 'the good of 
salvation'.  In a lucid recent study of these and related questions Max Charlesworth explicitly rejects the 
position long held by the Roman Catholic church that '... ethical truths established by human enquiry are 
also 'truths of salvation' subject to the teaching authority of the church' (Charlesworth, Max 1997, p. 132).  
He acknowledges that there is a division within the Christian churches '... between those who believe that 
there is a distinctive and autonomous Christian ethics, and, on the other hand, those who think that, while 
a Christian religious commitment provides a special moral perspective and motivation, there is, in fact, no 
Christian ethics providing the basis for specific ethical norms and a specific methodology' (Charlesworth 
1997, p. 105).  However, he argues very strongly in favour of the latter of these two positions on two 
grounds.  First, the Christian revelation attested in the Christian scriptures is addressed to a particular 
community, the community of believers in their particular settings of time and place. Second, a 
contradiction is involved in attributing to people obligations of which they cannot be aware (in the sense 
that, not being members of the Christian community, they cannot share in the divine revelation to that 
community of the supposed universal ethical obligations).  Charlesworth expresses his thesis thus: 
The basic ethical principles must be accessible to all human beings who are rationally competent 
(the term 'rational' is used in the widest and most neutral sense) since a contradiction would be 
involved in human beings being obliged to follow certain ethical imperatives and, on the other 
hand, being unable to know - at least in principle - what those imperatives were (Charlesworth 
1997, p. 105). 
On this view the Christian revelation excludes certain ethical positions such as those based on materialist 
conceptions of the world, but it is compatible with a number of different ethical systems:  'In other words', 
Charlesworth writes, 'the position of Christianity with regard to the ethical and social orders is of necessity 
a pluralistic one' (Charlesworth, Max 1997, p. 135). 
Rawls might argue that Charlesworth's position supports his own in at east four ways, though these ways 
may not necessarily be consistent with one another.  First, by acknowledging the divisions between the 
Christian churches on the status of ethical teaching within the Christian revelation, Charlesworth might be 
taken to be supporting Rawls’ claim that certain conceptions of 'the good of salvation' are conflicting and 
irreconcilable despite the recently achieved doctrinal agreements referred to in this chapter.  Second, 
Rawls might contend that by demonstrating the absence of a universalist ethical system from the Christian 
revelation, Charlesworth has eliminated one of the major potential sources of objection to Rawls’ pluralist 
thesis.  If, in other words, the Catholic church can no longer sustain its long held claim to be the divinely 
appointed interpreter of the 'natural moral law', what credible claimants to such authority are left in 
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western societies?  Third, Charlesworth’s acknowledgment of the compatibility of several ethical systems 
with the Christian revelation seems to be an acknowledgment also of the inevitability under conditions of 
free human enquiry of pluralism of the very kind asserted by Rawls.  Fourth, if such pluralism is 
inevitable, it must be because the nature of the good is, as Rawls affirms in his earlier work, 
'heterogeneous', and that heterogeneity must in turn be attributable to its origin in the human will rather 
than in some metaphysical order of reality transcending the human will. 
In reply to the first of these arguments, it must be conceded this distinction between the good of salvation 
and the ethical good betokens a dispute between and within Christian churches about the nature of the 
good.  The fact that there is considerable support for each view suggests that reconciliation on the issue 
would be difficult, but the force of this difficulty should not be exaggerated.  Within the Catholic church  
this dispute has led in recent years to a crackdown by Vatican authorities on certain theologians for 
placing in doubt the church's authority to interpret the 'natural moral law' (The Congregation for the 
Doctrine of Faith, formerly known as the Holy Office and before that the Inquisition, is the body charged 
with the responsibility of safeguarding doctrine in the Catholic church.  This body withdrew the ‘canonical 
mission’, roughly understandable as a scholar’s official licence to teach as a Catholic theologian in 
ecclesiastical institutions, from American moral theologian, Charles E Curran, during the 1980s).  The 
Vatican authorities and these theologians are, however, generally at one in insisting that 'the common 
good' demands the elimination of the gross inequality of the distribution of wealth and power in the world.  
Although they cause tensions, particularly in relation to sexual morality, these differences between 
theological schools on the relationship between the ethical good and 'the good of salvation' are generally 
regarded as cause for dialogue, not schism, within and between the churches. Indeed, disputes of this kind 
are integral to the processes of knowledge growth in theology, particularly if such processes are conceived 
on the model of MacIntyre's conflicting 'traditions' (MacIntyre, 1988, ch. x), or of R.S. Laura’s model of 
‘epistemic primitives’ which will be expounded below (p. 214).  Moreover, since the division between the 
two schools of opinion identified by Charlesworth on the relationship between salvation and the ethical 
good crosses Catholic and Protestant boundaries, this division is not, as this possible Rawlsian reply 
would require, so much evidence of the irreconcilability of the Catholic and Protestant interpretations of 
'the good of salvation' as of the development of doctrinal understanding (growth of knowledge) within 
both churches.  A conspicuous example of such development is the Joint Declaration On The Doctrine Of 
Justification by the Lutheran World Federation and the Catholic Church (Federation and Church 1999) 
which is the fruit of a growth in understanding both of each other’s positions and of divine revelation on 
this doctrine. 
In responding to the second argument, it is important to understand correctly the interpretation of Catholic 
doctrine to which Charlesworth is referring.  Proponents of this interpretation are not renouncing belief in 
any conception of a 'natural law', nor are they suggesting that Catholic teaching should now be understood 
as providing no guidance on the nature of the good for humankind.  Noted Catholic moral theologian, 
Josef Fuchs SJ, sees faith and reason as supporting each other on these issues: 
Basically, we can say:  Christian faith acknowledges and recognizes man [sic], his nature, his 
being a person, his reason, as the creation of God.  It understands that humanity, freed from its 
sinful alienation from God through Jesus Christ, is accepted by the God of Love.  God belongs to 
the specificity of man, whose ultimate dignity thus stems from God.  God does not give positive 
rights and duties to man; rather man is the image of God and participates therefore in God's 
providence.  Humanity therefore must try to discover by itself an order of rights and morality for 
man and society in this world.  The binding force of the order of rights and morality, found in this 
way, is absolute because it is founded in the reality of man himself, created by God and redeemed 
in Jesus Christ.  The content of such an order of rights and morality will be determined by what is 
found to be good for man himself  (Fuchs 1984, p. 118, notes omitted). 
Rather than being entrusted with a divinely revealed, and in this sense ahistorical, code of laws, Christians, 
on Fuchs's view, along with the rest of ‘humanity’, must engage in genuine dialogue with one another to 
determine the good for human individuals and society in their concrete, historical situations. The good 
determined in genuine human dialogue is a divinely revealed good, on this view, because human beings 
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are constituted as beings endowed with divine power.  The divine guidance as to the nature of the good is 
to be found within the dialogue of Spirit-filled human beings, not in a law to be sought somewhere outside 
human history.  This last point is important for my reply to the third counter argument. 
Although this interpretation of Christian theology allows the possibility of a plurality of conceptions of the 
good being compatible with Christian belief, the plurality allowed is far from unlimited.  It is difficult to 
see, for example, how the fourth counter argument about the origin of the good in the will of the 
individual would be compatible with Christian belief.  For Christians, the good can never be an arbitrarily 
determined individual purpose or set of purposes because such a conception would conflict with the 
Christian understanding of the divine call of all to ultimate union with God, and thus of human solidarity 
in the quest to understand and fulfil human nature in history.  On the Judeo-Christian understanding of the 
nature of 'salvation', humans are saved by virtue of their membership of the community of the saved (to 
which all are called), not by virtue of some individual relationship with God.  The image of life in the 'new 
and eternal kingdom' to which Christians believe themselves called is communal: the image of fellowship 
in the Eucharistic meal.  The love celebrated in sign in this meal is supposed, in Christian belief, to be 
manifested in practice in the service of one's fellows.  Belief in the communal nature of human beings is, 
in other words, fundamental in the Christian tradition.  Because of their dependence upon human reason in 
their quest, Christians may legitimately differ amongst themselves and with non-Christians over how 
human community is to be achieved, and what form it is to take.  In reducing the good to 'the aims of the 
self', however, Rawls is rejecting the idea of a common destiny, and thus of the view of humanity as a 
community, the view which characterises the Christian understanding of that destiny (Will Kymlicka 
argues in chapter 4 of his book Liberalism, Community and Culture that the ‘self’ is free in conceptions 
such as Rawls’ to choose to form and foster community, but this seems to miss the point of the biblical 
notion of community.  On this notion, the individual remains called to God’s community even if s/he 
chooses to reject that call.  One’s calling, on the biblical notion, is communal even if one chooses not to 
follow it).  Though a range of conceptions of the good may be compatible, on Charlesworth’s view, with 
Christianity, conceptions such as Rawls’ which reduce the good to the aims of the self will not be 
compatible with it (By this reduction, Rawls, according to Ian Shapiro, is reflecting the conception of the 
self that underpins the liberal notion of rights, a conception which Shapiro regards as ideological because 
its main function in modern liberal polities is to support the functions of ‘capitalist market practices’ 
(Shapiro 1986, p. 303).  Shapiro characterises this conception of the self thus:  The view of the subject of 
rights embraced by the seventeenth-century theorists is usefully termed Cartesian.  It assumes that the 
individual will is the cause of all actions, individual and collective;  it ascribes decisive epistemic and 
hence moral authority to the individual over his actions, on the grounds that he has privileged access to the 
contents of his own mind.  For this reason individual consent becomes vital to the whole idea of political 
activity (Shapiro 1986, p. 275)). 
The ethical pluralism admitted by Charlesworth and other Christian writers is thus not a concession of the 
position hypothetically attributed to Rawls in objection four above. 
There is one final defence that Rawls might mount of his thesis of the inevitability of ‘reasonable 
pluralism’, the first premise of his ‘political liberalism’.  Rawls might argue that even if reunion between 
Catholic and Protestant churches were possible, a similar consensus on comprehensive doctrines and their 
various conceptions of the good between Christian and non-Christian religions and holders of no religion 
at all in liberal democracies would remain a practical impossibility given the much wider gaps between 
those doctrines. 
This defence assumes that only a comprehensive conception could serve as the common good 
underpinning public order in a free society.  Before challenging this assumption, I will comment on the 
present state of relationships between these groups and their prospects for future development.  Both 
Catholic and Protestant churches are committed to dialogue with non-Christian religions and with non-
believers.  The bishops in Vatican II affirmed certain values held in common with non-Christian religions 
in The Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions (Abbott 1966, p. 660ff.).  
In its Declaration on Religious Freedom the Council stated its belief that the '...truth cannot impose itself 
except by virtue of its own truth...' (Abbott 1966, no. 1, p. 677), and in its pivotal document The 
Constitution on the Church the Council asserted its relationship with nonbelievers: 'Those also can attain 
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to everlasting salvation who through no fault of their own do not know the gospel of Christ or His Church, 
yet sincerely seek God and, moved by grace, strive through their deeds to do His will as it is known to 
them through the dictates of conscience' (Abbott 1966, no. 16, p.35 notes omitted).  The World Council of 
Churches has also affirmed its commitment to the world beyond the boundaries of its member churches.  
In its recent policy statement it affirmed:   
2.4 More recent descriptions of the goal of the ecumenical movement have sought to take 
seriously the conviction that the object of God's reconciling purpose is not only the church but 
the whole of humanity - indeed, the whole of creation (WCC 1997). 
Similar dialogue has been under way in recent decades with various non-Christian religions to that 
between the various Christian religions.  Although the doctrinal difficulties facing such dialogues are 
greater than those between the Christian churches, their very existence is testimony to the belief of 
participants in the possibility of greater unity between them.  Although the existence of such moves 
towards greater unity between these religions is no guarantee of their success, their existence does count 
against Rawls’ claim that the differences between these religions are irreconcilable.  Unless he can show 
that these differences are in principle irreconcilable, Rawls cannot demonstrate that attempts at dialogue 
between at least some competing conceptions of the good are futile.  Since partial agreement on a 
conception of the good is likely to provide a sufficient foundation for order in a free society, it is not 
necessary for this purpose that dialogue between holders of such conceptions lead to full agreement.   
Rawls’ requirement that such conceptions of the good be abandoned in favour of his abstract principles of 
justice as foundations for order in a free society is neither necessary nor wise.  His demand that dialogue 
between holders of contending conceptions of the good be excluded and that those conceptions provide 
only the background foundation for commitment to his abstract principles (a) excludes as an explicit basis 
for order beliefs already embraced in favour of abstract beliefs not yet explicitly embraced by anybody, 
and (b) excludes from public consideration in the determination of society’s laws moral beliefs which 
might be relevant in deciding what the law ought to be. 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 Rawls’ ‘political’ conception of the good 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I acknowledged the contribution that Rawls had made to 
social justice theory, but gave two major reasons why his thesis could not satisfy my 
quest for such a theory.  The first of these reasons concerned Rawls’ prescription that 
commitments to what he termed ‘metaphysical’ conceptions of the good should be 
bracketed in the public forum.  I held that bracketing such commitments was not the 
appropriate way to address the problem of pluralism.  The second reason was my 
belief that Rawls’ prescription was itself based on a ‘smuggled in’ metaphysical 
conception of the good.  In this chapter I must make good these two claims.  I begin 
with the second, arguing that Rawls’ so called ‘political liberalism’ is in fact a 
metaphysical liberalism.  I then argue that, while no single conception of the good 
can be imposed on all citizens of a free society, Rawls’ attempt to avoid such 
imposition by requiring citizens to set aside their metaphysical conceptions in public 
debate results only in the imposition of his own metaphysical conception upon them.  
Groups holding alternative metaphysical conceptions of the good will understandably 
feel unjustly treated by and alienated from such a society.  Since the kind of social 
solidarity I am looking for appears to be best fostered by allowing citizens some 
freedom to appeal to their particular conceptions of the good in the public forum, I 
reach the conclusion that this quest might have more hope of reward from following 
the traditional approach to justice, the approach which attempts to define it in 
relation to some metaphysical conception of the good.   
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1. Does Rawls’ ‘political liberalism’ avoid metaphysical 
commitments? 
Rawls frames his notion of ‘political liberalism’ as a basis for public order.  He 
believes his ‘political liberalism’ provides a superior basis for such order to any 
metaphysical conception of the good precisely because his ‘political liberalism’, he 
claims, avoids any metaphysical commitments.  He believes differences between 
rivals on metaphysical questions about the content of the good, whether the good 
consists in doing the will of God or the bringing about of the communist state, for 
example, are irreconcilable.  His solution to the problem of public order is thus to 
seek acknowledgment from contending parties that agreement on such questions is 
too difficult in a pluralist society, and that a more widely acceptable basis for 
common order is therefore one that makes no reference to these metaphysical 
conceptions of the good.  This acknowledgment of 'the fact of reasonable pluralism' 
(Rawls, J. 1996, p. 153) does not, according to Rawls, require ‘…that we [citizens] 
should be hesitant and uncertain, much less skeptical, about our own beliefs’ (Rawls, 
J. 1996, p. 63).  Rather, by this acknowledgment, one is simply admitting that one's 
own (say, religious) beliefs cannot '...be publicly and fully established by reason...' 
(Rawls, J. 1996, p. 153).  Rawls assumes that the appropriate course of action, if 
citizens of a free society make this admission, is to exclude their metaphysical 
conceptions of the good from public policy debate, and to limit the terms of such 
debate to his ‘political conception’.  I have already acknowledged in the previous 
chapter the need for some political conception of the good in pluralist societies.  My 
problem with Rawls’ position here is that I do not believe his ‘political liberalism’ 
succeeds in avoiding all metaphysical commitments, or that an appropriate political 
conception of the good need exclude all appeal to metaphysical conceptions in public 
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debate.  The presence of any metaphysical commitments in any conception of the 
good that purported to be political would, of course, reduce that conception to just 
one more metaphysical conception competing with other such conceptions for 
acceptance as the basis of public order.  I believe this is the case with Rawls’ 
‘political liberalism’.  In what follows, I will try to show that Rawls’ account of 
‘reasonable pluralism’ glosses over a metaphysical assumption underpinning his 
‘political’ conception of the good which reduces the latter conception to the status of 
one more among the competing metaphysical conceptions1. 
 
We saw in the previous chapter that, on Rawls’ theory, ‘reasonable pluralism’ was 
expressed in 'reasonable disagreements', and such disagreements were possible for 
two reasons.  'Reasonable disagreements' were possible, Rawls argued, because they 
were disagreements between 'reasonable persons', that is to say, between persons 
who have '... a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the 
good'.  ‘The capacity for a rational conception of the good’, Rawls explained, ‘is the 
capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of one's rational 
advantage or good’ (Rawls, J. 1996, p. 19).  The good, in other words, is assumed to 
be something of which individuals form their own conceptions, not something to 
which they must conform their own conceptions.  Moreover, if the individual is, as 
Rawls implies, the arbiter of the good, it is hard to see how in a free society the good 
could be anything but heterogeneous.  And if Rawls does indeed still adhere to the 
view that the good is heterogeneous, there would seem to be little, if any, difference 
between his present ‘political liberalism’ and the position he asserted explicitly in 
1972: 'Human good is heterogeneous because the aims of the self are heterogeneous' 
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(Theory of Justice 1972, p. 553).  Heterogeneous or not, I submit that his present 
understanding of the good commits Rawls to at least two metaphysical propositions. 
 
The first of these propositions is that the good is of its nature something determined 
by the individual.  This proposition is not intended, on Rawls’ theory, to be merely 
an empirical description of how the good is determined.  Rather it is a claim that this 
is necessarily how the good is determined owing to its very nature.  And insofar as it 
is a claim about the nature of the good, it is a metaphysical claim.   
 
The second metaphysical proposition implied, in my opinion, in Rawls’ 
understanding of the good as something determined by the individual is that there 
can exist no good which of its nature could be binding on all2.  If I am correct in 
these judgments, Rawls is therefore misleading his readers when he claims to be 
seeking no more from holders of comprehensive doctrinal systems than the 
admission that their beliefs cannot ‘be publicly and fully established by reason ...’ 
(1996, p. 153), the admission he claimed was the only one necessary for such persons 
to assent to his ‘political liberalism’.  His understanding of the nature of the good as 
something determined by individuals would commit assenting citizens to the further 
admission that that no such binding good could exist.   
 
Note that the difficulty here for Rawls is not that his proposition about the nature of 
the good is necessarily wrong, but that it is necessarily metaphysical and that, as 
such, it undermines his claim to have achieved a purely ‘political’ conception of the 
good.  And because his conception of the good is in reality metaphysical, it will not 
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be acceptable to some significant groups in free societies, at least some of whom 
Rawls must have hoped to accommodate.  Since my quest is for an understanding of 
social justice that will generate the social solidarity necessary to sustain it, it is 
important for me to consider the difficulties some of these groups would have in 
accepting Rawls’ conception of the good.  Before doing so, however, it is important 
to ensure that I have not omitted any important aspect of Rawls’ account of the 
relation between citizens’ metaphysical conceptions of the good and his political 
conception.  He might argue that there is at least one way in which I have not done 
justice to his account of that relation.  
 
Rawls has never denied that his ‘political’ conception of justice is informed by 
conceptions of the good.  His argument has been only that, since no particular 
conception of the good can be the good of all in a free pluralist society, the limits on 
the allowable conceptions of the good in such a society have to be determined by an 
agreed conception of justice.  The particular conception of justice proposed by Rawls 
consists of two principles: 
a. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and 
liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the 
equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value. 
b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be 
attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, 
and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society  
(Rawls 1996, p. 5-6). 
The features of this ‘political’ conception of justice are: 
…first that it is a moral conception worked out for a specific subject, namely, the basic 
structure of a constitutional democratic regime; second, that accepting the political 
conception does not presuppose accepting any particular comprehensive religious, 
philosophical, or moral doctrine;  rather, the political conception presents itself as a 
reasonable conception for the basic structure alone;  and third, that it is not formulated in 
terms of any comprehensive doctrine but in terms of certain fundamental ideas viewed as 
latent in the public political culture of a democratic society (Rawls 1996, p. 174-5)3. 
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Rawls could defend himself against the charge of harbouring metaphysical 
commitments in his ‘political’ conception of justice by arguing that, while it reflects 
some ideas of the good, this conception does so only within the limits defined as 
legitimate within this conception.  That is, the ideas of the good reflected in the 
‘political’ conception of justice concern only the ‘basic structure of society’; they are 
neither formulated in terms of, nor do they presuppose, any ‘comprehensive doctrine’ 
but rather reflect ‘…certain fundamental ideas viewed as latent in the public political 
culture of a democratic society’.  Thus, Rawls might argue that the above objection 
that his ‘political liberalism’ is metaphysical misses the mark because, as the 
quotations above show, it misunderstands what he means by ‘political’. 
 
But this reply does not show that his ‘political liberalism’ has been misconstrued in 
my account of it.  Rawls proposes this ‘political liberalism’ because he denies the 
possibility of agreement on a common substantive conception of the good.  Even if 
he were to concede greater reconcilability than he previously admitted between 
clashing doctrinal systems and their conceptions of the good, he remains committed 
to the view of the good as by nature something determined by the will of the 
individual, and thus in a free society as heterogeneous.  It is this view of the good 
that prompts my second reservation about Rawls’ conception of social justice, 
namely, that this conception deals with pluralism by requiring adherents of 
competing doctrinal systems to bracket their commitment to such systems in debate 
about public policy. 
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2. Bracketing doctrinal beliefs an inadequate response to 
pluralism: ‘political liberalism’ too restrictive in its conception of 
liberty 
 
Many comprehensive doctrinal systems entail belief in a substantive common good 
to which individuals must conform rather than to which they may conform if they 
choose.  Members of such groups could not consistently adhere to their own 
conceptions of the good and embrace a conception according to which the good was 
determined by the individual will.  Several such groups, which Rawls must have 
hoped to accommodate, come immediately to mind. 
 
First, there are in liberal democracies many religious and ideological groups that 
would not accept that the good is determined by the individual will and therefore 
heterogeneous.  On Rawls’ own admission, comprehensive doctrinal systems 
upholding a single, overriding conception of the good on which '... institutions are 
justifiable to the extent that they effectively promote that good' (Rawls 1996, p. 134), 
are incompatible with his 'political' conception of justice.  Holders of such systems 
would thus be one group that would not accept Rawls’ metaphysical conception of 
the good.  A second group in this category would be ‘traditional’ Catholics.  Despite 
the development in Catholic theology of a school defending ethical pluralism in the 
sense explained above (ch. 2, note 21), there are large numbers of Catholics - 
possibly the majority - who subscribe rather to the traditional Thomist view of a 
single overriding conception of the good.  Fundamentalist Christians (and probably 
Jews and Muslims as well), because they hold their own single overriding 
conceptions of the good, would be a third group in this category.  Rawls 
acknowledges from the outset the inability of his conception of the good to 
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accommodate these groups in his kind of society.  He seems to imagine, however, 
that more liberal-minded Catholics and Protestants, and perhaps Jews and Muslims 
as well, will have little difficulty in accepting his claim that the nature of the good is 
heterogeneous, and that the source of the good is in the aims of the individual.  I have 
indicated above (p. 112ff) how difficult I believe it would be for even the most 
liberal Christians to accept these two propositions.  In short, Rawls’ proposition 
concerning the nature of the good would exclude from his 'overlapping consensus' 
even those 'liberal' adherents of these doctrinal systems whom he must have hoped to 
accommodate.  Rawls’ theory of justice would to this extent undermine rather than 
foster the social solidarity that I am seeking in such a theory. 
 
Indeed, the enforcement of Rawls’ conception of the good through the rules of 
justice in a free society could thus severely restrict the freedom to pursue their 
conceptions of the good of all such groups.  Rawls’ ‘political’ conception of the good 
would thus function in a free society, as MacIntyre points out, as a rival metaphysical 
conception of the good which limits rather than enhances citizens’ freedom to pursue 
competing conceptions: 
Any conception of the human good according to which, for example, it is the duty of 
government to educate the members of the community morally, so that they come to live out 
that conception of the good, may up to a point be held as a private theory by individuals or 
groups, but any serious attempt to embody it in public life will be proscribed.  And this 
qualification of course entails not only that liberal individualism does indeed have its own 
broad conception of the good, which it is engaged in imposing politically, legally, socially, 
and culturally wherever it has the power to do so, but also that in so doing its toleration of 
rival conceptions of the good in the public arena is severely limited (MacIntyre 1988, p. 336). 
Rawls acknowledges that his ‘political liberalism’ imposes some limits upon the 
metaphysical conceptions of the good that can be accommodated in a free society.  
He argues, however, that while education in ‘political liberalism’ may in fact amount 
‘in the case of some’ (Rawls, J. 1996, pp. 199-200) to an education in the substantive 
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liberal values of individualism and autonomy associated with the names of Kant and 
Mill, this ought to be countered to the extent possible by showing how much more 
limited the political conception of justice is to the comprehensive conception.  The 
critical fact to which Rawls returns in defence of his limitations on rival conceptions 
of the good is ‘the fact of reasonable pluralism’ (Rawls, J. 1996, p. 201).  I have 
already criticised this so called fact in section 1 above, but there is one important 
defence that I have not yet considered.  That defence consists in Rawls’ account of 
the relation between the self and its ends, and the consequences he draws from that 
account for the relation between justice and the good.   
The ‘self’ not prior to its ends 
In his A Theory of Justice, Rawls had argued that ‘...the self is prior to the ends 
which are affirmed by it’ (Rawls 1972, p. 560).  By this he meant that the good is not 
something given to us from some source independent of our own wills.  Rather the 
good is something chosen by the self, and the self is in this sense prior to its ends.  
Rawls argued that it is not our ends or aims that reveal our nature but the rules of 
justice which we favour to ensure our freedom to choose our aims:  ‘It is not our 
aims that primarily reveal our nature but rather the principles that we would 
acknowledge to govern the background conditions under which these aims are to be 
formed and the manner in which they are to be pursued’ (Rawls 1972, p. 560).  He 
strenuously maintains this priority of the right, expressed for him in his conception of 
justice, over the good in his Political Liberalism (Rawls 1996, Lecture V), and thus 
retains in this later work the view that the nature of the good is determined by the 
‘aims of the self’ rather than the view that the nature of the self is determined by its 
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ends.  Rawls’ claim that the good is determined by ‘the aims of the self’ implies, as 
Michael Sandel explains, a radical separation of the self from its ends: 
The priority of the self over its ends means that I am not merely the passive receptacle of the 
accumulated aims, attributes, and purposes  thrown up by experience, not simply a product of 
the vagaries of circumstance, but always, irreducibly, an active, willing agent, distinguishable 
from my surroundings, and capable of choice (Sandel 1982, p. 19). 
Sandel argues that the self stripped of its ends, as Rawls conceives it, is reduced to an 
empty consciousness:  ‘For the self totally detached from its empirically-given 
features would seem no more than a kind of abstract consciousness (consciousness of 
what?) ...’ (Sandel 1982, p. 21).  It is difficult to see how a self so separated from any 
ends could make a choice of anything, for choosing would seem to imply preferring 
one alternative to others on account of some end already held.  More importantly, 
Rawls’ conception of the self as separated by clear boundaries from its ends denies 
the consciousness attested by so many communitarians that their ends are at least in 
part constitutive of their identity, and as such form the most fundamental source of 
their moral obligations (see Sandel 1982, p. 179).  On this view, the good (the ends 
of the self) is in a certain way given by the practices and traditions of the community 
in which one lives, and not something determined by the choice of the self guided by 
a supposedly prior conception of justice.  Justice, on this communitarian view, is not 
prior to the good as Rawls argues, but is dependent for its definition upon the 
conception of the good; the good is in some measure common because it is 
determined by the ends of the community-embedded self4.  Justice will thus consist 
in a distribution of the relevant community’s advantages according to the demands of 
the common good, for example, on a merit or needs principle. 
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Kymlicka (1989, ch. 4) defends Rawls against this objection by arguing that Sandel 
misinterprets Rawls’ conception of the self as prior to its ends.  This priority, 
Kymlicka argues, does not imply that by introspection we can somehow get past our 
ends to some abstract, empty consciousness:  ‘What is central to the liberal view is 
not that we can perceive a self prior to its ends, but that we understand our selves to 
be prior to our ends, in the sense that no end or goal is exempt from possible re-
examination’ (Kymlicka 1989, p. 52).  Although I may not be able to perceive myself 
without some ends, ‘...I can always,’ according to Kymlicka, ‘envisage myself 
without its present ends’ (Kymlicka 1989, p. 52).  Here Kymlicka tries to turn the 
argument back upon Sandel.  From the admission that there ‘... must always be some 
ends given with the self when we engage in [ethical] reasoning, ... it does not follow 
that any particular ends must always be given with the self’ (Kymlicka 1989, p. 53).  
‘No matter how deeply implicated we find ourselves in a social practice or tradition’, 
Kymlicka writes (Kymlicka 1989, p. 54), ‘we feel capable of questioning whether the 
practice is a valuable one ...’.  Such questioning, he continues, ‘... isn’t meaningful 
on Sandel’s account (how can it not be valuable for me since the good for me just is 
coming to a greater self-awareness of these attachments and practices I find myself 
in?)’ (emphasis Kymlicka’s).  Kymlicka’s argument is that Sandel’s claim that our 
ends are always ‘given’ to us in our traditions and practices implies that we will 
always be committed to some particular end(s), that is to say, to some unrevisable 
ends. 
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But, as Kymlicka recognises, Sandel holds that the self engages in a process of 
discrimination amongst the ends which constitute its identity, and thus appears to 
deny commitment to any unrevisable ends: 
[Sandel] says the boundaries of the self, although constituted by its ends, are none the less 
flexible and can be redrawn, incorporating new ends and excluding others.  In his words, ‘the 
subject is empowered to participate in the constitution of its identity’; on his account ‘the 
bounds of the self are open ... and the identity of the subject [is] the product rather than the 
premise of its agency’ (Sandel 1982, p. 152) (in Kymlicka, W. 1989b, p. 55). 
The difference Sandel sees between his position and the ‘individualist’ one, a version 
of which Kymlicka is defending, is as follows.  On Sandel’s view, the boundaries of 
the self are not fixed in advance of the acquisition of its ends but rather constituted 
by their acquisition.  Thus, for him, the task of the agent in discriminating between 
the ends competing for his allegiance in his particular situation is the cognitive one of 
recognising which of these ends best fits the self understanding given to him by the 
traditions and practices of his community: 
The relevant agency here was not voluntarist but cognitive; the self came by its ends not by 
choice but by reflection, as knowing (or inquiring) subject to object of (self-) understanding. 
... The challenge to the agent was to sort out the limits or the boundaries of the self, to 
distinguish the subject from its situation, and so to forge its identity (Sandel, M. 1982, p152). 
On the individualist view expressed by Kymlicka, however, the boundaries of the 
identity of the self are fixed in advance of the choice of ends, and the task of the 
agent is the voluntarist one of linking the already constituted self to ends as objects 
of choice by the exercise of the will.  In Sandel’s words, 
This sort of agency depended on the faculty of will, for it is the will that allows the self to 
reach beyond itself, to transcend the bounds that are fixed in advance, to grasp the ends it 
would possess and hold them as it always must, external to itself (Sandel, M. 1982, p. 152). 
But Kymlicka protests that if the ends of the self are revisable on either the 
communitarian or the individualist view of the matter, the differences between their 
respective accounts of the relationship between the self and its ends, contrary to 
Sandel’s claim, are not sufficient to make either incompatible with the liberal 
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tradition.  Kymlicka argues quite strenuously that Sandel’s insistence on the 
differences between liberals and communitarians on the relationships between the 
self and its ends ‘... hides a more fundamental identity: both accept the person is 
prior to her ends’ (Kymlicka, W. 1989b, p. 55).  By this, I take Kymlicka to mean 
that, while the ends may be constitutive of the self, what persists through every re-
constitution of the self through revision of its ends is the person.  The issue of the 
‘self’, according to Kymlicka, can thus be dismissed as a problem for the philosophy 
of mind.  Victory can thus be claimed over Sandel and the communitarians on the 
ground that agreement on the priority of the person over her ends is sufficient to 
defend Rawls and liberal philosophy against their objection that the self, being in part 
constituted by its ends, cannot be prior to them, and that the good (her ends) must 
therefore determine justice rather than be determined by the agent choosing justly: 
For so long as Sandel admits that the person can re-examine her ends - even the ends 
constitutive of her ‘self’ - then he’s failed to justify communitarian politics.  He has failed to 
show why individuals shouldn’t be given the conditions appropriate to that re-examining, as 
an indispensable part of leading the best possible life.  And amongst those conditions should 
be the liberal guarantees of personal independence necessary to make that judgement freely 
(Kymlicka, W. 1989b, pp. 55-6, emphasis in original). 
In order to maintain that justice is prior to the good, Kymlicka needs to defend the 
thesis that one’s ends (goods) are chosen, not discovered (and thus in a certain sense 
given to us).  Sandel’s account of the self as constituted by its ends threatened to 
undermine this thesis of Rawls and Kymlicka.  Kymlicka’s counter on behalf of 
Rawls, and liberals generally, is that if the person survives those reconstitutions of 
her ends, and thus of her self, that occur in her life, we can legitimately conclude that 
the person chooses her ends rather than discovers them, and thus that justice is prior 
to the good.  But this substitution of the ‘person’ for the ‘self’5 as the subject of 
choice (the choice by which the good is determined on the liberal account) makes the 
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somewhat facile assumption that a revision of a person’s constitutive ends is a matter 
of simple choice.  I shall try to show that this assumption is ill-founded. 
 
Imagine that among the constitutive ends of my self is a commitment to Christian 
theism.  A major part of my perception of myself is as someone bound by that 
commitment.  My understanding of myself is illuminated by my increasing 
understanding of the content of the Christian faith and by my practice of that faith.  
That faith teaches me that I am essentially a member of a community called together 
and held together by the power of the Holy Spirit.  Two features of this example are 
relevant to Kymlicka’s attempt to substitute ‘person’ for ‘self’ in his response to 
Sandel.  First, the faith, and my self-perception in so far as it depends upon that faith, 
are given to me by that faith community in the sense that, even if I sought instruction 
in it initially, my faith will teach me now to account for my embrace of it in terms of 
a gift from God mediated by the instructing community.   
 
Second, the role played by the fundamental beliefs of that faith in my self-
understanding is that of what R.S. Laura calls ‘epistemic primitives’ (Laura, R.S. 
1980).  Epistemic primitives have a threefold function in the belief systems which they 
underpin:  a) a presuppositional or foundational function, b) a constitutive function, and 
c) an organisational function.  Epistemic primitives are the presuppositions upon which 
our belief systems rest.  Unlike the other beliefs in such systems, they are not inferences 
made within the discipline, conclusions to chains of reasoning.  Rather they are 
presupposed by all  the inferences, all the chains of reasoning engaged in within our 
disciplines.  To say that epistemic primitives are constitutive of our belief systems is to 
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say that part of what it means to hold such systems is to hold the epistemic primitives 
upon which the systems are based.  The belief that diseases have physical causes,  for 
example, is constitutive of the science of pathology. The third function of epistemic 
primitives in the belief systems they underpin is their organisational function.  They 
organise their belief systems in the sense that they order the evidential relations that are 
to prevail in the system.  Thus the pathologist's belief in causality will be an organising  
principle of that science for him or her.  S/he will therefore reject any attempt to 
account for an illness, for example, in terms of the influence of evil spirits.  Epistemic 
primitives are resistant to test because their function in their belief systems is to act as 
principles in virtue of which tests are conducted.  This is not to say that epistemic 
primitives are immune from doubt but that they cannot be doubted while exercising the 
discipline that they underpin.  It is also to say that their overthrow is not the result of 
testing, but of their eventual displacement by other primitives perceived as better able to 
order one’s experience in the relevant domain.  This process is akin to a conversion, a 
yielding up of one primitive belief in favour of another, the conditions of which can 
only be identified with hindsight.   
 
Thus, the fundamental beliefs of my Christian faith will, on Laura’s theory, serve as 
(a large) part of the overall framework of beliefs in terms of which I monitor all my 
experience.  They are not simply particular beliefs among a number from which I can 
simply choose (and discard) but rather beliefs whose role in constituting my self is 
such that to specify the conditions which would make me renounce them would in 
fact be to renounce them.  So fundamental are they to my self-understanding, in 
other words, that I cannot imagine myself for example as an atheist in anything more 
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than a role-playing way because to go beyond that way would be to render me an 
atheist.  Conversions from such beliefs are, for the self constituted by them, more 
experiences of desertion by its (the self’s) meaning system than of deliberate choice 
of an alternative.  Depending upon the depth of the faith lost, the self can undergo a 
traumatic process in discovering a new belief(s) for ordering the relevant areas of 
experience.  The conversion of the former Christian theist to atheism will not be an 
exercise of will by a sovereign self detached from either alternative; indeed, the 
subject may well be torn between the alternatives.  The process of re-constitution of 
one’s ends is not made more a matter of choice by Kymlicka’s substitution of 
‘person’ for ‘self’ as the subject of choice because the nature of the process is not 
thereby changed.  The change is undergone by the self whose capacity for choice is 
limited by the degree to which the ends at stake either already constitute its self-
understanding or make claims to be able to do so.  That capacity is limited not 
because the self’s freedom to consider alternatives is necessarily limited but because 
of the epistemic role of such beliefs in constituting its identity.  My argument here is 
not that individuals have no right to freedom in relation to such ends but rather that 
acknowledgment and respect of such freedom does not imply, as Kymlicka and 
Rawls hold, that the embrace of such ends is a matter of sovereign choice by a self 
detached from the ends claiming its allegiance6.   
 
If the criticisms in this section are correct, it follows that Kymlicka’s substitution of 
‘person’ for ‘self’ fails to demonstrate the priority claimed by him and Rawls of the 
self over its ends.  And since the priority of justice over the good required that the 
self be prior to its ends (that the ends be chosen rather than discovered by the self), 
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Rawls and Kymlicka fail to demonstrate their liberal thesis that justice is prior to the 
good.  Acceptance of these two priorities is not, therefore, a simple recognition of the 
empirical facts in relation to these things (of the ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’), but 
the embrace of two particular metaphysical theses about them.  Like those considered 
in section 1, this defence of Rawls’ ‘political liberalism’ is unable to remove the 
doubt that this liberalism is tainted by the very kind of metaphysical commitments it 
was meant to avoid, and that the restrictions it imposes on the conceptions of the 
good admissible to free societies must discourage rather than foster the kind of social 
solidarity I am looking for.  The power of Rawls’ ‘political’ conception of the 
common good to foster the unity, and to that extent to justify the bracketing of 
metaphysical conceptions, necessary to sustain a free society, given its importance to 
my quest, warrants more detailed assessment.  Charles Taylor is one writer who has 
attempted such an assessment7.   
‘A rule of right’ as a conception of the common good? 
In one of his essays Taylor considers the question of the power of Rawls’ ‘political 
conception of the good to sustain social unity in relation to the generation of 
patriotism (Taylor 1989a).  If only a common good can generate the kind of 
patriotism necessary to unite citizens in a free society, ‘procedural liberals’ might 
contend, according to Taylor, that a sufficient common good is operative in their 
commitment to ‘a rule of right’, and indeed that one way of interpreting the 
American reaction to Watergate is as patriotic outrage at the violation of this good:   
What the outraged citizens saw as violated was precisely a rule of right, a liberal conception 
of rule by law.  That is what they identified with, and that is what they rose to defend as their 
common good (Taylor 1989a, p. 175). 
Taylor sees two problems with this reply.  The first of these concerns its value as a 
defence against the charge that ‘procedural liberalism’ is necessarily ‘atomistic’.  
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This charge is that, according to ‘procedural liberalism’, the good is individual in 
character and therefore that, beyond families and friendships, any apparently 
communal bonds are no more than instruments in the service of the pursuit of the 
individual good: ‘... common institutional structures have to be understood as in the 
nature of collective instruments’ (Taylor 1989a, p. 166).  Taylor agrees that, 
ontologically, procedural liberalism does not entail atomism8 but he holds that 
patriotism requires more than the holism provided by this view of the common good 
as the commitment to the ‘rule of right’:  
But we have to remember that patriotism involves more than converging moral principles; it 
is a common allegiance to a particular historical community (Taylor 1989a, p. 176). 
Procedural neutrality may be possible in adjudicating disputes between (a) theists 
and atheists about the admissibility of prayers in public schools, or between (b) 
supporters and opponents of a manual on sex education which presents 
homosexuality as a perversion, for example, but it will not work, according to 
Taylor, in disputes between patriots and antipatriots.  A legal challenge to American 
school curricula which exalted the likes of Thomas Jefferson and George 
Washington as heroes, Taylor claims, would be tantamount to ‘ a questioning of the 
value of patriotism...’ and as such would be ‘profoundly un-American ...’ and ‘close 
to unthinkable as a public act’ (Taylor 1989a, p. 177).  ‘But’, he continues, 
logically such a challenge is possible, and it would be no more illegitimate on the terms of 
procedural liberalism than those under (a) and (b).  But any court which gave satisfaction to 
such a suit would be undermining the very regime it was established to interpret.  A line has 
to be drawn here before the demands of proceduralism (Taylor 1989a, p. 177). 
It is not just its moral principles but the cherishing and sustaining of the community 
itself, according to Taylor, which must constitute the common good of a ‘well 
ordered society’ and thus the procedural liberal conception of the common good as ‘a 
rule of the right’ is deficient on the latter requirement. 
123   
 Rawls deals with this first problem by admitting the ‘political liberalism’ does indeed 
‘abandon the ideal of political community if by that ideal is meant a political society 
united on one … comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine’ (Rawls, 
J. 1996, p. 201).  He argues, however, that  ‘the fact of reasonable pluralism’ makes 
this form of political unity impossible for a free society.  This does not mean that 
political and social unity have been abandoned as values by ‘political liberalism’, but 
rather that such liberalism ‘conceives of social unity in a different way: namely, as 
deriving from an overlapping consensus on a political conception of justice suitable 
for a constitutional regime’ (Rawls, J. 1996, p. 201).  What then are the common 
final ends that unite citizens in their commitment to Rawls’ society?  Rawls replies 
that they are united in their commitment to ‘the same political conception of justice’.  
In the same passage he tells us that this ‘means that they share one very basic 
political end, and one that has high priority: namely, the end of supporting just 
institutions and of giving one another justice accordingly, not to mention many other 
ends they must also share and realize through their political arrangements’ (Rawls, J. 
1996, p. 202). 
 
If I am correct, however, in my argument in the previous section that the ‘fact of 
reasonable pluralism’ commits him to an individualist definition of the good, Rawls’ 
response here fails to meet this problem satisfactorily.  In other words, if ‘reasonable 
pluralism’ is a ‘fact’ because the good is necessarily individual, any basis for social 
unity is necessarily also only instrumental to the pursuit of individual goods.  Rawls’ 
form of ‘procedural liberalism’, in my view, does indeed entail ontological atomism.  
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But Rawls’ response does not even address the second part of the difficulty posed by 
Taylor.  Taylor argued that the generation of patriotism depended not just on a 
commitment in principle to the ‘rule of right’, but also on a commitment to the 
community that holds that principle.  Rawls does not even discuss the latter claim. 
 
The second problem Taylor sees with treating ‘a rule of the right’ as a common good 
is that it omits an element viewed by what he calls its ‘traditional republican’ rival as 
essential: ‘What this [procedural liberal conception of the common good] leaves out 
is the central good of the civic humanist tradition: participatory self-rule’ (Taylor 
1989a, p. 177).  Taylor points out that to see ‘... self-rule as essential to a life of 
dignity, as the highest possible political good in itself, would take us beyond the 
bounds of procedural liberalism’ (Taylor 1989a, p. 178).  Taylor does not claim to 
have demonstrated the impossibility of a conception of procedural liberalism based 
on a holistic ontology sustaining a patriotism sufficient to ensure the survival of a 
free society.  Rather he believes that having admitted the possibility of such a 
conception of procedural liberalism, he has made it possible to raise ‘... a whole 
range of concrete questions about its viability in practice’ (Taylor 1989a, p. 180), 
questions such as the adequacy of its patriotism.   
 
Rawls addresses this criticism in his Political Liberalism (Rawls, J. 1996, pp. 205-6).  
He distinguishes ‘classical republicanism’ from ‘civic humanism’.  Rawls’ 
characterises ‘classical republicanism’ in what I would call instrumental terms 
because he sees commitment to public life as a means to the end of preserving 
democratic values: ‘Classical republicanism I take to be the view that if citizens of a 
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democratic society are to preserve their basic rights and liberties, including the civil 
liberties which secure the freedoms of private life, they must also have to a sufficient 
degree the “political virtues” (as I have called them) and be willing to take part in 
public life’ (Rawls, J. 1996, p. 205).  Because ‘classical republicanism’ does not rely 
on any comprehensive doctrinal system, Rawls sees ‘no fundamental opposition’ 
between it and ‘political liberalism’.  ‘Civic humanism’ is, however, fundamentally 
opposed to ‘political liberalism’ because the former defines the human person as a 
political animal, and participation in political life as an essential part of the good life.  
His response to this second difficulty posed by Taylor is thus that these doctrines 
form part of a comprehensive doctrinal system, which, because of the fact of 
‘reasonable pluralism’, cannot provide a legitimate basis for unity in a free society 
(Rawls, J. 1996, p. 206).  There are several reasons, besides those considered earlier 
in this chapter, for challenging Rawls’ restrictions on the role of comprehensive 
doctrinal systems in free societies. 
 
My first reason for challenging this reply of Rawls to Taylor is that it assumes that 
society is a voluntary contract, and that therefore the terms of membership can be 
defined to exclude holders of some comprehensive doctrinal systems.  The 
assumption that society is a union of those voluntarily contracted to membership 
seems to me to be the antithesis of Taylor’s ‘civic humanist’ thesis that humans are 
political animals and participation in political life is therefore an essential part of 
their good.  Logical symmetry requires that if the latter is to be regarded as part of a 
comprehensive doctrinal system and thus unacceptable as a basis for order in a free 
society, the former should also be so regarded.  If humans are naturally social beings, 
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it is not open to them (except in rare and extreme cases) to opt out of society.  To this 
extent, it seems to me that ‘social contract’ theorists in general and Rawls in 
particular are unfair to holders of doctrines that Rawls would regard as incompatible 
with participation in free societies.  This is not to argue that any society can tolerate 
all doctrines.  It is, however, to point out that Rawls’ definition of society as a 
voluntary contract between free and equal citizens might commit him to exclude 
from it groups committed to even the democratic overthrow of that view of society.  
For example, while they would reject imposition of their faith on non-believers, 
many traditional Catholics would see it as the duty of a government to ban abortion, 
homosexual acts, and pornography, to impose strict censorship of literature and 
visual media, and to restrict other liberties like the right to dress as one wishes, to 
gamble and consume alcohol and other drugs.  Above all, they would see it as their 
duty to combat Rawls’ liberal ideology and his view of society.  Since society is a 
natural union, they might argue, the problem for its members is not, as Rawls holds, 
to determine for themselves what its final ends shall be but to discover what those 
ends are, and to structure society to best achieve them.  By imposing his assumption 
that society is a contractual union, and defining the terms of the contract either to 
exclude from membership or to restrict the rights of those who see it as a natural 
union, Rawls opens himself to the accusation of proposing an ideology that is to that 
extent authoritarian and socially divisive. 
 
As we have seen above and as Mulhall and Swift remind us (Mulhall and Swift 2002, 
pp. 468-9), Rawls’ reply to this criticism is that the ‘civic humanist’ conception of 
the good urged here by Taylor, and by implication the natural union conception of 
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society, is a comprehensive doctrinal system, which by definition cannot '...be 
publicly and fully established by reason...' (Rawls, J. 1996, p. 153), and which for 
this reason could not serve as a legitimate basis for order in a free society.  But if, as 
I have argued, Rawls’ so called ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’ commits him to certain 
metaphysical assumptions about the nature of the good, he forfeits independence of 
metaphysical assumptions as a ground for preferring his basis for order over its 
competitors’.  The values of liberty and equality that Rawls has made ‘trumps’ in his 
‘political liberalism’ are thus opened to assessment against other values.  Part of that 
assessment must include an appraisal of the effects of their application to some of the 
problems of social justice I have identified in the Introduction to this thesis.  One of 
these problems was the issue of justice for Australia’s Aborigines. 
 
For Australian Aborigines to accept Rawls’ Kantian account of the value of equality 
would, I believe, perpetuate rather than remove the injustices that presently afflict 
them.  As we saw in section 1 above, equality of citizens stems from their status as 
persons.  He derives his account of the person from Kant and according to that 
account persons are defined by '... a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for 
a conception of the good'.  ‘The capacity for a rational conception of the good’, 
Rawls explained, ‘is the capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a 
conception of one's rational advantage or good’ (Rawls 1996, p. 19); ‘the members 
of society are citizens regarded as free and equal in virtue of their possessing the two 
moral powers to the requisite degree.  This is the basis of equality’ (Rawls, J. 1996, 
p. 109).  The value of equality thus demands equal respect for the exercise of those 
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capacities by each individual, in short, for their capacity to choose and pursue their 
own life-plans9.   
 
Australia’s Aborigines, however, claim the status not merely of equal citizens 
pursuing their individual life-plans but also of ‘first peoples’ of this land entrusted as 
peoples by their Dreamtime ancestors with the care of the land.  Moreover, for them, 
the latter status implies not merely a place of honour in the institutions and practices 
of the nation but also entitlement to the rights accorded to colonised peoples by the 
United Nations.  Two International Covenants begin with the following 
proclamation: 
All people have the right to self-determination.  By virtue of the right they freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development10. 
Australia’s Aborigines are campaigning for a treaty with the Australian Government 
to give effect to these rights acquired as a result of their dispossession of sovereignty 
and land by the British:  
Treaties in other countries have provided for indigenous self-government.  It is likely that 
Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islander peoples would want to negotiate self-
government in relation to traditional lands as part of a treaty in Australia (NTSG 2001). 
Australian Governments, however, have held that these rights apply only to 
sovereign peoples and not to the indigenous inhabitants of countries like Australia.  
The present Australian Government regards the status of ‘first peoples of this land’ 
as merely a status of honour.  The rights of Aboriginal peoples flow from their status 
as equal citizens in Australia’s liberal democracy, a status to which their 
Aboriginality is irrelevant.  As a disadvantaged group within that society, they are 
entitled to whatever kind of assistance is needed to relieve that disadvantage just as 
any other disadvantaged group would be11.  Acceptance of Rawls’ Kantian version of 
the value of equality by Australia’s Aboriginal peoples would imply forsaking their 
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claim to rights flowing from their status as ‘first peoples’ of this land, that is, to the 
repayment of the debt owed to them for their usurped inheritance.  Indeed, it is the 
Australian Government’s commitment to this Rawlsian version of equality of 
citizenship that is closing its members’ minds and hearts to these Aboriginal 
grievances and to other ways of responding to them.  The division within the 
Australian nation to which these grievances give rise is thus perpetuated by the 
Government’s commitment to the Rawlsian version of equality.  This is not, of 
course, to say that equality has no value at all in a free society.  It is to say rather that 
it should not be equated with a definition derived from a particular European 
philosophical doctrine, and imposed by the former colonial power on the Aboriginal 
peoples with whom that power still has not made a treaty.  As leading Aboriginal 
activist, Pat Dodson, argued in an article published on Australian Day, 2004, the 
present Federal Government is pretending to fulfil the national commitment to 
reconciliation with Aboriginal peoples by improving their access to such things as 
health and education and calling this policy ‘practical reconciliation’.  But, as 
Dodson points out, since all Australians have the right to ‘equal access to health and 
education’ (Dodson 2004), the improvement of Aboriginal access to such things 
cannot be equated with the addressing of their grievances as ‘first peoples’ of the 
land, with the process dubbed by the national Parliament as ‘reconciliation’.  Dodson 
writes: ‘Trading such fundamental rights off as ‘practical reconciliation’ means 
genuine reconciliation is not achievable because there’s no dialogue’ (Dodson 2004).  
In fact, contrary to Rawls’ ambitions for his ‘political liberalism’, the refusal of 
dialogue about the meaning of equality and the imposition of this Rawlsian version 
upon Australia’s Aboriginal peoples has only perpetuated and exacerbated their 
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subjugation to white power.  As Dodson puts it: ‘It [Trading such fundamental rights 
off as ‘practical reconciliation’] means Aboriginal people increasingly avoid 
articulating their concerns for fear of upsetting the government’ (Dodson 2004).  In 
the case of Aboriginal claims for justice, the Rawlsian (Kantian) version of the value 
of equality, I suggest, has been used as a device for obliterating outstanding debts by 
assimilating all Australians to the same moral and legal status12. 
 
The problems of Australian Aborigines are not, however, a problem for this 
particular group alone.  They are problems for the nation as a whole because this 
aggrieved group feels alienated from the nation and indeed challenges its 
legitimacy13.  If there is any justice at all in Aboriginal claims, our unity and 
legitimacy as a nation depend upon a satisfactory settlement of those claims.  If the 
above arguments are correct, the Rawlsian prescription to treat all citizens as equals 
in his Kantian terms is patently inadequate to the task of settling these claims.  A 
much broader dialogue of the kind urged by Dodson is therefore necessary for this 
task.  The meaning of equality has to be broadened beyond the Kantian individualist 
one proposed by Rawls to one of equal respect for diverse comprehensive doctrinal 
systems in the determination of our constitution.  Pace Rawls, it is the failure to take 
account of Aboriginal ‘doctrines’ in our constitution, not any attempt to do so, that 
fundamentally divides our nation.  Indeed, Australia’s original constitution explicitly 
forbade the counting of Aboriginal people in the census, a provision that was not 
reversed until the referendum of 1967.  That referendum, according to Dodson, 
mandated the establishment of a rightful place for Australia’s ‘first peoples’ but this 
has not happened.  Instead, he argues, ‘Public sector control programs …are meant to 
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be partnerships … [b]ut are really about conformity and compliance with mainstream 
objectives.  They allow little accommodation of Aboriginal cultural and social 
values.  They do not inform non-indigenous Australians about indigenous people’s 
protocols or induce respect for them and their unique position as the first peoples of 
this land …’ (Dodson 2004).  Without dialogue that can take account of these diverse 
‘doctrines’, this division between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples in this 
country cannot be resolved in a just way.  The aim of present government policy, 
which along with Dodson and most indigenous Australians I would reject, is 
assimilation: ‘The ongoing thrust of assimilation is to continuously try to make us 
into something that we aren’t, and denies our aspirations to take responsibility for 
decisions affecting our lives’ (Dodson 2004).   
 
Another group that might place a different value on liberty to Rawls is the traditional 
Catholics referred to above.  If they believe, as the Catholic church teaches, that they 
are called to promote Christian values in society, they are very likely to value what 
they regard as modesty and decency in public standards more highly than the liberty 
that allows public nudity and pornography, for example.  They are likely to see the 
upholding of their standards as not merely a matter of taste but more importantly of 
protecting the morals that constitute the fabric of society.  If Rawls’ ‘political 
liberalism’ is not independent of metaphysical commitments, why should such 
people prefer his weighting of liberty to their weighting of preserving public morals 
on which they believe the fabric of society depends?  In order to answer this 
objection, Rawls would need to defend his weighting of liberty against the traditional 
Catholics’ weighting of preserving public morals.  But by engaging in such a 
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defence, Rawls would be embracing an alternative form of democracy to the one he 
proposes.  Instead of determining public policy by excluding considerations 
depending on comprehensive doctrinal systems, this form of democracy, into which 
ex hypothesi he would be forced in order to answer this objection, would determine 
such policy by substantive debate between competing systems.   Since there is no 
ground in Catholic tradition for traditional Catholics to reject the value of liberty so 
totally as to object to the legitimacy of democratic debate, such Catholics should feel 
able to support this form of democracy.  Because he wants to exclude doctrines from 
any role in such debate, Rawls is rejecting this alternative form of democracy, and 
thus also alienating the allegiance of at least this group of potential contributors to 
social unity. 
 
A second reason for challenging Rawls’ restrictions on the role of comprehensive 
doctrinal systems in free societies is raised by Michael Sandel.  Some public policy 
issues, like grave moral issues such as the permissibility of abortion, Sandel 
observes, turn on questions of truth: ‘If the doctrine of the Catholic church is true, if 
human life in the relevant moral sense does begin at conception, then bracketing the 
moral-theological question of when human life begins is far less reasonable than it 
would be on rival moral and religious assumptions’ (Sandel, Michael 1998 2nd edn, 
p. 198).  If the Catholic doctrine is right, abortion is morally ‘tantamount to murder’ 
(Sandel, Michael 1998 2nd edn, p. 198).  Sandel therefore has difficulty in seeing 
how ‘the political values of toleration and equal citizenship for women …’ can 
justify leaving abortion to the choice of women.  Rather, if the legal right to abortion 
is to be established, Sandel believes that governments of free societies need to 
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engage with the substantive question of whether or not the Catholic doctrine about 
the status of the foetus is true: ‘The case for respecting a woman’s right to decide for 
herself whether to have an abortion depends on showing, as I believe can be shown, 
that there is a relevant moral difference between aborting a fetus at a relatively early 
stage of development and killing a child’ (Sandel, Michael 1998 2nd edn, p. 198).  In 
short, the public justification of such laws as those permitting abortion depend, not 
on public neutrality on the moral question of the status of the foetus, but on the 
adoption of a substantive position on that status.  In these circumstances, the 
determination of public policy would require government to engage with, and not set 
aside, relevant doctrines.  
 
A third objection to Rawls’ requirement that considerations relying on metaphysical 
conceptions of the good be excluded from public debate also comes from Sandel.  
According to Sandel, Rawls assumes that in a free, plural society there will not be a 
diversity of conceptions of justice just as there is a diversity of conceptions of the 
good: ‘While it is certainly true that people in modern democratic societies hold a 
variety of conflicting moral and religious views, it cannot be said that there is a “fact 
of reasonable pluralism” about morality and religion that does not also apply to 
questions of justice’ (Sandel, Michael 1998 2nd edn, p. 196).  Sandel cites in this 
connection the example of the controversy over Rawls’ ‘difference principle’.  This 
controversy will involve not only disputes about its application, which Rawls can 
acknowledge without conceding Sandel’s point, but also disputes about the principle 
itself.  Antony Flew14, for example, expresses in vigorous terms the criticism that 
Rawls’ ‘difference principle’ assumes the availability to all of the ‘primary goods’ he 
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wants to redistribute in accordance with that principle.  By concentrating on the 
'basic structure' of society, Flew argues, Rawls mistakenly attributes concepts like 
ownership and entitlements to 'hypostatized entities' like 'Society' (Flew 1989, p. 
136).  Sandel allows Rawls the reply that such disagreements would not be judged, 
‘on due reflection’ (Sandel, Michael 1998 2nd edn, p. 206), to be reasonable, and so 
the relevant governments would be justified in adopting the ‘difference principle’ as 
their principle of distribution.  Sandel’s point, however, is that if we can arrive at 
judgments about the reasonableness or otherwise of conceptions of justice, and live 
with the relevant dissenting groups, why can we not do likewise with different 
conceptions of the good and their associated groups?  He writes: 
If we can reason about controversial conceptions of distributive justice by seeking a 
reflective equilibrium, why can we not reason in the same way about conceptions of the 
good?  If it can be shown that some conceptions of the good are more reasonable than others, 
then the persistence of disagreement would not necessarily amount to a ‘fact of reasonable 
pluralism’ that requires government to be neutral (Sandel, Michael 1998 2nd edn, p. 207). 
Government neutrality is not the only nor necessarily the best option before doctrinal 
differences.  I contend that there is a fourth reason why this is so. 
 
Rawls’ exclusion of doctrinal systems from any role in the determination of public 
policy depends on a distinction between the so called ‘public’ and ‘private’ sphere, a 
distinction which some groups see as itself dependent on a doubtful doctrinal 
presupposition.  The application of this distinction by the state these groups therefore 
see as illegitimately restricting their freedom and to that extent alienating them from 
the relevant society.  I am referring here not only to Aboriginal Australians, but also 
to the many religious groups in Australian society which protest that they are not 
accorded by government equal respect for their cultural or political or religious 
rights15.  Rawls’ ‘political liberalism’ prescribes equality of respect for such rights of 
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all citizens but as individuals with the moral capacity to choose their own life-plans.  
Groups and individuals who do not accept the Kantian account of moral equality 
proposed by Rawls feel aggrieved when they are accused by government of violating 
the norms of a free society by structuring their activities according to their own 
values.  Equal opportunity laws in this country typically prohibit discrimination in 
the employment of teachers in religious schools on religious grounds, except in the 
case of Principals and religious education teachers.  Similar prohibitions apply to the 
employment of staff in other institutions run by religious bodies, institutions like 
hospitals, charities and the like.  Religious bodies typically see such prohibitions as 
cases of the value of individual liberty trumping their right to establish in their own 
institutions the ethos necessary to fulfil the religious mission which is their raison 
d’être.  Religious bodies in this country are even complaining that governments are 
using neo-liberal economic principles to limit the freedom of religious charitable 
institutions to carry out their mission in accordance with their religious principles.  
The terms of the contracts of service imposed by governments often require these 
institutions to order their priorities among clients according to the demands of 
government policies rather than those of religious principles (Cahill, Bouma et al. 
2004).   
 
Governments and their agencies defend these prohibitions and restrictions by 
claiming that they apply only to activities by religious institutions in the public - 
secular - sphere, and that religious freedom applies only to the private sphere, that is 
in their chapels, religious houses and religious education classrooms where these 
institutions are free to teach and act in accordance with their beliefs.  But this 
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defence cuts little ice with religious bodies.  Firstly, they see confinement of religion 
to what the state defines as the private sphere - chapels, religious houses and 
religious education classrooms - as itself an illegitimate restriction of religious 
freedom inasmuch as the supposedly neutral liberal state thereby asserts its 
competence to define the sphere of religion16.  Secondly, they dispute the state’s 
definition of that sphere.  In particular, the conduct of charitable works such as 
services to the poor, they believe, is an integral part of their religious mission, but 
such works are also obviously public.  Governments that dictate priorities to religious 
charities are therefore interfering with their religious freedom.  Since the principles 
invoked to justify this interference are neo-liberal economic and managerial 
principles, these bodies could plausibly argue that the exclusion from public policy 
determination of metaphysical conceptions of the good such as theirs is exposing 
religious charitable institutions to subversion into instruments of government policy 
based on an actual, but unadmitted, alternative metaphysical conception of the good.  
If the Rawlsian state is not competent to define unilaterally the boundaries between 
the private and the public, the religious and the secular, it follows that the 
determination of any such boundaries in a democratic state can only be done justly in 
dialogue between the state and the relevant religious bodies.  Since such a dialogue 
would be about what constitutes religion and what does not, it would necessarily 
require admission of the relevant comprehensive doctrinal systems with their 
metaphysical conceptions of the good.   
 
Rawls would no doubt respond to my difficulty by arguing that distinctions like those 
between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’, the ‘religious’ and the ‘secular’ do not depend 
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on metaphysical doctrines like secularism but on the notion of ‘public reason’.  The 
latter, according to Rawls, is the form of reason needed in a liberal democracy for 
citizens to determine their constitution and other laws: ‘in a democratic society 
public reason is the reason of equal citizens who, as a collective body, exercise final 
political and coercive power over one another in enacting laws and in amending their 
constitution’ (Rawls, J. 1996, p. 214).  The limits of public reason, according to 
Rawls, ‘do not apply to all political questions but only to those involving what we 
may call ‘constitutional essentials’ and questions of basic justice’ (Rawls, J. 1996, p. 
214).  Rawls distinguishes the realm of ‘public reason’ from that of the reasoning of 
churches (among other groups) by the term ‘nonpublic’ reasoning (Rawls, J. 1996, p. 
220ff.).  But the whole point of his notion of public reason is to provide a basis for 
determining the questions he refers to without appeal to comprehensive doctrinal 
systems in a society where freedom and equality as he defines them are trumps.  The 
distinction therefore between the realms of state and religion, however he terms the 
distinction, are essential to his ‘political liberalism’.  Logically, the role played in the 
defence of this ‘political liberalism’ by these values and the accompanying 
understanding of the nature of society is equivalent to the role played by the various 
notions of the good, and the understandings of society to which they relate, in the 
comprehensive doctrinal systems held by citizens of free societies.  Holders of the 
latter systems therefore have good reason for regarding Rawls’ ‘political liberalism’ 
as itself relying on metaphysical doctrines.   
 
Moreover, I find it hard to see how acceptance of Rawls’ values and understanding 
of society would render citizens or their state epistemologically competent to define 
138   
the boundaries between the religious and the secular without reference to the 
doctrines of the society’s religions or to their holders.  And if the effect of embracing 
Rawls’ public reason was going to be to restrict what they saw as the legitimate 
religious freedom of one’s own or all religious groups in the relevant society, 
religious believers would justifiably feel discriminated against by, and alienated 
from, this society.  If, however, the same groups were prepared to accept that 
because of the plural nature of their society, some restrictions on their freedom might 
need to be agreed to, a dialogue as to which of their doctrines were admissible might 
avoid dogmatism on the part of the state and lead to agreements to which the relevant 
groups might feel committed.  And having been listened to and having had their 
religious commitments taken into account, these groups might feel a considerably 
stronger allegiance to this kind of democracy than to the Rawlsian kind that excluded 
these things from public debate. 
 
I conclude this section then by claiming firstly with Taylor that the ‘rule of right’ 
considered as a common good cannot generate the patriotism necessary to unite a 
democratic society, but secondly that the attempt to enforce this version of the 
common good can actually threaten the very liberties it was intended to protect.  
Threats to religious liberties tend to discourage rather than encourage allegiance of 
religious groups, particularly when they see the threats as stemming from a rival 
metaphysical conception of the good, the good in the case referred to in the previous 
paragraph as liberal secularism.  There is one more significant difficulty with Rawls’ 
reduction of the common good to a procedure rather than a metaphysical conception.  
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This difficulty, raised by some communitarians, must be considered before 
concluding the chapter. 
 
Does Rawls’ procedural version of the common good lead to incoherent action? 
I have said repeatedly in the course of this thesis that my quest is for a theory of 
social justice that interprets human dignity to imply the right to subsistence and 
which is capable of generating the social solidarity necessary to order a democratic 
society according to that interpretation.  The ‘difference principle’ in Rawls’ theory 
aims to ensure the right to an appropriate share of the ‘primary goods’.  While I have 
argued above that sharing these on the basis of the values of liberty and equality is 
not adequate to the task of social justice as I see it, I have also affirmed the 
desirability of the kind of distribution implied by this principle.  But an adequate 
theory of justice must not only specify its distribution principle, it must also define 
the relationship between principle and action.  Some critics, broadly termed in the 
critical literature ‘communitarian’, have presented what I believe are good reasons 
for doubting Rawls’ definition of the latter relationship. 
 
One such critic is Alasdair MacIntyre17 who argues that Rawls’ conception of the 
common good in terms of 'political' or procedural justice is an inadequate substitute 
for some metaphysical conception of the common good as a foundation for social 
justice.  MacIntyre agrees with Antony Flew18 in insisting on the centrality of such 
concepts as 'desert' in the traditional understanding of the concept of justice but 
argues that desert is related to some metaphysical conception of the common good.  
For MacIntyre, justice is a disposition to act in pursuit of a particular conception of 
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the common good (MacIntyre 1988, p. 342).  Indeed, on MacIntyre's philosophy of 
action, human actions are intelligible only '... in virtue of  ... their relationship to 
certain kinds of social institution and practice' (MacIntyre 1986, p. 66;  see also 
MacIntyre 1988, ch. xvii).  'Practices', in MacIntyre's sense, include activities as 
diverse as 'physics', 'baseball' and ‘farming’, and, being ordered to particular goods 
(MacIntyre 1988, p. 66), provide the context of initiation for persons to the pursuit 
and refinement of their conceptions of such goods, and ultimately to a conception of 
a single 'overriding good' (MacIntyre 1988, p. 337).  In cases of reason-governed 
actions, 'practices' initiate persons to '...what is recognizably a good reason for so 
acting', namely, conformity with the relevant conception of the good (MacIntyre 
1986, p. 66).  Although such persons may fail to act in accordance with whatever 
'good reasons' may be relevant in a particular case, say, of just action, that failure will 
not be due to an incoherence in their reasons for acting because, as 'good reasons', 
they remain in conformity with the relevant metaphysical conception of the good.  
This will not, however, be the case with those liberals who deny the existence of any 
metaphysical common good.  In the absence of any 'overriding good', the actions of 
such liberals are governed by 'preferences' for particular goods, 'preferences' which 
can change from moment to moment.  Such liberals, argues MacIntyre, will thus 
always be liable to deflection from action in pursuit of the good 'preferred' at any 
particular moment by a subsequent change of preference: 
Acting upon a particular want here and now, implementing a particular preference here and 
now, depends not only upon external circumstances permitting, but also upon no other want 
or preference presenting itself in such a way that the person does something else.  And where 
as in modern liberal culture the range of desired goods is taken to be irreducibly 
heterogeneous and without any overall ordering, this is always liable to happen (MacIntyre 
1988, p. 341). 
Unlike metaphysical conceptions of the common good, 'preferences' are neither true 
nor false, and thus disputes about them cannot be settled by rational debate.  Debates 
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about justice on this liberal view are reduced, MacIntyre argues, from debates about 
the relationship of certain actions or, in the case of distributive justice, of certain 
distributions, to the common good to disputes over the rules of pursuit of diverse and 
conflicting preferences for particular goods: 
The rules of distributive justice are both to set constraints upon the bargaining process, so as 
to ensure access to it by those otherwise disadvantaged, and to protect individuals so that 
they may have freedom to express and, within limits, to implement their preferences 
(MacIntyre 1988, p. 337). 
Rawls’ conception of justice is fatally flawed, on this view, because it neglects the 
traditional foundation required for any theory of justice purporting to be based on a 
coherent theory of action, namely, a foundation in a particular community's 
metaphysical conception of the common good. 
 
Rawls’ defence against this criticism includes again an appeal to the so called ‘fact of 
reasonable pluralism’.  Appeal to any metaphysical conception of the good as the 
foundation for justice, he argues, is not open to members of a free plural society 
because they cannot agree to any such conception.  However, because citizens are 
free to follow within the limits of Rawls’ principles of justice their metaphysical 
systems, their actions in the name of justice can to this extent meet the standards of 
coherence specified by MacIntyre.  Indeed, Rawls remarks that “persons’ 
conceptions of the good are assumed, at a any given time, to be determinate: that is, 
they express a scheme of final ends and attachments together with a comprehensive 
doctrine in light of which those elements are interpreted” (Rawls, J. 1996, p. 108).  In 
the public realm, citizens’ action will also be coherent according to at least some of 
MacIntyre’s standards because they are required to conform with principles agreed 
by them as free and equal citizens, ‘the principles of justice selected by the parties in 
142   
the original position as they try to advance the interests of those they represent’ 
(Rawls, J. 1996, p. 103). 
 
It seems to me that the most that MacIntyre would have to concede to this defence is 
that there can be a political conception of the good to which actions may cohere.  But 
such actions could not properly be called just because just actions are those that 
conform with my good as a person and actions conforming with this so called 
political good need not cohere with my good as a person.  For Rawls, my good as a 
person is what I choose as such, my preferences among the supposed options.  
MacIntyre’s point is that since such preferences are of their nature vulnerable in the 
ways described in the objection above, Rawls’ account of justice, when confronted 
with the question of whether actions in accordance with its principles cohere with my 
good as a person, eliminates coherence between reason and action.  Rawls’ insistence 
on the ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’ implies this metaphysical proposition that the 
nature of the good is individual and heterogeneous.  But this proposition leaves him 
open to MacIntyre’s objection unless it can be shown that basing of just actions on 
preferences need not lead to incoherence.  Since the latter possibility will be 
considered in the next chapter on MacIntyre’s theory of justice, I will postpone 
discussion of its merits until then. 
 
Conclusion 
Rawls’ principles of justice have the great merit of making provision of the ‘primary 
goods’ a matter of justice rather than of a feeling of moral obligation as Hayek 
regarded such provision.  It seems to me, however, that as a theory of justice Rawls’ 
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account faces insuperable difficulties.  Despite the sophistication and complexity of 
his so called ‘political’ conception of the good, that conception depends upon the 
very kind of metaphysical presuppositions Rawls was trying to avoid.  What he 
claims to be the ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’ can only be a fact if the good is, as he 
held in his A Theory of Justice (1972), heterogeneous.  Logically, since this 
proposition is the antithesis of the proposition that the good is one and binding on all, 
the proposition that Rawls held to be metaphysical, his proposition must also be 
metaphysical.  Thus, Rawls cannot argue that his theory ought to be accepted as the 
basis of order in free societies on the ground that it is free of metaphysical 
presuppositions.  Considered on the alternative ground of its merits as a social 
contract to protect cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal, Rawls’ 
theory encounters several difficulties.  His definition of society as a voluntary 
contract must be regarded as tendentious, and his exclusion of metaphysical 
conceptions of the good from public debate as an unjustifiable and excessive 
measure for dealing with pluralism in free societies.  His theory also seems 
vulnerable to the objection that it renders reason incoherent with just action.  Above 
all, Rawls’ ‘political liberalism’ is unable for at least two reasons to satisfy my quest 
for a theory of justice capable of generating the social solidarity necessary to sustain 
a just society.  First, his conception of equality in the Kantian terms of moral 
autonomy would obliterate the social injustices that still afflict Australia’s Aboriginal 
peoples, and thus perpetuate and exacerbate the most fundamental division in 
Australian society today.  Second, while his ‘difference principle’ promised a 
fairness in distribution that would encourage consent among its members, his 
imposition of the Kantian liberal values of freedom and equality as trumps in 
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determining public policy would alienate certain religious groups as well as 
Australia’s Aboriginal peoples.   
 
Rawls addressed the problem of moral and ethical pluralism by trying to develop a 
theory of justice modelled on metaphysical conceptions of the good but free of their 
metaphysical bases.  By this means, he hoped to achieve a basis for order compatible 
with most metaphysical conceptions of the good but dependent on none.  The terms 
of public policy debates could thus be restricted to the political conception of justice.  
Having been unable to escape metaphysical presuppositions in his so called political 
conception of justice, Rawls is exposed as unwittingly urging the imposition of one 
among the competing metaphysical conceptions and explicitly excluding the latter 
from any role in the determination of public policy.  Rawls has done the quest for a 
theory of justice for modern democracies a great service by his monumental attempt 
at a political theory.  If that attempt has failed, as I have argued, it is difficult to say 
that the failure was due to any lack of thoroughness or sophistication and that 
therefore remedying of such defects could enable the attempt to succeed.  I conclude 
therefore that the quest for an appropriate theory of social justice must return to the 
traditional path of determining what is due to each in relation to his or her 
contribution to what Rawls has called a metaphysical conception of the common 
good.  My hope is that the theories to be considered in the forthcoming chapters will 
offer ways of addressing the problem of moral and ethical pluralism that are capable 
of encouraging rather than discouraging the kind of social solidarity I am looking for. 
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Notes to chapter three 
1  For another discussion of Rawls’ claim to avoid metaphysical commitments, see (Kukathas and 
Pettit 1990, pp. 133-41). 
2  In the next section I will consider Michael Sandel’s (Sandel, Michael 1998 2nd edn) detailed debate 
of this question with Will Kymlicka (Kymlicka, Will 1989a). 
3  For a sympathetic discussion of this passage, see (Mulhall and Swift 1992)  These authors take 
Rawls to be claiming that his conception of justice has always been ‘political’ and that his critics have 
been mistaken in seeing his position in A Theory of Justice (1972) as metaphysical.  As the ensuing 
paragraphs will show, I hold Rawls’ position to have always been metaphysical in the sense I 
elaborate.  
4  It is important to note here, however, that no community worthy of the name would accept that its 
ends were just those the members happened to prefer at the relevant time.  As Michael Sandel puts the 
point: ‘The term ‘communitarian’ is misleading … insofar as it implies that rights should rest on the 
values or preferences that prevail in any given community at any given time’ (Sandel, Michael 1998 
2nd edn, p.186). 
5  For a contribution to this general discussion which accepts uncritically Kymlicka’s shift of 
terminology from ‘self’ to ‘person’, see (McKenna and Zannoni 1993). 
6  This is not to say that one’s attachment to epistemically primitive beliefs is not rational, and that 
evidence is therefore irrelevant to their assessment.  No such belief can withstand an indefinite 
accumulation of anomalies.  Rather it is to say that the rational overthrow of these beliefs is not a 
matter of assessing them against what counts as evidence within the relevant system because it is these 
beliefs which determine what counts as evidence within their systems.  Their overthrow will thus 
entail a recognition of their inability to order the relevant realm of experience in the way they once 
did.  If an alternative belief is placing pressure on the original belief, the experience of the holder may 
be that she suddenly finds herself seeing the relevant realm of experience in the light of the new 
belief, a genuine conversion.  If no alternative presents itself when the old belief is perceived to be 
untenable, the experience may be of traumatic inability to make sense of the relevant realm. 
7  Another is Alasdair MacIntyre (MacIntyre 1984). 
8  In another work, Taylor contrasts the ‘atomist’ with what he calls ‘the social view of man’.  For 
purposes of a discussion of the nature and scope of distributive justice, Taylor Writes, ‘we can 
describe as atomist views of the human good for which it is conceivable for man to attain it alone.  In 
the following paragraph, he continues:  
By contrast a social view of man is one which holds that an essential constitutive condition of seeking 
the human good is bound up with being in society.  Thus if I argue that man cannot even be a moral 
subject, thus a candidate for the realization of the human good, outside a community of language and 
mutual discourse about the good and bad, just and unjust, I am rejecting all atomist views; since what 
man derives from society is not some aid in realizing his good, but the very possibility of being an 
agent seeking that good (Taylor 1985b, p. 292). 
Contrast this Aristotelian understanding of human nature with the Cartesian understanding of the self 
described by Ian Shapiro above chapter 3, note 21. 
9  Rawls of course distinguishes this ‘political’ conception of the autonomy of the citizen from the 
Kantian metaphysical conception from which it is adapted: 
Given their differences, citizens cannot fulfill in any other way their conception-dependent desire to 
have a shared political life on terms acceptable to others as free and equal.  This idea of a shared 
political life does not invoke Kant’s idea of autonomy … as moral values belonging to a 
comprehensive doctrine.  The appeal is rather to the political value of a public life conducted on terms 
that all reasonable citizens can accept as fair (Rawls, J. 1996, p. 98 note omitted). 
Rawls is, however, effectively excluding any alternative conception of the person as the political 
conception.  More importantly for my criticism of its application to the Aboriginal case, it is the 
political conception of the person that underpins the notion of equality I am rejecting. 
10  Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 
Article 1.  
11  I have offered a detail critique of the present Australian Government’s policy of Practical 
Reconciliation (as expressed in the document issued on the website of its party (LPA 2001)) in a paper 
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delivered at the 2001 Diversity Conference held at Deakin University, Geelong (Vic., Australia) 
(Leahy, Michael 2001). 
12  Lest anyone should doubt that this conception of the value of equality could be used in this way, I 
quote the following assertion from Gary Johns, former Minister in the Keating (ALP) Government, 
and now Fellow of a right wing 'thinktank': "Of course, Western civilisation could offer a modest 
contrary [to the moral principle he imputes to Aborigines] principle: that all are created equal - a 
morality that has freed white and black people the world over, and a basis for civilisation that offers 
the longest, most comfortable, free, and artistically and intellectually stimulating life ever known" 
(Johns 2001a, p. 14 all quotations).  Roger Sandall is even more dogmatic in his account of the 
anthropological 'facts' underpinning this morality.  Inveighing against what he dubs the 'culture 
cultists' who, Sandall claims, believe "[a]ll cultures exist on a level plain", he writes: "But there's a 
Big Ditch right in the middle of this plain which separates the tribal world from modernity…" 
(Sandall 2001, p. viii).  For Sandall, the 'facts'  about 'traditional cultures' provide a justification and 
even a 'duty' (Sandall 2001, p. x) for assimilating them to modern cultures.  These 'facts' are that 
"[m]ost traditional cultures feature domestic repression, economic backwardness, endemic disease, 
religious fanaticism, and severe artistic constraints" (Sandall 2001, pp. viii-ix).   
13  So strong are indigenous claims to sovereignty that the National Council for Aboriginal 
Reconciliation felt obliged to acknowledge "that there are many Aboriginal peoples that would not 
recognise the Australian constitution as a Document to which they have given any consent" (NCAR 
2000). 
14  Hayek, of course, is another who takes this view and, as Sandel notes, so too are Robert Nozick and 
Milton Friedman (Sandel, Michael 1998 2nd edn, p. 205, note 56). 
15  For example, the Catholic bishops of New South Wales in April 2001 published a major statement 
titled Religious Freedom in NSW - a Right and a Responsibility (Bishops 2001) in which they 
expressed concern about the threat to religious freedom posed by the kinds of restrictions referred to 
in the rest of this paragraph.  This document was tabled at a Consultation of the New South Wales 
Heads of Faith conducted as part of a national study titled Religion, Cultural Diversity and Social 
Cohesion in Contemporary Australia (forthcoming in March 2004).  The concerns expressed in the 
document found wide sympathy from the other Heads of Faith around the table.  Indeed, similar 
concerns were expressed by Heads of Faith in Consultations in the other State capitals. 
16  This concern was explicitly expressed by representatives of the Catholic Archdiocese of Sydney in 
the New South Wales Heads of Faith Consultation referred to in the previous note.  It was also voiced 
by the New South Wales Bishops' spokesman, Bishop Luc Matthys of Armidale, who argued in the 
accompanying press release that it is 'beyond the competence of government... to try and define 
Catholicism' (CC 2001). 
17  Who is categorized in some of critical literature as a ‘communitarian’ despite his explicit 
repudiation of this label (MacIntyre 1991b). 
18  In his anxiety to achieve a 'political' theory of justice, Rawls, according to Flew (1989, pp. 134-42), 
neglects such fundamental aspects of the traditional understanding of that concept as: (a) that justice 
consists in 'granting to each his or her due'; (b) that justice is owed to individuals or collections of 
individuals; and (c) that what is due to the relevant individuals or collections of individuals is to be 
determined by their deserts or entitlements, not by decision of 'some sovereign collective' (Flew 1989, 
p. 136).   
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Chapter Four 
 
Justice as ‘virtue’ 
 
Introduction 
 
Thus far in this thesis I have been concerned with views on the possibility of social 
justice from the viewpoints of the political philosophies dominating modern 
democracies, philosophies that can be broadly characterised as liberal proceduralist.  
Hayek denied this possibility on the ground that any conception of social justice 
would necessarily depend on some notion of the common good towards the 
attainment of which human actions were somehow naturally ordered.  The notion of a 
common good was, according to Hayek, an error flowing from the failure of its 
proponents to recognize the subjective nature of value and its consequence that good 
is a matter of individual choice and, in a free pluralist society, likely to be 
heterogeneous.  Since the individual has to make such choices in a degree of 
ignorance, he or she, Hayek holds, is prone to error even in relation to his or her own 
good.  The risk of error is, on his view, far greater therefore in predicting the good of 
others.  Direction of human action towards some common good, he argues, would 
thus involve submission to the judgment and command of some fallible authority, and 
this is the path to totalitarianism, the antithesis of political liberalism.   
 
Although he shared the belief that this individual understanding of the nature of the 
good and of human action was fundamental to liberalism, Rawls’ version of 
liberalism differed considerably from Hayek’s.  For Rawls, social justice defined the 
nature of justice in a free society whereas for Hayek social justice was the antithesis 
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of justice in a free society.  Rawls’ ‘difference principle’ went much further than 
Hayek’s ‘safety net’ towards satisfying my quest for a distribution principle based on 
citizenship rather than capacity to earn.  However, Rawls’ Kantian conception of 
liberty and equality were adjudged too individualist (a) to permit recognition of the 
injustices afflicting Australia’s Aboriginal peoples, and (b) to remedy the kind of 
exclusivism that taints our definition of our polity. 
 
The underlying cause of the shortcomings in both these theories, I argued, was the 
thinness of their individualist conception of the good and the proceduralist 
understanding of justice to which that conception gave rise.  The individualist 
conception of the good underpins the definition of society as a voluntary contract, a 
definition that ignores the non-voluntary social bonds between human beings.  Since 
it is these social bonds that I have argued are indispensable to generating and 
sustaining any just society, my quest is for a theory of social justice based on a 
conception of the good derived from a recognition of these bonds.  Rawls objected to 
any such theory of justice on that ground that, being metaphysical in character, it will 
be irreconcilable with the many rival metaphysical conceptions of the good to be 
found in modern democracies and thus unacceptable to most citizens as a basis for 
public order.  I have argued that this difficulty affects equally his so called ‘political’ 
conception of justice, since this conception too turns out to be metaphysical at least 
inasmuch as it supposed the good to be the creation of the individual will.  My task 
now is to examine some accounts of justice based on metaphysical rather than 
procedural conceptions of the good to see whether they are thick enough to foster the 
social bonds to which I have referred above, yet not so thick as to be unable to 
accommodate the plurality and diversity characteristic of modern democracies. 
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 Since Alasdair MacIntyre is widely recognised in the relevant literature1 as a trenchant 
critic of ‘liberal modernity’ and its procedural account of justice and a prominent 
advocate of its traditional predecessor, the first metaphysical (in Rawls’ sense of 
substantive) account I turn to is his.   
 
MacIntyre’s case for a neo-Aristotelian view of justice 
MacIntyre’s three stage account of the virtues 
According to MacIntyre, liberal individualists misconceive the nature of justice 
because they misconceive the nature of the good.  The good, he argues, is not 
individual in nature but common, and justice is the virtue which disposes us to reward 
each member of our community according to his or her contribution to the common 
good.  An understanding of MacIntyre’s theory of justice thus requires an 
understanding of his account the virtues. 
 
For MacIntyre, the virtues have not only a philosophical but also a sociological basis.  
He acknowledges that the traditional accounts of the virtues - the Aristotelian and 
Thomist accounts - have suffered in modern empiricist intellectual climates from their 
dependence on metaphysical suppositions, metaphysical biology in Aristotle’s case 
(MacIntyre 1988, p. 196) and metaphysical natural theology in the case of Thomism 
(MacIntyre 1988, p. 165).  Moreover, he recognises that, since there have been many 
different accounts of the virtues produced over the centuries, there must be some 
doubt of the possibility of a unified account of them (MacIntyre 1985, p. 181). 
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Referring to the history of the concept he has given in earlier chapters of After Virtue, 
he writes: 
Yet although I have dwelt upon the prima facie case for holding that the differences and 
incompatibilities between different accounts at least suggest that there is no single, central, 
core conception of the virtues which might claim allegiance, I ought also to point out that each 
of the five moral accounts which I have just sketched so summarily does embody just such a 
claim (MacIntyre 1981, p. 186). 
MacIntyre makes a similar claim for allegiance to his own account but argues that his 
claim can only be substantiated by a sociologically based account of how a proper 
conception of the virtues develops.  He sees that development as having three stages, 
each later stage supposing its earlier stage(s) but no earlier stage predicting the later 
stage(s) (MacIntyre 1981, pp.186-7).  In the first stage of its development, virtue is 
conceived as an excellence required by what MacIntyre calls a ‘practice’.  In the 
second stage of this development, virtue is conceived as the foundation for what 
MacIntyre characterises as ‘the narrative order of a single human life’ (MacIntyre 
1981, p. 187).  In the third stage of its development, the concept of virtue is 
understood as being derived from, and dependent upon, a particular ‘moral tradition’ 
(MacIntyre 1981, p. 187).  A brief account of these stages of development of the 
concept is necessary if we are to understand MacIntyre's conception of the virtues. 
Stage 1: the social basis of the virtues in ‘practices’ 
 
For MacIntyre the foundation of the core concept of virtue is a social ‘practice’.  In 
this technical sense a ‘practice’ connotes a cooperative activity ordered towards some 
good and requiring certain excellences for the achievement of that good.  MacIntyre 
defines a ‘practice’ thus: 
By a ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially established 
cooperative human activity through which goods integral to that form of activity are realized 
in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and 
partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve 
excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically 
extended. (MacIntyre 1981, p.187) 
 - 151 -  
This definition is rather dense and requires some ‘unpacking’. 
 
The first feature to be clarified is what is to count as a ‘practice’ in MacIntyre’s sense.  
Although he admits that it is not possible to draw a precise line between activities 
which are to be classified as ‘practices’ and activities which are not, MacIntyre argues 
that there are clear examples of each.  Thus, activities or skills which form a part but 
not the whole of a ‘practice’ are not themselves ‘practices’; ‘throwing a football with 
skill’ is not a ‘practice’ ‘but the game of football is’ (MacIntyre 1981, p. 187).  The 
sciences, the humanities and the arts as well as the making and sustaining of human 
communities are ‘practices’:  ‘Thus’, MacIntyre concludes (MacIntyre 1981, p. 188), 
‘the range of practices is wide: arts, sciences, games, politics in the Aristotelian sense, 
the making and sustaining of family life, all fall under the concept’.   
 
A second feature of a ‘practice’ is the constitutive role played in it by its internal 
goods.  By ‘internal goods’, MacIntyre means the excellences, and the enjoyment of 
their exercise, which, because they are proper to the relevant ‘practice’, ‘... can only 
be identified and recognised by the experience of participating in the practice in 
question’ (MacIntyre 1981, p. 188-9).  External goods are those goods which may be 
achieved by participating in a ‘practice’ but which are not among the intrinsic 
excellences of the relevant ‘practice’ e.g. the rewards of money or prestige which 
might flow from such participation.  Unless one is pursuing the internal goods of a 
‘practice’, MacIntyre is arguing, one’s participation in it is only the appearance of 
engagement in it because one is in fact motivated by ‘external goods’ (MacIntyre 
1981, p. 188).  Thus, one may engage in politics according to its rules of excellence 
but in fact be motivated by such extrinsic goods as prestige, or power.  Part of what it 
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means to be engaged in a ‘practice’ is to be committed to, and to experience the 
enjoyment of, its internal goods. 
 
The manner in which such internal goods are to be attained is a third feature of a 
‘practice’.  Success in mastering the excellences of a ‘practice’ and experiencing their 
enjoyment can, according to MacIntyre, be achieved only by the exercise of three 
specific virtues: ‘justice, courage and honesty’ (MacIntyre 1981, p. 191).  The 
excellences of a ‘practice’ are mastered only by submitting our judgments and 
performances to the scrutiny of the community of practitioners whom we 
acknowledge by our engagement in the ‘practice’ as the relevant authorities.  Justice 
is required to acknowledge the need to submit our performances to the authority of 
that community.  Because submission of our performances to the scrutiny of its 
members entails the risk of criticism, courage is required to take that risk.  Of course, 
the risk might be avoided if we are prepared to submit a deceptive performance of 
some kind, but then we would be aware that we had not really mastered the relevant 
excellences at all.  Thus, honesty too is required for genuine engagement in a 
‘practice’.  At this stage of the development of the core concept of a virtue, in other 
words, the ‘excellences’ of a ‘practice’ may not all be moral, but every ‘practice’ will 
require at least these three moral virtues. 
 
The essentially communal nature of a ‘practice’ highlighted in the previous feature is 
also evident in another feature.  While the external goods such as fame and money 
acquired through a practice will, according to MacIntyre, be the possession of the 
individual, the internal goods such as the development of a new batting technique in 
cricket or of a new technique in painting remain the possession of the relevant 
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community (MacIntyre 1981, p. 191).  There is a necessary identity, in other words, 
between the genuine good of an individual engaging in a ‘practice’ and the good of 
the relevant community of ‘practitioners’.  To define the good in private or individual 
terms is, on MacIntyre’s view, to ignore this essential feature of ‘practices’. It is, 
however, one thing to bind the good of the individual to that of the relevant 
community within a ‘practice’, but quite another to do so for the multiplicity of 
activities which constitute the individual’s life as a whole.  MacIntyre acknowledges 
this point in another feature of his concept of a ‘practice’. 
 
It is also in the nature of ‘practices’, MacIntyre argues, that no ‘practice’ constitutes 
the whole of life.  Thus, a good painter may be a poor father: the excellences which he 
brings to painting or acquires and sustains through painting may not extend to other 
areas of life.  MacIntyre recognises, in other words, that it is one thing to show that at 
least some virtues are required to engage in the essentially social activities that he has 
called ‘practices’, but quite another to show that the whole of life has a unity similar 
to ‘practices’, a unity which would thus require these virtues if it were to be lived 
successfully.  But, he argues, it is the individual’s experience of the goods intrinsic to 
particular ‘practices’ that leads him or her to seek the good that will give coherence to 
the actions which together constitute his or her life as a unified narrative.  Only a 
single, overriding conception of the good can bring to the whole of life the coherence 
brought to particular ‘practices’ by their internal goods.  It is to the demonstration and 
elucidation of this proposition that MacIntyre turns next. 
 
Stage 2: life as a unified narrative 
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MacIntyre argues that the liberal individualist2 equation of morality with the qualities 
of individual actions ‘atomises’3 human actions.  By this he means that the isolation of 
individual actions from one another within a person’s life detaches them from the 
very sources of their intelligibility: the narratives4 of which they form parts.  Human 
actions even of the simplest kind, according to MacIntyre, can only be understood if 
the causal intentions and the social and temporal context in which they took place are 
also understood.  A question about what a man is doing may, he argues, be answered 
by an observer in a number of different ways.  The man might be said to be ‘digging’, 
or ‘gardening’ or ‘trying to please his wife’ (MacIntyre 1981, p. 206).  Which, if any, 
of these answers is correct depends on what the man’s primary intention is among all 
these possibilities.  Moreover, MacIntyre argues, if the primary intention is, for 
example, ‘to please his wife’, an understanding of the man’s action would require an 
understanding not only of the general context designated by the term ‘marriage’ but 
also the particular context represented by this marriage.  Was the man ‘trying to 
please his wife’ by getting the garden into the condition she preferred, or was he 
trying to please her by getting some exercise?  If human actions are distinguishable 
from animal actions, MacIntyre argues, by the fact that we can ask for an account of 
them, then an adequate account of this man’s action is not possible without an account 
of its causal intention and its social context.  Indeed, an adequate account of an 
agent’s action, MacIntyre contends, will require a knowledge of his long-term as well 
as his short-term intentions.  Thus, an agent engaged in the intentional action of 
‘writing a sentence’ may also have the long term intention of securing ‘tenure’, an 
intention in which, we can report, the agent either succeeded or failed (MacIntyre 
1981, p. 207).  An adequate account of human actions is in reality, according to 
MacIntyre, an historical narrative.  MacIntyre sums up his account of the relationship 
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between ‘the intentional, the social and the historical’ aspects of human actions in 
precise terms: 
We identify a particular action by invoking two kinds of context, implicitly if not explicitly.  
We place the agent’s intentions, I have suggested, in causal and temporal order with reference 
to their role in his or her history;  and we also place them with reference to their role in the 
history of the setting or settings to which they belong.  In doing this, in determining what 
causal efficacy the agent’s intentions had in one or more directions, and how his short-term 
intentions succeeded or failed to be constitutive of long-term intentions, we ourselves write a 
further part of these histories.  Narrative history of a certain kind turns out to be the basic and 
essential genre for the characterization of human actions (MacIntyre 1981, p. 208). 
It is the ‘narrative’ conception of human action, according to MacIntyre, which makes 
human actions intelligible (MacIntyre 1981, p. 214).  Actions, even verbal utterances, 
detached from their appropriate contexts become unintelligible.  Certain behaviours 
are deemed psychotic because such detachment is one of their characteristics.  Indeed, 
the despair expressed by certain Sartrian characters, according to MacIntyre 
(MacIntyre 1981, p. 214), is a protest that their life narratives have lost their 
intelligibility.   
 
The intelligibility of a life narrative, on MacIntyre’s theory of action, is derived from 
its directedness towards a telos.  To say this is not to say that such a life is governed 
by some external rules such as the Marxist laws of history.  But neither is it to deny 
that the unfolding of one’s own life narrative is constrained by that narrative’s 
necessary involvement with the narratives of others in their peculiar circumstances of 
time and place.  Although constrained in this way, our life narratives are open to the 
future in a way that is unpredictable.  Indeed, writes MacIntyre, 
If the character of our individual and social lives is to continue intelligibly ... it is always both 
the case that there are constraints on how the story can continue and that within those 
constraints there are indefinitely many ways that it can continue (MacIntyre 1981, p. 216).  
Implicit in the conception of life as continuous narrative is the conception of the self 
as the subject of that narrative.  My personal identity remains the same throughout life 
no matter what changes I may undergo.  Two consequences follow from this fact, 
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according to MacIntyre (MacIntyre 1981, p. 217-8).  First, I am the subject of a birth 
to death history with its own peculiar meaning, for which I am accountable.  Second, I 
am one who can ask others for an account of their histories.  As sharers in a common 
history with members of our communities we are accountable to each other for those 
histories. 
 
The unity of my life, so MacIntyre is arguing, is the unity constituted by its nature as 
a single narrative.  The narrative is made intelligible, on his view, by its directedness 
towards a telos, not in the sense that some inbuilt power directs it inevitably towards 
some definite end, but in the sense that one’s inclinations bend one towards a quest 
for some future good, a quest which gives overall unity to the limited goods one has 
experienced in various ‘practices’.  The function and point of the virtues which we 
recognised to a limited extent in our experience of the ‘practices’ becomes fully 
revealed in our quest for the overall good.  Without the virtues, we find we cannot 
sustain this quest: 
The virtues therefore are to be understood as those dispositions which will not only sustain 
practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but which will also sustain 
us in the relevant kind of quest for the good, by enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, 
temptations and distractions which we encounter, and which will furnish us with increasing 
self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the good (MacIntyre 1981, p. 219). 
In answering the question about the unifying good by defining that good as a ‘quest’, 
MacIntyre acknowledges its provisional nature: 
We have then arrived at a provisional conclusion about the good life for man: the good life for 
man is the life spent seeking for the good life for man, and the virtues necessary for the 
seeking are those which will enable us to understand what more and what else the good life 
for man is (MacIntyre 1981, p. 219). 
 
My quest for the good is, however, not just that of an individual but that of one who 
plays a certain social role within the life of a community that will have a tradition 
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about the good and members’ roles in seeking it5. The third stage of MacIntyre’s 
virtue based account of the good is expressed in this concept. 
 
Stage 3: The virtues and ‘moral traditions’ 
‘Practices’, according to MacIntyre, initiate us to various goods and their associated 
virtues.  Such initiation constitutes, on his account, stage one in our development of 
the virtues.  Our initiation to stage one, we saw, stimulates us to the quest for that 
good which will unify our lives as single narratives and as parts of the narrative of the 
historical community to which we belong.  That quest constitutes stage two, on 
MacIntyre’s account, of the development process.  The source of the answer to the 
question ‘what is this unifying good?’ has still to be identified.  MacIntyre’s answer, 
and the third stage in his theory of the development of the virtues, is ‘by initiation to 
the moral tradition of our community’.  Let us outline briefly what MacIntyre means 
by a tradition. 
 
‘A living tradition’, MacIntyre writes, ‘... is an historically extended, socially 
embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which 
constitute that tradition’ (MacIntyre 1981, p. 222).  Several features of this definition 
are noteworthy.  First, by defining traditions as arguments, MacIntyre is asserting that 
true and false statements can be made about the nature of the goods constituting the 
relevant tradition.  There can, in other words, be ethical facts as well as empirical 
facts.  On MacIntyre’s view the ethical fact about the good for a particular individual 
supposes knowledge of that individual’s ‘narrative history’, and it is that knowledge 
which is supposed by moral attributions of virtue or vice to that individual: 
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What is better or worse for X [some individual] depends upon the character of that intelligible 
narrative which provides X’s life with its unity.  Unsurprisingly it is the lack of any such 
unifying conception of a human life which underlies modern denials of the factual character of 
moral judgments and more especially of those judgments which ascribe virtues or vices to 
individuals (MacIntyre 1981, p. 225). 
Second, applied to moral traditions, the definition of traditions as arguments means 
the moral beliefs, values and practices of a community are not simply handed down as 
fixed and unchangeable; rather the ‘living’ quality of the content handed down is 
evident in the fact that the content is part of an argument continuing ‘... sometimes 
through many generations’ (MacIntyre 1981, p. 222).   
 
Third, the social and historical context in which the individual’s quest for his or her 
good takes place is defined by the traditions which form part of his or her life and that 
of his or her community.  Traditions, so MacIntyre seems to argue, are what render 
individual and community ‘narrative histories’ intelligible.  Because the narrative of 
the individual’s life is socially and historically ‘embedded’ in the narrative of the 
community’s life, the traditions rendering intelligible the individual’s life are rendered 
more intelligible by those informing the life of the relevant community:  
the history of a practice in our time is characteristically embedded in and made intelligible in 
terms of the larger and longer history of the tradition through which the practice in its present 
form was conveyed to us;  the history of each of our own lives is generally and 
characteristically embedded in and made intelligible in terms of larger and longer histories of 
a number of traditions (MacIntyre 1981, p. 222). 
The terms of the debate about the good life for me and my community are, in other 
words, defined for me and my community in the traditions we have inherited from the 
past and which we will develop by our own contributions to the debate.  
 
On MacIntyre’s view we are all led by our initiation to ‘practices’ to seek a unified 
good life.  Our traditions define the terms of, and render intelligible the quest for, that 
life as it has unfolded within the community to which we belong.  His provisional 
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answer to the question of what the good life consists in is that it consists in the quest 
itself.  The virtues both sustain us in the quest and fulfil the quest. 
 
To this point, MacIntyre has provided a formidable argument in the terms of social 
theory in support of his Aristotelianism.  However, MacIntyre acknowledges in a 
Thomist journal his commitment to an answer in other terms to his question of what 
the good life consists in6.  He admits his belief in ‘... a community teleologically 
ordered to a substantive conception of the ultimate human good’ (MacIntyre 1991a, p. 
109).  Moreover, he affirms that that teleology is expressed in a conception of ‘... the 
natural law, whose justification can ultimately only be spelled out, as Aquinas spelled 
it out, in theological terms’ (MacIntyre 1991a, p. 108).  Since MacIntyre’s account of 
the virtues can be defended independently of its theological presuppositions7, I will 
not need to examine those presuppositions here8.  But since MacIntyre’s fundamental 
criticism of ethical systems of liberal modernity such as Rawls’ was that such systems 
rendered practical reason incoherent, we must first consider his claim to have 
provided in this account a restoration of a basis for coherent practical reasoning in 
general and in the moral field in particular.   
 
A coherent philosophy of human action 
On the neo-Aristotelian or Thomist account defended by MacIntyre, chains of 
practical reasoning begin from the premise that X is the good for me.  The logical 
outcome of such chains of reasoning, on this view, is action in accordance with that 
premise.  A person who fails to act in accordance with that judgment when it is in his 
or her power to do so, writes MacIntyre, ‘... lapses into the unintelligibility of blank 
inconsistency’ (MacIntyre 1988, p. 341)9.  On the liberal individualist account of 
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‘practical reason’, however, action is not the necessary outcome of a chain of practical 
reasoning.  The reason for this is that the first premise of the liberal individualist chain 
of reasoning is not a proposition about what the good is for me, but a desire.  Desires, 
MacIntyre recognises, can motivate actions but they do not necessarily issue in them 
because desires are subject to change and to overthrow by stronger desires.  Thus, to 
reason that I have a particular desire but not to act on it, even when it is in my power 
to do so, is not unintelligible because desires of their nature are unstable and in 
competition with other desires.  Thus, it is a quite intelligible explanation of a failure 
to act on a desire that I preferred to do something else.  In other words, when practical 
reason is conceived as beginning from desires, no other reasons can be given for 
actions or failures to act than statements of our desires.  This conception of practical 
reason extinguishes not only the possibility of rational debate with others about what 
ought to be done in particular cases but also the possibility of rational deliberation in 
ourselves in such cases.  MacIntyre’s claim is thus that the possibility of rational 
debate and deliberation on practical questions such as moral ones, for example, can be 
restored only by returning to a conception of practical reason on which the first 
premise of a chain of practical reasoning is a proposition about the good for the 
reasoner given his or her role in the relevant community.  MacIntyre believes his 
conception restores coherence to practical reason in the sense of reinstating the 
(logically) necessary link between reason and action, the link dissolved in the liberal 
‘emotivist’ conception.  Justice, on MacIntyre’s conception, will also be a feature of 
the individual’s involvement in a community united around a common conception of 
the good10. 
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MacIntyre on the virtue of justice 
According to MacIntyre, restoration of communities, of the kind which existed in pre-
Enlightenment Europe, united around a particular conception of the good would 
reinstate also the context of discourse which gives intelligibility to the notion of 
justice.  The liberal philosophy which characterises what he calls ‘modernity’ has 
distorted this notion by detaching it from this context, and this distortion has 
undermined the ability of both individuals and society to reason about questions of 
justice as well as all other questions of action.  That context of intelligibility was the 
ethos which prevailed in an admittedly imperfect manner in pre-Enlightenment 
Europe, the ethos expressed in neo-Aristotelian or Thomist ethical theory.  In that 
context, the notion of justice was intelligible because it referred to the social 
arrangements and relationships arising out of a shared allegiance to a particular 
conception of the good.  ‘To spell out what allegiance to some such conception of the 
ultimate human good involves,’ MacIntyre explains, 
is to say what it is towards which the life and activities of the community as a whole are 
directed.  Different types of social arrangement and relationship will be evaluated insofar as 
they do or do not contribute to the achievement of that good (MacIntyre 1991a, p. 99)11. 
The notion of justice, on this pre-Enlightenment matrix, referred, according to 
MacIntyre, to the means of evaluating contributions to the common good.  On this 
understanding, justice consisted, firstly, of the rules (in Latin jus, [plural] jura), 
specifying the desert of each for his or her contribution to the attainment of the 
common good: ‘... what each person participating in relationship owes to each other 
person so participating’ (MacIntyre 1991a, p. 100), and, secondly, in the virtue ‘... 
exemplified in giving due recognition and reward to each office and person according 
to its or his or her contribution to the overall life of the community...’ (MacIntyre 
1991a, p. 100).  The liberal tradition, according to MacIntyre, distorted this pre-
Enlightenment notion of justice from a community’s rules (jura) for determining 
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each’s deserts for his or her contribution to the common good to an agglomeration of 
rights claimed by individuals to enable them to pursue their individual goods.  How 
does this shift in the understanding of jura from community rules for determining 
deserts to individual rights distort the notion of justice? 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter (p. 140), part of the traditional concept of justice 
was the notion of desert or giving to each his or her due.  However, without a shared 
allegiance to a common good, MacIntyre argues, there can be no common standard of 
desert.  Modern liberal theories of justice like Nozick’s and Rawls’ cannot allow ‘... 
this central place, or indeed any kind of place, for desert in claims about justice and 
injustice’ (MacIntyre 1981, p. 249).  Indeed, MacIntyre continues: 
Rawls (p. 310) allows that common sense views of justice connect it with desert, but argues 
first that we do not know what anyone deserves until we have already formulated the rules of 
justice (and hence we cannot base our understanding of justice on desert), and secondly that 
when we have formulated the rules of justice it turns out that it is not desert that is in question 
anyway, but only legitimate expectations (MacIntyre 1981, p. 249-50). 
Nozick’s exclusion of this concept from his theory, MacIntyre concedes, ‘... is less 
explicit, but his scheme of justice being based exclusively on entitlements can allow 
no place for desert’ (MacIntyre 1981, p. 250).  By thus removing this common 
standard of justice provided by shared allegiance to some common good, the liberal 
tradition as represented by these writers, MacIntyre holds, removed also the 
possibility of genuine rational debate about issues of justice and morality generally.  
Modern debates about justice and morality, MacIntyre holds, are but pseudo-debates 
because ‘modernity’ has stripped modern societies of the common standards of 
rationality necessary for genuine debates on such matters. 
 
Justice, on MacIntyre’s conception, is the community’s means to securing the 
common good.  Justice, thus conceived, assigns roles among members in pursuit of 
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that good.  The pursuit of the common good will, however, be impeded by ‘... a 
variety of types of activity inimical to and destructive of those institutions and that 
way of life’ (MacIntyre 1991a, p. 108) embodying the community’s conception of the 
good.  It will therefore be necessary if the good is to be achieved, MacIntyre argues, 
to make laws excluding and prohibiting such activities: ‘These exclusions and 
prohibitions will be the negative aspect of a law, shared respect for which will be a 
necessary constituent of any community within which such an overall conception of 
human life is to be realized’ (MacIntyre 1991a, p. 108).  It is such laws which give 
‘concrete form’ to justice in a community committed to a common good: ‘It is only 
through such law that a justice which will have to make upon each of us demands 
which will have to be expressed in categorical and exceptionless rules, if it is to be a 
justice in which each person and group receive their due, can be given concrete form’ 
(MacIntyre 1991a, p. 108).  To those committed to the relevant conception of the 
common good, MacIntyre believes, ‘... such a law will be primarily an enabling 
resource...’, but to those not so committed, he admits, ‘... it will appear as negative 
and oppressive, a barrier to a variety of claims to liberty of choice’ (MacIntyre 1991a, 
p. 108).  Indeed, that such a conception of law is diametrically opposed to any 
conception based on individual rights can be seen in the universality of its application 
in MacIntyre’s theory: ‘Such a conception of law, integral as it is to an understanding 
of justice which requires that no one be excluded from the claims upon them to 
participate in the tasks of this kind of community, has to extend to the relationships 
between those outside the community and those within it’ (MacIntyre 1991a, p. 108).  
Justice, on this argument, requires the contribution of everybody to the achievement 
of the common good, even of those who do not accept it as their good.  The degree of 
difference between this conception of justice and Rawls’ is even more stark when we 
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consider the scope and foundation of the subject matter of MacIntyre’s conception of 
law: ‘In scope of subject matter, as well as in universality, it will have to have the 
structure of the precepts and arguments of the natural law, whose justification can 
ultimately only be spelled out, as Aquinas spelled it out, in theological terms’ 
(MacIntyre 1991a, p. 108).  This account of MacIntyre’s conception of justice places 
us in a position to assess its ability to satisfy my quest for a theory of social justice 
appropriate to modern democracies.  
 
Social justice on MacIntyre’s account 
MacIntyre does not pretend to have in his conception of justice a set of solutions to 
the problems of justice anywhere, far less in nation-states like Australia.  Rather he 
believes that by basing justice on a conception of the common good, he has provided 
a proper framework for formulating questions and issues of justice.  Within this 
framework, he holds, ‘... we can formulate concerns about both desert and needs, in 
terms of an overall conception of a type of community once again informed by a 
shared conception of, and directed towards a shared achievement of, the ultimate 
human good’ (MacIntyre 1991a, p. 107).  Questions of social justice on this general 
understanding of justice are thus questions about how particular distributions affect 
one’s ability to contribute, or one’s due rewards for one’s contribution, to the 
common good.  ‘What is wrong with nonvoluntary poverty,’ MacIntyre writes, ‘... is 
that it prevents people from cooperating with their neighbours in making and 
sustaining just that type of community’ (MacIntyre 1991a, p. 107).  Inequality of 
opportunity which Rawls counted among the ‘burdens’ of cooperating in society is 
evaluated by MacIntyre in similar terms:  ‘What is wrong with discrimination in terms 
of race or of sex in admission to the kind of educational opportunity which enables 
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people so to contribute, is that it provides an unjust because irrelevant barrier to such 
contributions and such cooperation’ (MacIntyre 1991a, p. 107).  Social justice, on 
MacIntyre’s account, is never a case of justice for its own sake; rather justice is 
always a means to the common good: ‘...removal of such barriers [as racial or sexual 
discrimination] and the provision of enabling resources finds its point and purpose in 
the ends which justice serves, and not simply in justice itself’ (MacIntyre 1991a, p. 
107).  Indeed, MacIntyre sums up his understanding of the nature of social justice by 
reformulating Marx’s aphorism ‘From each according to his or her ability, to each 
according to his or her needs’ to ‘From each according to his or her ability, to each 
according to his or her contribution’ (MacIntyre 1991a, p. 107 italics added). 
 
For MacIntyre, social justice is possible only if the context from which this term 
takes its meaning is restored.  How - if at all - can this context be restored?  He 
holds out no hope of such a restoration in modern liberal nation states because 
society in such states is fragmented into groups engaged in irreconcilable conflicts 
about the nature of the good.  Indeed, he asserts, ‘Modern politics is civil war 
carried on by other means...’ (MacIntyre 1981, p. 253).  Public debate on issues of 
justice and morality is now reduced, he complains, to pseudo-debates in which 
terms such as ‘justice’ take on different meanings according to each debater’s 
fundamental assumptions about the nature of justice and morality.  Starting with 
these different fundamental assumptions, these public debates, he argues, logically 
have to reach different conclusions, and as a result the issues under debate remain 
vulnerable to further contest.  Resolution of such issues to the minimum degree 
necessary to permit social cooperation, according to MacIntyre, typically requires 
citizens to refrain from appeal to the foundations of their own beliefs because their 
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beliefs will ex supposito clash, and, there being no agreed standards for 
adjudicating such clashes, the rational resolution of the issues they underpin will 
be impossible.  In these circumstances, according to MacIntyre, what appear to be 
rational debates become in fact disguised ways of asserting the particular interests 
of the debaters:  
As a consequence [of the rival models of rational justification held by the relevant debaters], 
all too often what appears to be rational argument functions instead as a kind of rhetorical 
device, each of which is in fact only giving expression to its own partisan interests rather than 
participating in a common enterprise, whose end is to arrive at a genuinely rational solution to 
some set of disputed questions (MacIntyre 1991a, p. 106). 
The absence of agreed standards of rationality for the public adjudication of issues of 
justice and morality leads MacIntyre to two conclusions: 
... first, that over a particular range of issues the conditions for rational public debate can no 
longer be satisfied in the large-scale public arenas of our society, and secondly that to 
continue to use the dominant idiom of our recent public debates, that of rights, is to risk both 
misunderstanding and ineffectiveness in such debates (MacIntyre 1991a, p. 109). 
For these reasons, MacIntyre believes it prudent for adherents of his Thomist 
conception of justice ‘...for the moment at least, to a quite new extent to abstain from 
the controversies of large-scale public debate …’ (MacIntyre 1991a, p. 110) over 
issues of justice.  He counsels instead that their case should be put in other ways, 
firstly, in their ‘practice’: ‘We need to show as well as to say what an adequate 
conception of justice amounts to, by constructing the types of institutionalized 
relationship within which it becomes visible’; and ‘[s]econdly, much of our making 
and remaking of institutions occurs in cooperative enterprises, where other 
participants initially have a point of view very different from our own.  So our 
disagreements have to be formulated in concrete terms at the level of practice, as we 
make and remake schools, clinics, workplaces, and other institutions’ (MacIntyre 
1991a, p. 110).  He does, however, urge continued participation in such debates 
within universities. 
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 Universities, MacIntyre argues, should see their function as facilitating the rational 
conduct of debates between what, as we noticed above, he called rival ‘traditions’ of 
enquiry.  Such debate, he insists, should be conducted not by reference to what he 
describes as the ‘fictitious standards of objectivity’ of modern liberal individualist 
society but by rules which he proposes in his book Whose Justice?  Which 
Rationality? (MacIntyre 1988).  MacIntyre believes that the ‘fictitious standards of 
objectivity’ embraced by liberal individualists reflect a view that truth is unchanging 
and its apprehension independent of social conditioning of any kind.  For these 
reasons, he laments, liberal individualists have abandoned the notion of ‘tradition’ to 
adherents of the doctrines of Edmund Burke: 
The individualism of modernity could of course find no use for the notion of tradition within 
its own conceptual scheme except as an adversary notion; it therefore all too willingly 
abandoned it to the Burkeans, who, faithful to Burke’s own allegiance, tried to combine 
adherence in politics to a conception of tradition which would vindicate the oligarchical 
revolution of property of 1688 and adherence in economics to the doctrine and institutions of 
the free market.  The theoretical incoherence of this mismatch did not deprive it of ideological 
usefulness  (MacIntyre 1981, p.222). 
The notion of tradition is, MacIntyre implies, necessarily communal, but the Burkeans 
have used it to justify the seizing of common property by certain rich individuals 
under the British Enclosure Laws.  The embrace of a communal notion to protect their 
property interests did not prevent the same individuals espousing and exploiting 
individualist economic doctrines and institutions when the latter posture suited their 
ideological interests.  Justice, like the other virtues, is thus detached from the context 
which gave it meaning, and can only be properly understood when that context, that 
of contributing to the quest of a community for its common good, is restored.  
Individualist ontology, MacIntyre is arguing, distorts ethical notions like justice 
because it fails to recognize the bondedness of human beings across space and time, 
and the consequences of this bondedness for a true understanding of the nature of 
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human action.  It is this failure of understanding which leads liberal individualists to 
interpretations of ethical concepts like the virtue of justice or of chastity that are 
detached from their contexts of meaning, and to an incoherent philosophy of action. 
 
If restoration of these contexts of meaning is to be possible, according to MacIntyre, 
the true nature of the epistemological problem posed by the clash of ideologies and 
their associated theories of justice in modern societies must be understood and 
addressed.  Such an understanding will require the exposure as a pretence of the 
liberal individualist claim that there is some neutral or tradition-independent 
epistemological stance which, if adopted by the state, will enable avoidance of 
addressing the relevant ideological clashes by negotiating tradition-independent rules 
of common life.  Instead it will be necessary to recognize the tradition-bound nature 
of inquiry and to discern the procedures and rules by which traditions can be assessed. 
 
Appraisal of MacIntyre’s account of justice as virtue12
The first objection that might be levelled at MacIntyre’s virtue-based theory of justice 
is that the conception of the common good on which it is based is allowed to define 
the good of the individual.  Theories which define the good of the individual in terms 
of some common good provide the theoretical basis for totalitarian regimes like 
fascism and communism.  The kind of conception of the good I am seeking, its critics 
could therefore argue, can only be attained by suppressing individual liberty in the 
ways condemned by Hayek and Rawls.  W.D. Hudson, for example, finds it  
remarkable that MacIntyre regards the idea that a man realizes his telos only in so far as he 
contributes to the realization of the larger telos of his community, with such uncritical 
approval; and that he considers what he calls the invention of the individual, manifest in 
emotivist and existentialist conceptions of morality, to have been such an unqualified moral 
disaster (Hudson 1983, p. 362). 
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The first part of my response here is that, in levelling this difficulty, Hudson and 
likeminded critics are wittingly or unwittingly making an important concession to 
MacIntyre.  Instead of insisting on the possibility of epistemological and ideological 
neutrality in relation to a dispute about the good, they have followed his prescription 
(summarized in the last paragraph of previous section) for dealing with such disputes 
in universities.  Since I am in substantial, though not necessarily complete, agreement 
with this prescription, I intend to follow it in the second part of my response to this 
difficulty.   
 
According to MacIntyre’s prescription, debate between contending traditions on 
matters like justice should, among other things, expose those aspects of the topic 
which can be explained, and those which cannot, by each tradition.  Thus, MacIntyre 
can explain the nature of justice in a way that avoids rendering practical reason 
incoherent, but he does so at what his rivals see as a cost: the cost of defining the 
good in a way that leads to totalitarianism, or at least that cannot be applied to modern 
societies.  If this criticism were correct in the first part of its claim that MacIntyre’s 
definition of the good as common led to totalitarianism, it would conspicuously fail to 
meet my requirements for I am committed to a quest for a form of social justice for a 
democracy.  I must therefore first assess these contending conceptions of the good on 
the score of their compatibility with the notion of democracy.  
 
I think MacIntyre’s conception of the good as common rather than individual can 
stand up against the charge of being totalitarian for at least two reasons.  First, 
MacIntyre is aware of this danger and explicitly repudiates any totalitarian conception 
of the common good.  According to MacIntyre, to suppose that his account of justice 
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could provide the basis for order in nation-states like Australia is to fail to recognise 
the nature of the community implied in that account.  To make this supposition is to 
fall into the error of what he calls ‘communitarianism’.  MacIntyre speaks of 
‘contemporary communitarians’ as theorists ‘from whom I have strongly dissociated 
myself whenever I have had an opportunity to do so’ (MacIntyre 1994, p. 302)13 
because of their ‘... distinctively Romantic vision of nations ... as actual or potential 
communities, whose unity could be expressed through the institutions of the state’, a 
vision ‘... which liberals have rightly resisted, understanding how it generates 
totalitarian and other evils’ (MacIntyre 1994, p. 302-3).  Where Hayek and Rawls saw 
their versions of liberalism as solutions to the problem of order in the modern nation-
state, MacIntyre sees the nation-state itself as an impediment to the Aristotelian form 
of community he favours.  The nation-state is divided not only by a plurality of 
conceptions of the good but also by a plurality of conceptions of rationality.  This 
polity, MacIntyre believes, has therefore been stripped by the ‘modernity’ that 
spawned it of the means of rationally settling its disputes about the good and of 
healing its divisions.  If MacIntyre is correct, in other words, modern liberal societies 
need not only new conceptions of morality but also new polities if they are to be cured 
of the ills of ‘modernity’.   
 
Second, as we saw on page 158 above, stage 3 in MacIntyre’s account of the 
development of the virtues consists in initiation to one’s moral tradition which, as we 
recall,‘... is an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument 
precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition’ (MacIntyre 1981 p. 
222).  The individual, on MacIntyre’s conception of the common good, is permitted, 
and indeed required, to contribute to the argument about the community’s goods.  It 
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is, however, typical of clashes between such traditions that they interpret the same 
terms in different ways.  Thus, freedom in Rawls’ tradition is not the freedom to 
determine one’s own good, the freedom defended by liberals like Hayek and Rawls.  
This is not to say that there will be no overlap at all between the contending 
interpretations.  Presumably, MacIntyre holds some belief like the Christian doctrine 
of the dignity of the human person which would prohibit the treatment of individuals 
as means to community ends as totalitarian ideologies permit.  However, it is to say 
that in MacIntyre’s view the liberal conception of freedom as the right of the 
individual to determine his or her own good is substantially incompatible with his 
conception of the good as common.  A conception of the good as common, such as 
MacIntyre’s, is therefore not necessarily totalitarian, and thus not necessarily 
disqualified as a candidate for the democratic form of justice I am looking for.  
MacIntyre’s version of this conception of the good is, however, less compatible than 
its liberal rival with the notion of democracy in several respects.    
 
It seems to me of little solace to his sympathisers for MacIntyre to plead that his 
account of the good and justice is not intended to be a candidate for a basis for order 
in democratic nation-states.  Since those sympathisers have to live in such states, they 
need a form of justice to provide public order.  Given the nature of democracy itself 
implies some degree of individual freedom, those sympathisers do not need to be 
unwitting liberals to feel uncomfortable with the restrictions on liberty envisaged by 
MacIntyre in his just society.  We have already observed MacIntyre’s 
acknowledgment that his conception of the good would require curtailment of certain 
individual liberties by enacting a law to protect the pursuit of the common good, a law 
which to those not committed to the relevant conception of the common good, he 
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admits, ‘... will appear as negative and oppressive, a barrier to a variety of claims to 
liberty of choice’ (MacIntyre 1991a, p. 108).  While it would be unfair, indeed 
patently false, to interpret him to be prescribing a conception of the good on which to 
base order in a modern liberal state, it seems to me fair by his own standards for 
assessing rival traditions to see as a weakness in his account of justice its 
inapplicability to the kind of state in which most of his readers live.  One can 
acknowledge considerable force in his argument that, contrary to the theories which 
characterise liberal modernity, a true conception of the common good is possible but 
it is only attainable within a suitable community structure, and that anybody wishing 
to attain that good must therefore renounce as far as possible life in the wider societies 
of modernity and retreat to appropriate forms of community on those societies’ 
margins.  Before acceding to that argument, however, sympathisers with accounts of 
justice based on a substantive notion of the common good are entitled, by MacIntyre’s 
standards for assessing traditions, to scrutinise alternative accounts of this kind to see 
whether these accounts can accommodate the good of individual freedom. 
 
One such alternative account comes from Charles Taylor who, along with most 
modern Catholic theologians, challenges MacIntyre’s repudiation of modern liberal 
societies.  Taylor discusses MacIntyre’s version of virtue-based ethics in his 
contribution to a volume of essays titled After MacInytre (Taylor 1994)14.  Taylor 
implies that MacIntyre errs by not recognising that certain goods can transcend goods 
internal to practices, and that in the age of modernity one such ‘...vision of the good, 
that of disengaged, free, rational agency, [is] one of the most important, formative 
transcendent goods of our civilization’ (Taylor 1994, p. 36).  Justice also, according to 
Taylor, can have a transcendent form as well as the form it takes within the practices 
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of a particular community.  Taylor challenges the core of MacIntyre’s thesis, namely, 
that an Aristotelian view of the good and justice is necessarily at odds with liberal 
modernity’s ‘...vision of the good ... [as] disengaged, free, rational agency...’, and 
with accounts of justice, such as Rawls’, based on this vision.  This transcendent good 
is referred to in various places by Taylor as ‘disengaged reason’ (Taylor 1994, p. 32) 
and ‘disengaged freedom’ (Taylor 1994, p. 35), and its source located in ‘modern 
rationalism’ (Taylor 1994, p. 35).  Taylor’s case against MacIntyre’s thesis is that 
while modern rationalist defences of ‘disengaged reason’ must fail against 
MacIntyre’s Aristotelian critique of this notion, and by extension that MacIntyre’s 
account of justice remains unscathed, Taylor’s own Aristotelian defence of 
‘disengaged reason’ succeeds, and requires modification of that account of justice.  
We turn now to a consideration of Taylor’s case against MacIntyre’s thesis. 
 
As a fellow Aristotelian, Taylor agrees with MacIntyre, firstly, that ethics is 
concerned with the good rather than the right, as modern rationalist defenders of the 
notion of ‘disengaged reason’ hold, and, secondly, that the good can be found in our 
various practices.  However, Taylor diverges from MacIntyre in asserting, as he does 
in the passage quoted in the previous paragraph, that there can also be goods which 
transcend these practices, one important example of such a transcendent good, for 
Taylor, being ‘the ideal of disengaged reason’ (Taylor 1994, p. 32).  Encounters with 
such ‘transcendent goods’, Taylor argues, confront us all with a question for practical 
reason, ‘How do we think, reason, increase our understanding of such goods?’ (Taylor 
1994, p. 35).  For Taylor, it is the superior ability of the Aristotelians to answer this 
question for practical reason that gives them victory over modern rationalist defences 
of ‘disengaged reason’. 
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 Aristotelians like MacIntyre, Taylor believes, are often taken by modern rationalists 
to be obliged, by their commitment to the existing goods of their practices, to respond 
to this question by rejecting the possibility of any revision of the existing goods, and a 
fortiori the possibility of any transcendent good (transcendent only in the sense of 
transcending the goods internal to particular practices).  But, Taylor points out, 
MacIntyre shows convincingly that Aristotelians are under no obligation to preserve 
the existing goods from revision.  According to Taylor, MacIntyre’s notion of a 
‘narrative unity of a human life’ (Taylor 1994, p. 34) provides a very sophisticated 
account of how our goods can be revised and integrated into a particular conception of 
the good.  In fact, according to Taylor, the ones who have a problem explaining how 
we reason about transcendent goods are the modern rationalist defenders of ‘the 
modern idea of disengaged freedom’ (Taylor 1994, p. 35).   
 
Modern rationalists are anxious to explain ‘disengaged reason’ as a meta-ethical 
principle by which we reason rather than a good about which we reason.  They 
believe that it is only insofar as reason is disengaged from particular conceptions of 
the good that it is able to revise them, and indeed to trump them.  Such defenders of 
‘disengaged reason’ believe, according to Taylor, that to concede this idea’s 
dependence on any ‘context of practice’, or that it might not be ‘... independent of 
particular life experiences and cultural settings’ (Taylor 1994, p. 35) would call into 
question its disengagement from goods and risk reducing it to a good.  ‘A procedural 
ethic of rules,’ Taylor explains, ‘cannot cope with the prospect that the sources of 
good might be plural’ (Taylor 1994, p. 39).  In their anxiety to avoid this pitfall, 
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modern rationalists, Taylor believes, neglect a crucial fact about the nature of 
practical reason that differentiates it from theoretical reason. 
 
Theoretical reason, Taylor contends, can disengage itself from its objects of study to a 
much greater extent than can practical reason.  Presumably this is because practical 
reason in the ethical sphere is operating on questions about the ‘good-for-me-and-
mine’ whereas theoretical reason is operating only on questions about what is, the 
answers to which can only contingently affect my good.  The ‘ideal of disengaged 
reason’, Taylor holds, has served modern civilisation well in modern science and 
technology where it operates on things other than my good but it cannot do the same 
job for ethics where it is directly concerned with my good : 
By its very nature practical reason can only function within the context of some implicit grasp 
of the good, be it that mediated by a practice to which this good is internal or by practices 
which contribute to it as cause and constituent, or by contact with paradigm models, in life or 
story, or however (Taylor 1994, p. 35). 
In order to reason about the good at all, Taylor is arguing, practical reason, unlike 
theoretical reason, must have antecedently some grasp of the good even if only of 
transcendent goods encountered in models or stories like the Gospel stories rather 
than goods encountered in actual practices.  That practical reason is unable to operate 
independent of some conception of the good is evident for Taylor in the different 
methods and standards of proof employed by ‘practical reason’ on the one hand and 
‘theoretical reason’ on the other:  
You cannot prove that man is rational life, or rational agency, or the image of God, the way 
you show the kinetic theory of heat or the inverse square law.  The gains of practical reason 
are all within a certain grasp of the good, and involve overcoming earlier distortions and 
fragmentary understanding.  The certainty we gain is not that some conclusion is ultimately 
valid, but that it represents a gain over what we held before.  The propositions of which we 
can be confident are comparative.  What we are confident of is that our present formulations 
articulate better, less distorted, less partially, what we were never entirely without some sense 
of.  Moral knowledge, unlike that gained in natural science, does not deal with the wholly new 
(Taylor 1994, p. 36). 
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This degree of necessary engagement with the good on the part of practical reason 
means, according to Taylor, that MacIntyre is correct in his contention that the liberal 
conception of practical reason as ‘disengaged’ from any context (i.e. from any 
conception of the good) is incoherent and leads to ‘scepticism’ and ‘despair’.  An 
effective defence of the notion of ‘disengaged reason’ against this criticism, Taylor 
argues, requires acknowledgment of the notion’s dependence on a ‘context of 
practice’ and its conception of the good, and ‘... trying to articulate better what this 
context implies’ (Taylor 1994, p. 36).  Articulation of these implications, Taylor 
believes, would reveal ‘... that the goods about which one reasons in [practical 
reason’s] context-related way include transcendent ones, and that this reasoning does 
not by any means have to be comprehensive only, but can be highly revisionist’ 
(Taylor 1994, p. 36).  In order to be capable of revising goods, reason, in other words, 
does not, on Taylor’s version of Aristotelianism, have to be so absolutely disengaged 
from any good that ‘disengaged reason’ must be conceivable only as a meta-ethical 
principle.  Concession of this degree of engagement on the part of reason is sufficient, 
on Taylor’s argument, both to remedy the incoherence in practical reason exposed by 
MacIntyre in the modern rationalist case, and to preserve the good implied in the 
notion of ‘disengaged reason’.  Moreover, since the notion of ‘disengaged reason’, on 
Taylor’s defence, transcends particular practices, MacIntyre’s own account of the 
nature of the good is exposed as defective insofar as he rejects the possibility of 
‘transcendent goods’.  Indeed, in the last section of his essay, Taylor argues that one 
consequence of his theory of ‘transcendent goods’ is that communities can be 
confronted with one valid standard of justice emerging from the goods internal to 
their practices and another equally valid standard arising from a transcendent good. 
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In his reply to Taylor in the same volume, MacIntyre rejects the suggestion that there 
can be goods which transcend practices in the sense of being ‘wholly independent of 
practices...’ (MacIntyre 1994, p. 289).  Insofar as alleged goods like the ideal of 
‘disengaged reason’ are goods, MacIntyre argues, they are so because of their roles 
within practices.  Because practices can be ‘injured and deformed’ by ‘unscrutinised 
considerations independent of and possibly at odds with the practices’ goods ... 
[becoming] influential in the activities and relationships of its participants’ 
(MacIntyre 1994, p. 289), reason, whether practical or theoretical, needs to be able to 
disengage ‘... from any commitment which either is, or is with reason suspected to be, 
a contingent source of distortion or illusion’ (MacIntyre 1994, p. 289).  Such 
disengagement, however, is never ‘... from those contexts of practice from within 
which it acquires its point and purpose’ (MacIntyre 1994, p. 289).  Conceived in 
Taylor’s sense of ‘transcend[ing] all our practices’ (Taylor 1994, p. 35), the idea of 
‘disengaged reason’, according to MacIntyre, ‘...is a philosophical illusion, one that 
has both its Cartesian and empiricist versions’ (MacIntyre 1994, p. 289).  And, 
according to MacIntyre, ‘... because it is an illusion’, Taylor’s attachment of 
‘important beliefs about human dignity to it [casts] needless doubts on those beliefs’ 
(MacIntyre 1994, p. 289). 
 
But Taylor’s point is that Aristotelianism, at least as he understands it, is 
distinguished from any ‘procedural ethic of rules’ by its ability to accommodate a 
plurality of goods.  Thus, he holds, transcendent goods, even though they may be 
incompatible with the goods internal to some practices, may nonetheless be able to 
co-exist with them.  In the case of ‘disengaged reason’, its status as a transcendent 
good can, according to Taylor, be acknowledged provided that it is not detached from 
 - 178 -  
its context of origin and transformed into a meta-ethical principle for eliminating all 
other conceptions of the good.  In the case of justice, Taylor believes, a community 
might agree that a particular member might deserve a greater reward than all other 
members for a conspicuously greater contribution to the common good, but the same 
community may also accept Rawls’ much stricter ideal of distributive justice of 
equality for all save only for the ‘difference principle’.  MacIntyre’s argument has 
been that since Rawls’ principles of justice have not been generated from the practices 
of any community, to regard them as transcendent goods is to fall victim to an illusion 
which can only be dissolved by recognising the ‘desert’ criterion as the true one.  
Taylor suggests that this conclusion is too hasty.  Why? 
Because we could also understand the dispute this way: each side is pointing to a different 
good.  These may indeed be rivals, and in that sense, incompatible; but they are still both 
goods.  The fact that the theory designating one is valid need not mean that that designating 
the other is confused and invalid - although special arguments in one or the other case may 
show that this is so (Taylor 1994, p. 38). 
Taylor’s argument is that we can and do recognize goods which transcend, and, in 
some cases such as the prophets’ condemnation of the sacrifices of Israel as 
‘abominations’ in the sight of God, even ‘repudiate’ current practices (Taylor 1994, p. 
35).  So called transcendent goods cannot be dismissed as ‘philosophical illusions’ 
simply because they transcend our present practices.   
 
MacIntyre, however, does not believe that his objection to the possibility of 
‘transcendent goods’ has been adequately addressed by Taylor.  MacIntyre’s question 
is ‘how can any community recognize a supposed transcendent good as a good, 
especially if, as in the case of the prophets’ demands of Israel, the supposed good 
(‘pure hearts’) is opposed to some of the goods (‘holocausts’) internal to the relevant 
community’s present practices?’  MacIntyre explains that on his account of the 
Aristotelian ethic, the good can only be recognised as such by individuals when they 
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ask themselves, ‘What is my good?’ (MacIntyre 1994, p. 288).  The answer to this 
question, his explanation continues, can be discovered only by the participation of the 
relevant individuals in the practices of their community, and in the processes of 
ordering the goods internal to those practices to the community’s overall conception 
of the good life.  So called ‘transcendent goods’, MacIntyre is arguing, could not even 
be recognized as goods if they transcended ‘all our practices’, as Taylor holds (Taylor 
1994, p. 35), because ‘[a]ll goods are ... partially defined by their relationship to 
practices and to the common good’ (MacIntyre 1994, p. 288).  Rather, on MacIntyre’s 
theory, the types of goods termed by Taylor ‘transcendent’ are ‘... integrative of and 
partly structured in terms of the goods internal to particular practices, and never to be 
understood as wholly independent of them ...’ (MacIntyre 1994, p. 288).  Applied to 
the notion of ‘disengaged reason’, Taylor’s example of an important modern 
‘transcendent good’, MacIntyre’s conclusion implies that, conceived as transcending 
‘all our practices’ (Taylor’s phrase), this notion must be a philosophical illusion.  For, 
notwithstanding the need for the kind of disengagement necessary for healthy 
reflection upon a community’s practices, there can none the less be no ‘...standpoint 
which is that of reason disengaged as such, independent of all practice-based 
standpoints’ (MacIntyre 1994, p. 289). 
 
MacIntyre’s rejection of the possibility of ‘transcendent goods’ is of crucial 
importance to his thesis on liberal modernity.  If there can be goods which transcend 
the practices of communities, a liberal society could be the source of some such goods 
including the good regarded by Taylor as ‘... one of the most important, formative 
goods of our civilization’ (Taylor 1994, p. 36), namely, ‘disengaged reason’.  If 
Taylor’s position were admitted, a society would be possible in which communities 
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could flourish in the pursuit of their common good while also acknowledging such 
goods as ‘disengaged reason’ and transcendent principles of justice like Rawls’.  But 
such a society sounds very like the societies of liberal modernity which MacIntyre’s 
entire endeavour has been to expose as fatally flawed.  Yet, despite the importance to 
MacIntyre’s thesis of rejecting the possibility of such ‘transcendent goods’ as 
‘disengaged freedom’, it is difficult not to agree with Taylor that the distance between 
his position and MacIntyre’s on this question is not great ‘in substance’ (Taylor 1994, 
p. 34).  Although Taylor speaks in terms of goods transcending practices, even his 
example of a good which repudiated previous practices, the ‘pure hearts’ called for in 
place of ‘holocausts’ on the part of Israel, was a good for the life of that community.  
That good quite evidently was lacking in the practices of the community at that time 
and is thus in that sense justifiably described by Taylor as a transcendent good.  But 
the measure of its goodness and the source of its power to evoke conversion was its 
resonance with an authentic part of that tradition of which the contemporary practices 
(‘holocausts’) formed a part.  Probably, both Taylor and MacIntyre would agree with 
this last claim.  At the theoretical level, then, there may not be a great distance 
between their two positions.  At the practical level, however, Taylor’s version of 
Aristotelianism can be applied to democratic nation-states whereas MacIntyre’s 
cannot.  
 
Conclusion 
MacIntyre’s account of justice is undoubtedly capable of generating social solidarity 
since it supposes a conception of the common good to which its adherents are deeply 
committed.  This conception is so thick, however, that, on his own admission, it 
cannot be applied to democratic nation-states.  MacIntyre’s account thus fails to meet 
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my basic requirement of a satisfactory form of social justice.  My other requirements 
arising out of the particular problems confronting Australian society at present will 
also not be met by this account.  The positions of our Aboriginal peoples, of the 
aggrieved faith groups and of asylum seekers, on MacIntyre’s account, will simply be 
examples that demonstrate the incapacity of nation-states to constitute communities of 
justice.  The source of this incapacity is this account’s inability to accommodate 
goods transcending its own conception of the good.  If, however, this difficulty can be 
overcome, as Taylor has argued, the result might be a conception of the good with the 
capacity not only to generate the social solidarity that liberal proceduralism was 
adjudged to lack, but also to be applied to democratic nation-states.  In the next 
chapter, I will examine Taylor’s writings on justice and the good to see whether an 
account of justice capable of satisfying my quest can be assembled from them. 
                                          
Notes to chapter four 
1  This recognition is evident in at least two facts.  First, a symposium on his After Virtue (MacIntyre 
1981) was conducted in the journal Inquiry (Volumes 26, 27).  Second, a book titled After MacIntyre 
(Horton and Mendus 1994) has been devoted to the assessment of both his critique of liberalism and his 
own theory of justice.  In particular, however, Stephen Mulhall (Mulhall, Stephen 1994, p. 205) and 
Robert Stern (Stern 1994, p. 147) draw attention in their contributions to the latter volume to the 
importance of MacIntyre’s critique of ‘modernity’ and of Rawls’ theory of justice as representative of 
that modernity.  For a Marxist critique of MacIntyre’s judgment of modernity, see (McMylor 1994).   
A comprehensive bibliography of MacIntyre’s works can be found online at 
http://www.netidea.com/~whughes/macintyre.html.  A collection of his most important works appears 
in (Knight 1998). 
2  ‘Liberal individualism’, according to Nigel Pleasants, is the ‘captive’ in the Wittgensteinian sense of 
a certain ‘picture’ of the individual: 
The picture of individual as a creative rule-follower in possession of tacit knowledge is deeply 
ingrained in our individualist intellectual and political culture.  This picture epitomizes the liberalist 
presentation of the modern subject: a freely-choosing, epistemically sovereign individual.  As 
Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein 1968, 115) says, ‘a picture held us captive, for it lay in our language and 
language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably’ (Pleasants 1997, p. 37). 
Note the similarity between Pleasants’ and Shapiro’s (p. 104, note 20) characterisation of ‘liberal 
individualism’. 
3  Charles Taylor (Taylor 1990a) makes a similar claim an attempt at rebutting which is made by 
Moore and Crisp;  see the discussion in (Moore and Crisp 1996, pp. 608-11) in which an extensive set 
of references is presented.  For an account of what is meant by ‘social atomism’ in analytical 
philosophy, see (Pettit 1995, pp. 28-30). 
4  On MacIntyre’s use of this concept see (Bell 1990) and on the use of this concept in the sciences 
philosophy and literature see all the essays in this volume.  See also (Allen 1993), (Schneewind 1982; 
Colby 1995; Bloechl 1998) and (Bradley 1990). 
5  For another neo-Aristotelian account of the ultimate end of the human person, see (Ashley 1994).  
This work includes numerous references to similar works. 
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6  It is important to note that I am not reading MacIntyre’s works referred to so far (MacIntyre 1981; 
1985; 1988) as defences of the ‘substantive conception of the ultimate human good’ referred to in the 
next sentence.  Indeed, it was to the article (MacIntyre 1991a) from which this quotation is taken that I 
had to turn to ascertain whether MacIntyre held such a commitment.  I do claim, however, that in this 
article MacIntyre does acknowledge such a commitment. 
7  The ultimate ground of MacIntyre’s ethic is Aquinas’s ‘unified metaphysical theology’ (MacIntyre, 
1988, p. 171), and in particular his account of the ‘natural law’ (MacIntyre, 1991a, p. 108).  MacIntyre 
presents his account of Aquinas’s ‘unified metaphysical theology’ in chapters X and XI of his Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality? (1988)7.  Aquinas’s theology is based on a unified conception of the good, 
pace Rawls who, as MacIntyre reminds us, regards such a conception ‘... as irrational, or more likely as 
mad’ (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 165 quoting Rawls 1971).  But like Rawls, Aquinas, according to 
MacIntyre, also ‘... recognized the variety and heterogeneity of goods...’ (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 165), 
and, like Aristotle, he saw the unification of those goods as being accomplished within ‘the teleological 
order of the cosmos’ which is theologically specified (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 166).  Within that order, on 
Aquinas’s theology, human beings have their own specific telos.  That telos, MacIntyre tells us 
(MacIntyre, 1988, p. 173), orients us to apprehend being and good: 
We do indeed, according to Aquinas, apprehend being as the most fundamental concept of 
theoretical enquiry and make explicit what we apprehend in the recognition which our 
judgments accord to the principle of noncontradiction.  Similarly we apprehend good as the 
most fundamental concept in forming practical activity and make explicit what we apprehend 
in the recognition which our actions accord to the principle that good is to be done and evil to 
be avoided (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 173). 
In order to achieve that telos, human beings need a certain natural directedness (inclinatio) toward the 
forms of action it requires.  Thus, the animal aspect of our nature directs toward the production and 
education of children ‘... to participate in the human forms of life’ (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 173), while the 
rational aspect of our nature directs us toward the pursuit of knowledge and above all knowledge of 
God.  Practical reason, in deliberating about how one must act in order to achieve one’s good, comes to 
know the ‘natural law’. 
The ‘natural law’, for Aquinas, is not natural in the sense that human beings are supposed to be ordered 
by some kind of biological or mechanical necessity towards particular ways of acting.  Rather the 
‘natural law’ is a command of reason, and thus its necessity can only be moral: the law tells me what I 
must do, or not do, in order to achieve my good.  The natural moral law is a participation in the divine 
law.  In an explication of prudence, the virtue which in Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s theories enables us to 
order our actions in accordance with divine law, MacIntyre writes ‘...according to Aquinas the good 
legislator needs prudentia, but that prudentia is exercised so that human law accords with divine law, 
more especially in respect of the divinely ordained precepts of the natural law’ (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 
197).  The ‘natural law’, according to Aquinas, is divided into primary and secondary precepts.  
MacIntyre explains: 
The precepts of natural law are themselves divided into the genuinely exceptionless first 
principles and the secondary conclusions immediately following from these, which do not 
vary from culture to culture any more than do the first principles, except when vice and sin 
have obliterated awareness of them, but which do require on numerous particular types of 
occasion supplementation in order to have right application (S.T. Ia-IIae, 94, 5) (MacIntyre, 
1988, p. 195). 
For purposes of adjudicating MacIntyre’s dispute with Taylor over the possibility of ‘transcendent 
goods’, I do not need to detail these precepts.  What is important for my purposes is MacIntyre’s 
alignment of himself with that school of interpreters of the ‘natural law’ which holds that ‘the essential 
nature of human beings’ (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 179) discloses to practical reason ‘... genuinely 
exceptionless first principles and the secondary conclusions immediately following from these, which 
do not vary from culture to culture any more than do the first principles...’.  Aquinas, in short, believed 
that human beings, like all creatures, had a metaphysical constitution which he termed their ‘nature’ or 
‘essence’.  That nature or essence was immutable7.  This ‘essentialist’ school of Thomist theologians, 
with which MacIntyre aligns himself, interprets the ‘natural law’ as a detailed set of absolute moral 
precepts to be apprehended by practical reason reflecting correctly on questions about one’s good. 
 
8  On the notion of ‘teleology’, see also (Bradden-Mitchell and Jackson 1997) and (Matthen 1997). 
9  On this see also (MacIntyre 1986). 
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10  MacIntyre could be criticised here for failing to acknowledge that desires can be evaluated (a) as 
appropriate or inappropriate means to the fulfillment of other desires, and (b) as the kinds of desires we 
ought to have in the relevant circumstances.  On this see (Becker c1996) to whom MacIntyre might 
reply such instrumental reasoning permits no conclusions about one’s ultimate ends, reference to which 
alone can lend ultimate stability and coherence to practical reasoning.  For an Aristotelian argument on 
how desires can and should be evaluated,  see (Taylor 1985a, ch. 1). 
11  To anyone who asks why communities rather than traditions are called for by MacIntyre, his reply is 
that the traditions spring from and feed back into the life of the relevant communities, and are 
evaluated as stated in this quotation.  Traditions are distinct from and auxiliary to the life of their 
communities. 
12  Some useful critical appraisals of MacIntyre’s work include (Horton and Mendus 1994), (Barber 
1988), (Galston 1998), (Kymlicka, W. 1989), (Mulhall, Stephen 1994); on the virtues, see (Martin 
1994), (Annas 1995) and (Wartofsky).  
13  MacIntyre  took advantage of another such opportunity in a letter to a periodical The Responsive 
Community (Summer 1991) to this effect: 
In spite of rumours to the contrary, I am not and never have been a communitarian.  For my judgement 
is that the political, economic, and moral structures of advanced modernity in this country, as 
elsewhere, exclude the possibility of realizing any of the worthwhile types of political community 
which at various times in the past have been achieved, even if always in imperfect forms.  And I also 
believe that attempts to remake modern societies in systematically communitarian ways will always be 
either ineffective or disastrous (quoted by Bell 1996, p. 17). 
Michael Sandel also regards this ‘communitarian’ characterisation as ‘misleading ... insofar as it 
implies that rights should rest on values or preferences that prevail in any given community at any 
given time’ (Sandel, Michael 1998 2nd edn, p. 186).  For an important recent volume of essays on new 
communitarian thinking, see (Etzioni 1995, esp. essays by Spragens, Walzer, Taylor and Etzioni). 
14  A comprehensive bibliography of Taylor’s works can be found online at 
http://www.netidea.com/~whughes/taylor3.html.  A useful collection of essays on his work can be 
found in (Tully 1994).  Among the most important  of Taylor’s works are (Taylor 1985b; 1989c; 
1995a).  Of special interest for this thesis are his publications on ‘modernity’: (Taylor 1991; 1995b).  
An interesting record of Taylor’s views on community is contained in (Abbey 1996). 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Taylor and justice where ‘disengaged freedom’ is a limited good 
 
Introduction 
My quest in this thesis has been for a theory of justice appropriate for application to 
nation-states like Australia.  The theory I am looking for, I have said throughout the 
thesis, would need to be thick enough to generate the social solidarity I believe is 
necessary to sustain a democracy.  The test of that theory’s acceptability for 
application to Australia’s democracy would be its evident ability (a) to heal the 
division between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australians, (b) to base the right to 
subsistence on citizenship rather than the capacity to earn, and (c) to be more 
inclusive in both its membership and its public policy deliberations of groups 
presently excluded or marginalised by liberal proceduralist principles1 and practice of 
justice.  Thus far in this thesis I have considered three accounts of justice, two that I 
have termed liberal proceduralist and one roughly classified in the relevant literature 
as communitarian.  Each of these accounts has been found wanting according to one 
or more of my criteria. 
 
The liberal proceduralist accounts were adjudged incapable of generating the social 
solidarity necessary to sustain a democratic nation-state because of the thinness of 
the conception of the good on which they were based.  Indeed, Rawls’ claim that his 
version of this theory was based on a fair procedure rather than on any metaphysical 
conception of the good was assessed as a de facto, if unwitting, proposal for 
imposing a metaphysical conception of the good - individual freedom to determine 
one’s own good - on all members of plural democracies.  Rawls’ distribution 
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principles went a long way further towards basing subsistence on citizenship rather 
than capacity to earn than Hayek’s safety net, but the thinness of his underlying 
conception of the good undermined confidence that it could generate a society 
willing to implement those principles. 
 
By restoring its traditional basis in a metaphysical conception of the good, 
MacIntyre’s account of justice provided the thickness necessary to generate social 
solidarity.  MacIntyre, however, recognises only one source of the good: the internal 
practices of particular communities.  Two consequences follow from this restriction 
on sources of the good for its power to generate solidarity.  First, access to the good 
can only be by membership of the relevant community.  Thus, this conception of the 
good could be applied to plural nation-states only by one of two means: either an 
unlikely general conversion of their member groups, or by an illegitimate imposition 
upon them.  Second, no genuine goods are to be found outside the practices of the 
relevant community.  Thus, the ‘disengaged freedom’ upheld by plural nation-states 
as the good that unites them cannot, according to MacIntyre, be acknowledged by his 
communities as a genuine good at all.  Thus understood, the Aristotelian conception 
of justice cannot be applied to the nation-state at all, let alone solve the particular 
problems of justice I have pointed to.  Taylor, however, offers another understanding 
of the Aristotelian conception. 
 
Taylor believes that liberal proceduralism is a meta-ethic, that is, a principle defining 
what counts as moral reasoning and what does not.  This meta-ethic, Taylor argues, 
defines moral reasoning in such a way as to exclude certain features of it that are 
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central to rival definitions.  Since the excluded features of moral reasoning are real 
whether or not they are acknowledged, Taylor holds that the task of moral debate is 
simply to expose the reality of these features2.  By doing so, the illegitimate status of 
liberal proceduralism would also be exposed, and a decision about its legitimate 
status in moral debate made possible.  Where Macintyre held that, having its source 
outside the practices of any moral community, it can have no legitimate status at all, 
Taylor has argued that it should be recognised as a ‘transcendent good’: the good of 
‘disengaged freedom’.  Taylor’s version of Aristotelianism thus removes the barriers 
to the recognition of the nature of justice posed by the meta-ethical status of the 
liberal proceduralism imposed by the plural nation-state.  The plurality of the nation-
state can be the source of genuine goods, so citizens’ own communities need not be 
the exclusive sources of the good for them.  And the ‘disengaged freedom’ enshrined 
in the liberal proceduralism that is so important to citizens of nation-states can be 
recognised as a genuine good but not used as a meta-ethic to trump competing goods.  
Since this understanding of justice shows promise as an answer to my quest, I need 
now to present its main features and the most important criticisms of them.  I will 
thus be in a position to show in the Conclusion to this thesis how they can meet the 
problems of justice I have put up as test cases. 
 
1. Taylor on the nature of justice 
Taylor has written specifically on ‘distributive justice’ in an essay in which he 
distinguishes this from other forms of justice (Taylor 1985b, p. 187ff.).  However, 
the background ideas on which his understanding of justice in all its forms depends 
are expressed in several of his other works (Taylor 1985a, chs. 1 and 2; Taylor 
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1985b, chs. 7, 9 and 11; Taylor 1989c, parts I and II; Taylor 1990a; 1994; 1995; 
1998).  The summary of his ideas presented here draws on all of those sources.   
 
Part I: the meta-ethical or framework assumptions 
 
Taylor feels it necessary to begin his account of justice at the meta-ethical level 
because he believes that the major differences between the dominant liberal accounts 
of justice and his own lie at this level3.  The feature which most distinguishes his 
understanding of justice from liberal proceduralists’ examined in earlier chapters is 
his insistence that justice is a good and not a meta-ethical principle governing 
individual choice of goods.  In his account of distributive justice, he thus sees his 
first task as defining what kind of good this form of justice is.  Indeed, he argues, we 
cannot determine the criteria of ‘distributive justice’ without first determining ‘what 
kind of good distributive justice is’ (Taylor 1985b).   
 
Taylor’s method for developing this account of justice is to follow Rawls’ approach 
in the latter’s works on justice.  Taylor agrees with Rawls that we have no settled 
formulations on which to base our account, so we need to begin with ‘inchoate 
intuitions’ about the nature of justice and to proceed to clearer ‘formulations’, both 
of which are altered until we reach a state of ‘reflective equilibrium’ (Taylor 1985b, 
p.290).  This state means that there is a ‘coherent order’ to those formulations 
(Taylor 1985b, p. 290). 
 
Taylor’s first intuition in this process of reflection is that differences between views 
of the nature of distributive justice flow from differences between views of the 
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purposes of society.  If we understand society as serving a purely instrumental 
purpose, our conception of distributive justice will be shaped by that purpose.  If, 
however, we understand society as something to which we belong and on which we 
depend for our good by nature, our conception of distributive justice will be shaped 
by our understanding of that nature. 
 
Taylor’s second intuition about the nature of distributive justice is that it somehow 
arises from a conception of human beings as worthy of respect, indeed, of equal 
respect.  Differences about the nature of distributive justice arise in part because of 
differences about what it is about human beings that commands respect.  Rawls, we 
have seen in earlier chapters, speaks in terms of a Kantian conception of human 
dignity as consisting in the nature of human beings as free, equal and rational.  But, 
Taylor holds, this, like any account of human dignity, supposes some answer to the 
question of what is the human good, and this implies the further question of whether 
that good can be attained ‘alone’ (Taylor 1985b, p. 291) or only in society.  He 
argues that the debate about the nature of distributive justice can only be resolved by 
confronting these underlying issues: ‘Thus deep disagreements about justice can only 
be clarified if we formulate and confront the underlying notions of man and society’ 
(Taylor 1985b, p. 291).   
 
Taylor characterises such disagreements with their underlying differences about the 
‘notions of man and society’ as disagreements between what he calls ‘atomist’ and 
‘social’ theories of justice.  Atomist doctrines, he asserts (Taylor 1985b, p. 187ff.), 
have their origins in the seventeenth century European ‘social contract’ theories, 
 - 189 -  
which Taylor dubs ‘primacy-of-right’ theories (Taylor 1985b, p. 188).  The 
seventeenth century exponent of such a theory, says Taylor, was John Locke4.  These 
theories justify political structures and action by reference to certain rights rather 
than to any obligation to belong to and foster such structures and action:  
Theories which assert the primacy of rights are those which take 
as the fundamental, or at least a fundamental, principle of their 
political theory the ascription of certain rights to individuals and 
which deny the same status to a principle of belonging or 
obligation, that is a principle which states our obligation as men to 
belong to or sustain society, or a society of a certain type, or to 
obey authority or an authority of a certain type (Taylor 1985b, p. 
188). 
According to these theories, the individual possesses certain rights independent of his 
or her membership of society.  Thus, one’s membership of one’s society is not 
integral to attaining one’s good because the rights that define that good are possessed 
independently of such membership.  On atomist views of the human good, in other 
words, ‘it is conceivable for man to attain it alone’ (Taylor 1985b, p. 292), though in 
practice attainment outside society may be difficult and extremely rare.  One’s 
membership of society is based rather on a voluntary contract, which is entered into 
for purely instrumental purposes.  How justice is to be conceived, on this view, will 
be determined by the relevant society’s instrumental purposes.  Taylor contrasts the 
understanding of distributive justice that flows from Locke’s instrumentalist view of 
society’s purpose with the understanding that flows from a ‘social’ view of its 
purpose. 
 
The purpose of voluntarily entering society, Locke argued, was to protect the 
property one already possessed inalienably because one had acquired it by one’s own 
efforts alone.  According to Taylor, Locke held ‘that men acquire property outside of 
society, by mixing their labour with it “without the assignation or consent of any 
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body”’ (Taylor 1985b, p. 293 quoting Locke Two Treatises of Government II 28).  
The role of distributive justice in a Lockean society was therefore to provide this 
protection of property.  Since, according to Taylor, the notion underlying distributive 
justice was the notion of equality, the question that arose was what equality would 
mean within this conception of the background of justice.  The answer, Taylor 
asserts, was the equality of ‘equal fulfilment’ (Taylor 1985b, p. 293).   
 
According to the principle of equal fulfilment, there would be no point in 
membership of a society entered by voluntary contract if the rights acquired by 
joining were not equally fulfilled for all members.  Since, according to Locke, the 
major right so acquired was the protection of property, that protection had, in justice, 
to be equally fulfilled for all members.   
 
In fact, the kind of justice that prevailed in societies where the members were 
conceived as self-sufficient individuals, according to Taylor, was the justice of 
‘independent possession’ (Taylor 1985b, p. 293) that fitted the State of Nature, and 
not distributive justice at all.  For, since the right to property in such societies was 
absolute and private, that property was simply not available to the state for 
redistribution.  The state’s role was to protect private property, not to redistribute it 
among citizens as any ‘social’ theory of justice would demand.    
 
Because any ‘social’ theory would, according to Taylor (Taylor 1985b, p. 294-5), see 
membership of some kind of society as an essential condition of the attainment of the 
human good, the conception of equality, and indeed of justice and the subject of 
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justice, would differ.  The goods of such a society would be in some sense common 
and thus available to some extent for redistribution.  The conception of equality to 
prevail would be determined by the nature of the relevant society.  Taylor contrasts 
the notion of equality conceived as applying to individuals with equal rights, the 
notion just outlined, with equality between various local communities.  The cost per 
individual of providing equality of access to various services may be much greater 
for members of remote communities than for other citizens.  However, he points out, 
if the communities rather than individual citizens are defined as the ones to whom 
justice is owed in the relevant society, the cost per individual is irrelevant to the 
delivery of distributive justice.  Because an essential part of the good for which the 
society exists in such a case is the fostering of remote communities, the role of 
distributive justice in such a society will be to ensure equality of access to certain 
services. 
 
Taylor, of course, holds a ‘social’ view of distributive justice - what he describes as 
the ‘Aristotelian meta-view’ that he puts forward ‘as a background to discussing the 
principles of distributive justice …’ (Taylor 1985b, p. 292).  However, he 
acknowledges that there are certain defences open to holders of the atomist view. 
 
Proponents of atomist theories, Taylor recognises5, often deny that this primacy-of-
rights doctrine depends on this view of the individual as self-sufficient or on any 
other view of human nature or society.  This denial is often grounded in the argument 
that historical/empirical considerations like the actual possibility of attaining the 
good outside society are irrelevant to this or any other normative doctrine.  Indeed, 
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Taylor acknowledges that these proponents might also argue that attempts to 
discredit this doctrine by showing the extreme difficulty of human survival in the 
wild distort the doctrine.  The self-sufficiency intended by Locke, they might 
contend, was ‘clearly a condition of exchange and fairly developed and widespread 
social relations, in which only political authority was lacking’ (Taylor 1985b, p. 
190), and not a pretence that individuals could survive unaided in the wild.  
 
But, Taylor replies, this defence misunderstands the criticism.  The atomism that he 
claims underlies the primacy-of-human-rights doctrine is not a thesis about human 
ability to survive in the wild but one about the ability to ‘develop their 
characteristically human capacities …’ (Taylor 1985b, p. 190)6 outside society.  
Defenders of the primacy of human rights, Taylor means, cannot, by this 
misconstrual of the criticism, avoid the question of what it is about being human that 
commands our respect for such rights, and that thus provides the foundation for the 
political authority to enforce such respect.  Taylor acknowledges, however, that this 
reply does not meet the first part of this objection. - that normative claims like the 
claim to human rights are not dependent on any valuation of human capacities.  
 
Defenders of the primacy of human rights sometimes support the latter claim by 
arguing that human rights are attributed to both infants and the irreversibly senile.  
Taylor counters this denial by pointing out that, since we do not attribute rights to 
inanimate things like rocks, we presume that to be the subject of rights one must be 
at least the kind of being that might under certain conditions possess certain 
capacities that we value.  However, what we mean by ‘capacity’ and ‘respect’ when 
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we speak of capacities commanding respect, Taylor admits, needs clarification.  The 
utilitarian attribution of rights to animals on the ground that they possess a capacity 
that ought to be respected, the capacity of sentience, provides an opportunity for such 
clarification.   
 
The capacity to feel pain is not on its own, according to Taylor, sufficient to account 
for the respect commanded: not to hurt or kill a sentient being.  The painless 
administration of an anaesthetic would waive the command, he argues.  Taylor 
believes that our insight here is that the capacity to feel pain means something more 
like “ ‘capable of enjoying life and one’s own various capacities’, where ‘enjoying’ 
has something like its old-fashioned or legal sense, as in ‘enjoying the use of one’s 
limbs’, rather than its narrower colloquial sense of having a good time” (Taylor 
1985b, p. 192).  A capacity understood in this sense commands respect not only in 
the sense of forbidding the infliction of pain but also in the sense ‘that it is something 
we ought to foster and which we are forbidden to impair’ (Taylor 1985b, p. 192).  
Taylor hastens to add that possession of a particular capacity is not a sufficient 
condition to command the respect we call a right.  He points out that some beaches 
may have the capacity to form dunes but that we don’t see interference with that 
capacity as a violation of a right.  It is rather the fact that some beings are of a certain 
kind - the kind that possesses capacities that command respect - that leads us to 
attribute rights to such beings.  Taylor explains: ‘Once we accept that beings with 
this capacity command respect, then indeed, it is sufficient that we identify A as 
possessing this capacity to make A a bearer of rights’ (Taylor 1985b, p. 192). 
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If all this is true, argues Taylor, then it follows that human capacities show that 
human beings are the bearers of rights, and what those rights are rights to (Taylor 
1985b, p. 193).  There are, he holds, specifically human capacities which show 
human beings to possess ‘a special moral status’ (Taylor 1985b, p. 193): the right ‘to 
freedom, to the unmolested profession of their own convictions, to the exercise of 
their moral or religious beliefs …’ (Taylor 1985b, p. 193).  Contrary to the claim that 
human capacities are irrelevant to human rights, Taylor contends that ‘there would be 
something incoherent and incomprehensible in a position which claimed to ascribe 
rights to men but which disclaimed any conviction about the special moral status of 
any human capacities whatever and which denied that they had any value or worth’ 
(Taylor 1985b, p. 193 note omitted).  Neither can this connection of human rights to 
human capacities be conceded by atomists as inconsequential for their thesis.  For it 
would make little sense to limit such rights to protection of their exercise: if these 
rights are so valuable, they must also entail ‘a commitment to further and foster 
them’ (Taylor 1985b, p. 194).  Indeed, asserts Taylor, the consequences of 
acknowledging the relationship between human capacities and human rights are 
highly significant: 
To affirm the scope of the human capacity to form moral and 
religious convictions goes far beyond the assertion of the right to 
one’s convictions.  It also says that I ought to become the kind of 
agent who is capable of authentic conviction, that I ought to be 
true to my own convictions and not live a lie or a self-delusion out 
of fear or for favour, that I ought in certain circumstances to help 
foster this conviction in others, that I ought to bring up my own 
children to have it, that I ought not to inhibit it in others by 
influencing them towards a facile and shallow complaisance, and 
so on.  This is because we are dealing with a characteristically 
human capacity which can be aborted or distorted or 
underdeveloped or inhibited or, alternatively, can be properly 
realized or even realized to an exemplary degree (Taylor 1985b, 
pp. 194-5).  
 - 195 -  
The peculiarly human capacities referred to by Taylor, in short, reveal humans to be 
beings of such a kind as not only to prohibit interference with the exercise of those 
capacities but also to compel their fostering and development.  Given the force of 
these arguments about the dependence of human rights on these peculiarly human 
capacities, one may ask how primacy of rights theorists can think a defence of human 
rights can be made without reference to these capacities.  Taylor suggests that part of 
the answer to this question lies in the commitment of some such theorists to what he 
calls an ‘ultra-liberal view’ of the ‘properly human’ (Taylor 1985b, p. 196). 
 
Ultra-liberal views of the properly human, according to Taylor, ‘give absolutely 
central importance to the freedom to choose one’s own mode of life’ (Taylor 1985b, 
p. 196).  Any account of the properly human in terms of the peculiarly human 
capacities referred to above would restrict that freedom by requiring that one choose 
a mode of life that develops those capacities.  Such an account of the properly human 
would therefore be unacceptable to ultra-liberals.  Taylor believes, however, that 
ultra-liberal views can be refuted even on their own terms. 
 
Ultra-liberal views, as has been said, regard the properly human as consisting in the 
absolutely free choice of one’s mode of life.  Their defenders thus imply that this 
absolute is preserved by excluding from the definition of the ‘properly human’ such 
elements as the peculiarly human capacities referred to above.  They therefore reject 
any moral obligation, arising from the possession of such capacities, of realising 
them.  Although it may be possible to criticise choices of way of life on other moral 
grounds, it is not possible to do so on the ground that the relevant choice fails to 
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realise any properly human capacities.  But, argues Taylor, ultra-liberals do not 
succeed by this argument in avoiding recognition of a moral obligation of self-
realisation.  ‘All choices are equally valid’, Taylor writes, ‘but they must be choices’ 
(Taylor 1985b, p. 197 emphasis in original).  And if they must be choices, he argues, 
it follows that humans have an obligation to ‘become beings capable of choice, that 
we rise to the level of self-consciousness and autonomy where we can exercise 
choice, that we not remain enmired through fear, sloth, ignorance or superstition in 
some code imposed by tradition, society, or fate which tells us how we should 
dispose of what belongs to us’7 (Taylor 1985b, p. 197).  But if indeed humans are 
obliged to develop and foster these capacities, the question now arises of how this is 
to be done, and what further obligations the answer entails. 
 
Taylor makes a case for the view that these peculiarly human capacities probably 
cannot develop or flourish outside society, and that human beings therefore have an 
obligation to belong to society.  To assert, for example, ‘the right to one’s own 
independent moral convictions’ while denying the obligation to belong to the society 
which fosters and develops this right would be to contradict oneself.  For to assert the 
right is to affirm the conditions necessary for exercising it, namely, that one belong 
to the kind of society that fosters and develops it.  For people asserting this right to 
withhold their commitment to such a society would, according to Taylor, be to 
undermine the conditions necessary to realise the right: ‘For in undermining such a 
society we should be making the activity defended by the right assertion impossible 
of realization’ (Taylor 1985b, p. 198).  Moreover, Taylor points out, if I applied this 
position to myself, I would be denying myself the conditions necessary for achieving 
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the right I assert.  My ability to realise that right (to my independent moral 
convictions) would be severely limited, if not completely eliminated, by the 
destruction of the society which fosters and develops this right: ‘For then in 
defending my right, I should be condemning myself to what I should have to 
acknowledge as a truncated mode of life, in virtue of the same considerations that 
make me affirm the right’ (Taylor 1985b, p. 199).  My conviction of the value of 
forming my independent moral beliefs requires me to condemn as ‘truncated’ a life 
where the formation of those convictions is not possible or is severely limited.  What 
then follows from all this for Taylor’s account of justice? 
 
Justice is the virtue we exercise when we are cooperating with the fellow members of 
our society in seeking the good or goods, the pursuit of which has brought us 
together as a society.  Belonging to an appropriate kind of society is a necessary 
condition of achieving our good understood by Taylor as the realisation of our 
peculiarly human capacities.  Justice is exercised when we treat all members of the 
society with the equality due to them as beings endowed with these capacities, 
equality understood by Taylor in the Aristotelian sense of ‘proportionate equality’.  
The goods produced or present in society are common property to the extent that no 
individual has an absolute right over them.  Rather they are available and must be 
distributed to all since that is the purpose of association in a society8.  However, since 
some contribute more to their attainment than others, they deserve a greater share of 
the rewards.  Distributive justice is distinct from the justice of independent 
possession that prevails outside societies.  Distributive justice is required in societies 
because of conditions of relative scarcity of the goods that all members need.  
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Distributive justice is the kind of right action we perform in these conditions because 
we recognise ourselves as the kind of beings whose good can only be realised by 
collaborating with one another in its pursuit, action which distributes the fruits of that 
cooperation according to rules based on need and desert.  The next question, 
according to Taylor, is what kind of principles of justice should a particular society 
have?  The answer, we shall see, depends on the kinds of goods for the attainment of 
which the members are associated. 
 
Part II: what principles of justice should particular societies have? 
The first part of Taylor’s answer to this question is that there is no ‘single set of 
principles of distributive justice’ for modern societies (Taylor 1985b, p. 312).  He 
recognises four ‘families of views’ of such principles, each of which fails to some 
extent to fit the needs of such societies.  The four ‘families’ are: 
(1) a ‘Lockean’ atomism which focuses on the inalienable right to 
property; (2) the contribution principle; (3) the family of liberal 
and social-democratic views which justify egalitarian 
redistribution; and (4) Marxist views which refuse the issue of 
distributive justice altogether, on the grounds that the question is 
insoluble here, and unnecessary in a communist society (Taylor 
1985b, p. 309). 
Let us consider each of these views and Taylor’s criticisms of them. 
 
As we saw above (p. 191), Locke saw the individual as self-sufficient because he 
could acquire property merely by applying his own labour to nature, and thus with no 
need of association with others.  The individual’s membership of society, therefore, 
was not a necessary means to the attainment his/her own good (understood by Locke 
as the acquisition of property), but a voluntary contract for the purpose of protecting 
his/her private property.  Distributive justice in this conception is expressed in the 
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principle of equal fulfilment, according to which the private property of each 
individual, no matter how unequally distributed, must be equally protected. 
 
Taylor’s criticism of Lockean atomism is that it neglects the degree of dependence of 
the individual freedom enabling the acquisition of private property on elements of 
civilisation: ‘The basic error of atomism in all its forms is that it fails to take account 
of the degree to which the free individual with his own goals and aspirations, whose 
just reward it is trying to protect, is himself only possible within a certain kind of 
civilization …’ (Taylor 1985b, p. 309).  The features of this civilization to which 
Taylor is referring here include ‘the rule of law’, ‘rules of equal respect’, ‘habits of 
common deliberation, of common association, of cultural self-development …’ 
(Taylor 1985b, p. 309).  If we are to ensure that this liberty is to be passed on to 
future generations, Taylor argues, it is not sufficient to establish rules to protect its 
present exercise by individuals.  Rather it is also necessary to form the kind of 
society that can communicate ‘the sense of liberty’ (Taylor 1985b, p. 310).  This 
claim has important consequences for the principles of justice that the relevant 
society can accept. 
 
A society that sees the protection of private property as the purpose of justice, 
according to Taylor (Taylor 1985b, p. 310), will be able to tolerate great inequalities 
of distribution because equality based on this purpose will mean equality of 
fulfilment of the right to protection.  However, a society that sees the purpose of 
justice as the nurturing of the sense of liberty, on which the right to private property 
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depends, will see gross inequalities as corrosive of this sense of liberty, and thus also 
of one the relevant society’s major goods of association.   
 
But, Taylor goes on, we cannot conclude from the latter argument that modern 
societies ought to be egalitarian societies to the extent required, say, by Rawls’ 
‘difference principle’, because, he points out, such a conclusion would assume ‘a 
society we have not yet got’ (Taylor 1985b, p. 311).  The principles of distributive 
justice, he holds in contrast to Rawls, must be variable according to the 
circumstances of the society to which they are to be applied.  The circumstances of 
‘contemporary society’, he argues, are characterised by ‘complexity’ and ‘plurality’ 
(Taylor 1985b, p. 311).  Our experience of society is on the one hand, he explains, 
‘republican’ in the sense that it is an experience of collaboration ‘to sustain liberty’ 
(Taylor 1985b, p. 311).  On the other hand, we also experience our society as a 
‘collaborative enterprise serving private purposes’ such as economic purposes.  In 
order to meet this plurality of our experience of society, Taylor argues, our principles 
of distributive justice will need to be in some senses in tension with one another. 
 
In order to satisfy the ‘republican’ aspect of our experience, we will need principles 
that reject gross inequalities and seek a measure of egalitarianism by redistributions 
via the tax system, for example.  However, in order to satisfy the private aspect of 
our experience, we will also need principles that express what Taylor calls the 
‘contribution principle’.  This principle governs the second family of views of 
distributive justice identified by Taylor. 
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According to this version of atomism, our intuition about distributive justice begins 
with a view of ‘the individual not as a possessor of property, but as an independent 
being with his own capacities and goals’ (Taylor 1985b, p. 305).  This intuition 
implies that, since some have greater capacities to contribute to the development of 
the economy, the development of which is one of the purposes of our association, 
they are entitled to a greater reward from the wealth thus created than others.  
Referring to the ‘contribution principle’, Taylor writes: ‘This is (at least partly) what 
lies behind the widely felt intuition that highly talented people ought to be paid more 
than the ordinary, that professions requiring high skill and training should be more 
highly remunerated, and in general that complete equality of income or distribution 
according to need, would be wrong’ (Taylor 1985b, p. 306). 
 
The third family of views of distributive justice identified by Taylor is the one that 
favours some form of ‘egalitarian redistribution’, the so called liberal and social 
democratic views.  At one end of this spectrum lie those views on which large 
inequalities are intolerable because the sustaining of a sense of liberty is far more 
important than maximising material prosperity.  While this intuition is prominent in 
contemporary societies, Taylor points out that the intuition underpinning the 
contribution principle is also a force in such societies.  Thus, at the other end of this 
spectrum of views are those which, while acknowledging some value in the 
republican intuition, defend also the value of the contribution principle. 
 
The fourth family of views of distributive justice is the Marxist and commune views.  
As Taylor points out, this family rejects the claim that society needs to develop 
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principles of distributive justice because this is an artificial need created by the 
fundamental injustice perpetrated by capitalist society of privatising property.  If 
property was owned in common, each would receive according to his or her needs 
and contribute according to his or her abilities.  Besides those that depend upon the 
Marxist critique of capitalism, there are other views that value the holding of 
property in common. 
 
In contemporary societies, Taylor believes, both the atomist and the republican views 
of distributive justice contend for allegiance.  Indeed, he argues that the ‘contribution 
and the republican principles, are in great and increasing tension …’ (Taylor 1985b, 
p. 315).  This tension could lead, he observes, to the polarisation of both parties, 
where ‘on both sides there is an overwhelming sense of living in a society where 
mere force, or political muscle, but not justice, makes the law’ (Taylor 1985b, p. p. 
316).  Since these two principles are incompatible, rational reconciliation of the 
principles themselves is not an option.  Thus, Taylor argues, the alternative is to 
argue for the program, the vision of society, each principle represents.  It is at this 
level that he believes the real differences between the parties, the Left and Right in 
contemporary societies, lie:  
But if I am right, the real nature of the critique levelled by both 
Left and Right against our present society concerns as much if not 
more its failure to embody or allow for certain excellences of the 
good life, as it does against unfairness.  What is involved in each 
case is the project of a different society - one which will 
supposedly liberate the self-reliant individual in one case, or one 
which will realize greater solidarity and collective self-
management on the other (Taylor 1985b, p. 316). 
Taylor does not believe that this measure will reconcile the contending parties, but he 
contends that it will clarify their differences.  By showing clearly how far apart they 
are, he holds that their positions will be better exposed to test against the realities of 
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their kind of society.  Referring to the program of the Left as one of transforming 
society and to that of the Right as one of achieving distributive fairness, Taylor 
writes: 
Distinguishing the issues of distributive fairness from those of 
political transformation should bring the debate closer to reality 
on both  It would make us defend our views about the former in 
relation to our actual culture and history; and that will make it at 
least somewhat harder to espouse dogmatically one principle in 
utter blindness to the relative claims of others (Taylor 1985b, p. 
317). 
A debate of this kind, Taylor concludes, could eliminate the extreme claims of both 
Left and Right, and also awaken both to the fact that the issues transcend justice and 
go to the goods that unite us as a society that needs justice. 
 
2.  Appraisal of Taylor’s view of justice 
As I indicated in the previous chapter the criticism that most affects my thesis is 
MacIntyre’s.  Although he shared Taylor’s Aristotelian view of justice, we recall 
MacIntyre held that the societies of liberal modernity were too irreconcilably divided 
in their conceptions of the good and of rationality to form appropriate polities for the 
application of this conception justice.  Taylor’s account of distributive justice, while 
acknowledging the distance between the republican and contribution principle views, 
argues the possibility of debate between their protagonists that will not only 
eliminate some of the misunderstandings of their views of justice but also permit 
appreciation of each’s case for their vision of society.  Where MacIntyre sees such 
debate as a trap to be avoided because it is likely to involve Aristotelians in accepting 
as terms of debate concepts that are distortive of the Aristotelian position, Taylor 
encourages such debate as necessary means of clarifying these terms and exposing 
the commitments they entail.  Provided conceptions of justice such as Rawls’ 
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abandon their pretence to be meta-ethical principles, they can, according to Taylor, 
be regarded as genuine goods, and as such lay claim to be assessed against rival 
conceptions in modern societies.  Though the conception of justice advanced by 
Rawls may be incompatible with that defended by MacIntyre, this does not mean that 
one or the other conception must be wrong.  Both conceptions of justice, according 
to Taylor, may be genuine goods, and thus have application depending upon the 
particular goods for which the relevant group is associated.  Aristotelians can 
acknowledge the relevance of historical circumstances to the determination of what 
is just whereas holders of meta-ethical views of justice cannot.  A community united 
around a common good may live according to MacIntyre’s conception of justice but 
the same community may also be part of a society united around other goods and 
other conceptions of justice.  Thus, what members of the community might do in the 
name of justice in their local community may differ from what they do in the wider 
society.  For example, a religious community whose members work in secular 
institutions like state universities might pool their earnings and share them according 
to need rather than to contribution within their own community.  The same members, 
however, might be active participants in trade union activities to win remuneration 
for academics based on some version of the contribution principle.  Aristotelians do 
not therefore need to retreat to their own communities on the margins of modern 
societies, on Taylor’s version of that philosophy, but can and should engage with 
their fellow citizens in the determination of the goods of association of the wider 
society. 
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A second objection concerns Taylor’s ‘social thesis’, which entails, in Will 
Kymlicka’s formulation, the proposition that ‘some limits on self-determination are 
required to preserve the social conditions which enable self-determination’ 
(Kymlicka, Will 1990, p. 216).  He considers three versions of this claim: ‘one about 
the need to sustain a cultural structure that provides people with meaningful options; 
a second about the need for shared forums in which to evaluate these options; and a 
third about the preconditions for political legitimacy’ (Kymlicka, Will 1990, p. 216).   
 
Kymlicka is in substantial agreement with the first two versions of this claim.  He 
explicitly parts company with fellow liberals like John Stuart Mill and Isaiah Berlin 
when he agrees with Taylor that the point of individual freedom is not the ability to 
make choices but the ability to make good choices, to live the good life.  Kymlicka 
does not believe liberals need object to ‘perfectionism’ as such but merely to state-
sanctioned perfectionism.  The neutrality of the liberal state, against which Taylor 
inveighs, is, according to Kymlicka, a protection against the latter form of 
perfectionism in order that competition may flourish between perfectionist ideals.  
‘Hence’, he argues, ‘the dispute [between liberals and communitarians] should 
perhaps be seen as a choice, not between perfectionism and neutrality, but between 
social perfectionism and state perfectionism - for the flip side of state neutrality is 
support for the role of perfectionist ideals in civil society’ (Kymlicka, Will 1990, p. 
219).  Self-determination can be limited, on Kymlicka’s conception of liberal 
individualism, by conceptions of the good provided they are not state-sanctioned 
conceptions.   
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However, Kymlicka disputes Taylor’s claim that the legitimacy of the relevant 
society is dependent on its members sharing a sense of the common good.  Taylor 
has argued that citizens of modern societies will be unwilling to accept the sacrifices 
demanded by the welfare state unless they have a strong sense of involvement ‘in a 
common form of life’ which ‘is seen as a supremely important good, so that its 
continuance and flourishing matters to the citizens for its own sake and not just 
instrumentally to their several individual goods or as the sum total of these individual 
goods’ (Kymlicka, Will 1990, p. 224 quoting Taylor).  The sense of allegiance that 
was generated in communities in the past, Kymlicka contends, was often the result of 
excluding other groups like blacks or women.  Though communitarians today are not 
advocating such exclusivism, the ends they claim could be shared are likely to be 
determined by the more powerful groups within modern societies.  Even if the 
definers of the relevant societies’ ends found ways within their definitions of 
defending women’s and homosexuals’ rights, for example, they would be likely to do 
so, according to Kymlicka, by imposing on these groups identities not determined by 
the groups themselves.  Kymlicka believes that political legitimacy is much more 
likely to be generated, if indeed it can be generated, in modern societies by a feeling 
that state power cannot be exercised in this manner and that instead the state will be 
required to respect individual freedom. 
 
But if pluralism can undermine the communitarian version of the nation state, it can, 
in my judgment, do likewise to Kymlicka’s version of the liberal nation state.  
Kymlicka concedes the communitarian assertion of the need to foster and deliberate 
about the various conceptions of the good to be found in modern societies.  However, 
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the basis for social and political order he seems ultimately to be pleading for is not, 
as we would expect in the light of this concession, agreement on some goods that are 
essential to society as a whole, but rather tolerance of differences on such 
conceptions.  The groups he refers to in his examples - some women’s groups and 
homosexuals - may feel better protected by the liberal individualist regime he prefers 
but their protection in his regime will very likely flow from an exercise of state 
power, not from victory in debate in the marketplace of ideas.  The protection of 
these groups will flow from a Bill of Rights or some similar legal instrument of the 
relevant state.  Moreover, the tolerance enjoined by such a legal instrument will 
probably betoken a renunciation of the possibility of agreement on matters like 
homosexual marriages rather than the achievement of such an agreement.  The 
enactment of the instrument will probably also signify victory in a power struggle 
rather than consensus flowing from deliberation between citizens respecting each 
others’ equality. 
 
In the case of Australia’s Aborigines, I believe it is the liberal individualist regime 
favoured by Kymlicka that has failed and continues to fail them.  They were 
dispossessed as peoples and their grievances against the rest of the nation are above 
all grievances held as peoples.  Australian governments have insisted on defining 
their problems, however, in terms of individual disadvantage9.  Moreover, it is the 
various forms of exclusion of Aboriginal peoples from the Australian community 
that is, in my opinion, the major obstacle to the achievement of goods like the 
protection of their individual rights.  Kymlicka rightly claims that strong 
communities in the past have often built their unity on exclusions.  But this is an 
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argument for reforming these bases rather than renouncing the possibility of forming 
better communities.  It is government insistence on difference-blindness in 
Aboriginal policy that not only permits, but compels, denial of the history of 
Australia’s relationship with its indigenous peoples, and of the debts which flow 
from that history10.  The Australian Government’s application the principle of 
difference-blind individual equality to Aboriginal peoples is an imposition of identity 
definition by government, an imposition of the very kind that Kymlicka warns 
against (Kymlicka, Will 1990, p. 226).  If these divisions in the Australian nation are 
to be healed and the rights of individual Aborigines protected, it would seem that 
they must first be recognised by other Australians in the identity they ascribe to 
themselves, namely, as the ‘first peoples’ of this land, rather than in the western 
philosophical and legal terms of ‘equal individuals’. 
 
My second test of theories of social justice concerned their ability to achieve 
distributions of wealth that did not make the right to subsistence depend on the 
power to earn.  I was thus implying that an acceptable theory of justice would have to 
enable corrections to be made to market distributions, corrections which in the nature 
of the case would require the exercise of state power.  Kymlicka concedes that 
freedom is for determining what the good life is.  He also concedes that we do this in 
mutual dialogue, and presumably we form societies on his view around certain 
agreed goods.  If only one of these goods is to redistribute wealth by some set of 
criteria, it follows that to this extent at least the realisation of a good agreed by 
Kymlicka requires the exercise of state power.  If the exercise of state power 
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threatens the legitimacy of a communitarian society, logically it must also threaten 
the liberal individualist society favoured by Kymlicka.    
 
My third requirement of the theory of social justice I was seeking was that it permit 
inclusion in the Australian nation state of groups previously excluded, like asylum 
seekers.  It is in fact the case that the basis for the Australian Government’s 
righteously indignant exclusion of so many of these people has been that part of its 
liberal individualist philosophy is its belief in the sovereignty of the nation state.  
Throughout the last Federal Election campaign, the Prime Minister proclaimed 
repeatedly: ‘We shall decide who shall come here and under what circumstances they 
shall come!’ (Hansard 28/8/2001)  The ground for detaining asylum seekers in 
virtual prisons was the liberal individualist one of the relevant rights.  The then 
Immigration Minister, Philip Ruddock, argued continually that these people ‘had no 
right to be here’.  The rights held to be most relevant in the determination of these 
applications for asylum were those defined by the laws made by the sovereign state 
of Australia.  While Kymlicka and other liberals might argue that the problem here is 
the particular application of liberal individualism by the Australian Government, it is 
to the concrete circumstances of Australia that the theory of justice I am looking for 
must apply.  The present use of liberal individualist theory as a basis for demonising 
some who are different, like asylum seekers who arrive here in boats, makes a 
philosophy that values difference as a good a much more promising one for including 
such people in Australian society. 
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It could be argued, however, that Kymlicka’s major objection to Aristotelian 
conceptions of justice like Taylor’s is the one expressed by Rawls, some aspects of 
which we considered in chapter four.  Kymlicka vehemently defends Rawls’ claim 
that justice is prior to the good because the self is prior to its ends.  Thus, for 
Aristotelians like Taylor to assert that justice is derived from ends which are given to 
us in the practices of our communities is, according to Kymlicka, to imply that we 
are bound by the practices in which we have been raised.  These practices, argues 
Kymlicka, reflect communal values which Taylor would have us regard as 
‘“authoritative horizons” which “set goals for us”’ (Kymlicka, Will 1990, p. 210 
quoting Taylor).  But, Kymlicka retorts, for liberals no goals can have authority for 
us save those we assess as authoritative for ourselves.  Since he is expressing here 
the major difference between the liberal individualist and the communitarian 
understandings of the foundations of justice, it is worth quoting Kymlicka at some 
length: 
Liberals … insist that we have an ability to detach ourselves from 
any particular social practice.  No particular task is set for us by 
society, no particular practice has authority that is beyond 
individual judgement and possible rejection.  We can and should 
acquire our task through freely made personal judgements about 
the cultural structure, the matrix of understandings and 
alternatives passed down to us by previous generations, which 
offers us possibilities we can either affirm or reject.  Nothing is 
‘set for us’; nothing is authoritative before our judgement of its 
value (Kymlicka, Will 1990, pp. 210-11). 
Nicholas H. Smith has argued that Kymlicka has mistaken Taylor’s meaning here: 
‘The target of Taylor’s argument is not the capacity for individual self-determination 
as such, but rather a failure to appreciate the ontology required to make sense of this 
capacity’ (Smith 2002, p. 146).  Smith means that, on Taylor’s view, our projects are 
only intelligible at all against some background and that background necessarily 
includes the conceptions of the good present in the relevant community.  And, Smith 
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argues, the background itself is the product of interaction between individuals and 
their community.  Thus, he concludes: ‘There must be some intertwining of the self-
defining purposes of the individual and the community’ (Smith 2002, p. 147).  Smith 
does not, however, spell out in any detail the nature of this intertwinement and for 
this reason the problem with Kymlicka’s criticism of Taylor is not made clear.  I 
think Kymlicka’s problem here is that he misconceives the epistemological processes 
at work in the assessment of fundamental commitments.  Let me explain what I mean 
in a little more detail. 
 
Kymlicka implies that the individual is always sufficiently detached from the values 
embedded in his or her community’s beliefs and practices to be able to review his or 
her commitment to those values.  His criticism of versions of communitarianism like 
Taylor’s is that they limit or even deny the freedom of individuals to review their 
commitments to their communities’ values.  My contention is that Kymlicka fails to 
recognise the degree to which our freedom to review our commitments is limited by 
the logical role those commitments, and their underpinning beliefs, play in ordering 
our experience.  The degree of detachment possible from those commitments and 
their underpinning beliefs is, in other words, limited by logic rather than by the 
authority of state, church or some other institution.  I need to say more about these 
limits. 
 
Now it is true that there are some goods to which our commitment is and ought to be 
limited.  Take the good of winning this year’s premiership for a footballer.  His club 
and its supporters may demand a ‘do or die’ effort from him to attain this good.  
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Clearly, however, the commitment of such a footballer to the good of winning the 
premiership must be limited by his commitment to higher goods such as the 
preservation of his life or the protection of the interests of his wife and family.  Thus, 
we can be detached from some of our commitments in the sense that we can adjudge 
other commitments as outweighing them, but not in the sense that in doing so we can 
detach our selves from all our commitments at will. 
 
Our commitment to particular goods of our practices can also be limited by possible 
and actual challenges from alternatives developed within those practices.  A new 
batting technique may be adjudged, for example, as superior to an existing one 
according to the prevailing standards in the game of cricket.  We can, in other words, 
detach our selves from a particular good within a practice like cricket without 
thereby detaching our selves from the good of the practice as a whole.   
 
The point of these examples is that we have a hierarchy of goods that determines our 
level of commitment to them.  The higher we go within that hierarchy the stronger 
our commitments to the relevant goods become.  Indeed, some commitments are so 
strong that they are notoriously resistant to efforts to shake them.  Religious and 
ideological commitments, for example, are often deemed the result of indoctrination 
because they are so unshakeable by supposedly rational tests11.  The charge of 
indoctrination has, however, proved harder to sustain against religion and ideology 
since writers like Thomas H. Kuhn (Kuhn 1970), Imre Lakatos (Lakatos 1970), Paul 
Feyerabend (Lakatos 1970; Feyerabend 1978; 1978) and R.S. Laura (Laura, R.S. 
1980) have shown that science, from which the supposed rational standards were 
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derived, has its foundations not in ‘brute facts’ of the relevant domain of empirical 
reality but in assumptions about the nature of reality in that domain.  The 
unshakeability of fundamental assumptions like these, and thus of believers’ 
commitments to the relevant religions and ideologies, is due, I want to argue, not to 
any irrational refusal to exercise the appropriate degree of detachment from them but 
to the logical role they play in their belief systems.  Let me recall briefly the account 
that I gave of this role in chapter four. 
 
Following Laura, I argued there that these assumptions were best understood as 
epistemically ‘primitive’ in the role they play in their systems.  That is to say, that 
their logical function in the belief systems they underpin is threefold.  First, their 
presuppositional function is that they are the assumptions about the nature of reality 
in the relevant domain rather than conclusions to chains of reasoning within that 
domain.  Second, their constitutive function is to determine what it means to operate 
in that domain.  Thus, the presupposition that certain diseases are caused by physical 
organisms defines what it means to do pathology, for example.  Third, their 
organisational function is to determine what is to count as evidence within their 
domains.  Alleged signs of the influence of gods or evil spirits, for example, will not 
be admitted as evidence in the science of pathology.  If I am correct in characterising 
as ‘epistemic primitives’ the beliefs underpinning such community practices as 
Christian theism, for example, how does this characterisation impugn Kymlicka’s 
thesis about the degree of detachment we can have from them? 
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Firstly, as the beliefs that determine what is to count as evidence in their systems, our 
‘epistemic primitives’ cannot be assessed by evidence they licence.  They are 
untestable by those standards because they are principles in virtue of which we test in 
that domain.  They are epistemically primitive in the sense that there are no higher 
standards against which, in a detached stance, we can test them. 
 
Secondly, because of the role they play in the overall body of beliefs in terms of 
which we order all our experience, our commitment to our ‘epistemic primitives’ is 
not detached and provisional.  The loss of an ‘epistemic primitive’ is the loss of the 
belief in terms of which we brought intelligibility and order to a particular domain of 
our experience.  That loss can lead to trauma and bewilderment.  The transition from 
Christian theism to atheism, for example, is not the result of a detached weighing of 
these two alternative ways of seeing the world.  If the Christian commitment was 
genuine, such a transition is more likely to be a discovery that one is now seeing the 
world in different terms from the Christian ones.  If a comprehensive alternative is 
not at hand when the Christian faith goes into crisis, the believer may experience 
bewilderment and even despair in his or her efforts to bring order to this domain of 
life.  For a committed Christian (or Communist, Jew, Muslim …) to specify in 
advance the conditions that would need to be fulfilled for him or her to give up their 
belief would be for him or her to in fact give up that belief.  The specification of 
these conditions would constitute a shift in consciousness that would alter this aspect 
of the relevant individual’s identity.  Indeed, the shift in consciousness required for 
the overthrow of an epistemic primitive in the logical order is paralleled by the kind 
of shift in the emotional order captured so poignantly by Joseph Conrad in his classic 
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novel The Secret Agent.  The main character, Mr. Verloc, is the secret agent.  He uses 
his wife's intellectually disabled brother in a bombing plot that goes wrong and 
causes the brother's violent death.  His wife has devoted her entire life to the 
protection of her brother.  When Verloc has to face his wife after she learns of her 
brother's death and her husband's role in it, her grief, though sympathised with by her 
husband, is so far beyond his comprehension that Conrad writes of Verloc: "In this 
[failure to comprehend her affection for her brother] he was excusable, since it was 
impossible to understand it without ceasing to be himself" (Conrad 1907, p. 190 
emphasis added).  
 
Third, the overthrow of ‘epistemic primitives’, and thus the review of the 
commitments we base on them, is the result not of a detached and deliberate 
assessment of them against some form of evidence but of a loss of their ability to 
order the relevant domain of our experience.  We find we can no longer 
accommodate anomalies, which their primitive character would in the past have 
forced us to accommodate in some way without allowing them to overthrow the 
relevant primitive.  Thus, a mounting number of experiences of evil may lead a 
Christian theist to the point where she is no longer able to accept her previous mode 
of accommodating such experiences by saying, for example, that God allows evil 
that good may result.  If an alternative primitive is at hand in such an epistemic 
crisis, we may well find ourselves thinking of our experience in the relevant domain 
in its terms.  But if no alternative is available, we may find ourselves in a state of 
bewilderment.  Either way, ‘epistemic primitives’ and the commitments we base on 
them are not open to revision in the sense that Kymlicka implies, not because our 
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belief in them is coerced by authority but because of the logical role they play in our 
belief systems. 
 
Of course, Kymlicka might object that the notion of ‘epistemic primitives’ implies 
that commitments to religious and ideological belief systems, for example, logically 
cannot and thus should not be limited by the rational grounds that can be adduced in 
their support.  The notion of ‘epistemic primitives’, if accepted, would thus license 
fanatical commitment to such belief systems of the kind we see manifested in recent 
acts of terrorism. 
 
The first point to be made in reply to this objection is that the notion of ‘epistemic 
primitives’ does not imply the absence of rational standards.  Rather one of the 
functions of such primitives is to act as such a standard: to determine what is to count 
as evidence in the relevant belief system.  Clearly, all belief systems have internal 
disputes according to such standards about the content of their systems.  To cite a 
current example, the Christian churches are engaged in such an internal debate in 
relation to their traditional ‘just war’ doctrine; the Catholic bishops in Vatican II 
questioned whether, given the capacity for mass destruction of modern weaponry, 
any war could be just.  This debate has been a burning issue since the United States-
led alliance threatened to invade Iraq, a threat it carried out in 2003.  In this example, 
the traditional ‘epistemic primitive’ in this area of morality was the belief that a war 
was just provided it met certain conditions.  The conduct of the enterprise of moral 
judgment in this area was  thus constituted by the application of these conditions to 
the relevant empirical facts.  This traditional ‘epistemic primitive’ is now under 
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pressure, however, because modern weaponry has made the possibility of those 
conditions being verified highly doubtful.  ‘Epistemic primitives’, in short, are not 
substitutes for rational standards but rather the rational foundations of those 
standards.  The foundations of our belief systems are not, as we might like to believe, 
immaculately perceived and conceived ‘brute facts’ but these epistemically 
primitive’ beliefs about the nature of reality in the relevant domains. 
 
The second point to be made in relation to this objection is that ‘epistemic 
primitives’ are not invulnerable to rational challenge.  Every primitive forms part of 
the body of primitives in terms of which we order all our experience.  Each primitive 
must therefore fight for its place in that body.  A religious believer in the modern 
world, for example, is likely to be scientifically educated.  If her religion’s doctrine 
of creation comes into conflict with her scientific belief in evolution, she may find it 
difficult to hold on to her epistemically primitive belief in her Creator-God.  
Similarly, an individual whose religion or ideology sanctions the killing of the 
innocent for the purpose of advancing the reign of ‘truth’ is also likely to have some 
moral beliefs about the value of human life.  The latter beliefs exert constant pressure 
in the mind of the believer on the ‘epistemic primitives’ underpinning the relevant 
religion or ideology.  Appeals to the other beliefs which as human beings religious 
and ideological believers need to hold can put pressure on the religious and 
ideological ‘epistemic primitives’.  Perhaps it would be convenient if there were 
moral and rational standards independent of all value systems, but in the absence of 
such standards pressure of this kind is the best we can do to reason with all, including 
fanatics. 
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 Because the self cannot be detached from all goods in the way Kymlicka imagines, 
he fails to vindicate the liberal individualist thesis that justice must be prior to the 
good.  Jurgen Habermas, however, proposes another version of that thesis which 
poses a more formidable objection to Taylor’s Aristotelian understanding of justice.  
Another of Taylor’s criticisms of this thesis is that liberal individualism, or atomism 
as Taylor terms it, cannot offer equal recognition to all individuals and racial, ethnic 
and cultural groups because atomism’s commitment to individual autonomy requires 
it to be difference-blind in the administration of public policy and law.  Taylor’s 
intuition is that implicit in liberal philosophy is what he calls ‘a principle of universal 
equality’ (Taylor 1994, p. 39).  In order to be able to apply this principle, the atomist 
version of liberalism abstracted from human differences and focussed on qualities all 
possessed either actually or potentially, namely, the capacity to form and act on one’s 
own life-plan.  This Kantian form of liberalism has as its highest value individual 
autonomy.  According to Taylor, however, another stream of the liberal tradition, 
represented by the likes of Rousseau and Herder, has also given rise to another value 
that demands recognition in modern societies: the value of authenticity.  The latter 
ideal emphasises the importance of individual and group uniqueness.  An individual 
or group is not being ‘true to itself’ if it is not living according to its own unique 
potential (Taylor 1994, p. 30-1).  Taylor is sympathetic to the claim that a principle 
of universal equality requires recognition of differences because denial of such 
recognition can do such great harm.  ‘The thesis’, he writes, ‘is that our identity is 
partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, 
and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if people 
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or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or 
contemptible picture of themselves’ (Taylor 1994, p. 25).  Taylor sees ‘a liberalism 
of rights’ as ‘inhospitable’ to cultural differences ‘because (a) it insists on uniform 
application of the rules defining these rights, without exception, and (b) it is 
suspicious of collective goals’ (Taylor 1994, p. 60).  That inhospitality, he argues in 
this essay, is evident in its desire to deny French Canadian claims to the right to 
impose certain laws, designed to ensure survival of French Canadian culture, on the 
grounds that such laws would infringe individual human rights.  While Taylor 
admits, and discusses at length, the formidable difficulties in applying the principle 
of universal equality to demands for recognition of cultural differences, he clearly 
doubts the ability of atomist versions of liberalism, because of their commitment to 
the value of difference-blind individual autonomy, to grant it.  Habermas argues that 
Taylor errs in this objection because he misconceives the notion of autonomy. 
 
According to Habermas, Taylor limits his understanding of autonomy to the capacity 
of the individual, and the consequent right to exercise that capacity, to choose his or 
her own life project.  By so limiting his understanding, Habermas argues, Taylor 
neglects ‘half of the concept of autonomy’ (Habermas 1994, p. 112).  Taylor, he 
contends, ‘does not take into consideration that those to whom the law [protecting 
the right of the individual to choose his or her own life project] is addressed can 
acquire autonomy (in the Kantian sense) only to the extent that they can understand 
themselves to be the authors of the laws to which they are subject as private legal 
persons’ (Habermas 1994, p. 112).  Indeed, Habermas, argues, individuals cannot 
even enjoy the protection of the liberty to pursue their own life projects unless they 
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first agree precisely what liberties are to be protected.  Any scheme of equal liberties 
that might be implemented in a democracy, on Habermas’s interpretation of the 
concept of autonomy, supposes the taking into account of individual and group 
differences.  The public protection of private liberties supposes an agreement that 
could not be reached unless such differences were taken into account: ‘Once we take 
this internal connection between democracy and the constitutional state seriously, it 
becomes clear that the system of rights is blind neither to unequal social conditions 
nor to cultural differences’ (Habermas 1994, p. 113).  What is needed in order to 
ensure recognition of such differences, according to Habermas, is not a supplement 
to the system of legal rights prevailing in the relevant democracy, as Taylor argues, 
but ‘the consistent actualization of the system of rights’ (Habermas 1994, p. 113).  
This measure will ensure the protection of the individual’s right to develop his self-
concept in his or her own social and cultural contexts, the protection that Taylor 
doubted the individualist conception of liberalism could provide.   
 
To the extent that ‘the system of rights’ to which Habermas refers can be actualised, 
the recognition due to individual and cultural differences would be forthcoming.  
Indeed, the process and the result of defining those identities to be accorded 
recognition would be approved by communitarians like Taylor because it would 
exemplify communities uniting in the determination of a common good.  The 
problem I see with Habermas’s response to Taylor, however, is that the actualisation 
of the relevant ‘system of rights’ presupposes the commitment of the relevant 
individuals and groups to one another as members of the community to which the 
rights will apply.  The present obstacle to the full actualisation of rights12 for 
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Aboriginal Australians is that they are still treated like foreigners in their own land in 
many respects and they still feel alienated from the Australian nation.  The first task 
of those working for reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
Australians, I believe, is to establish a sense of unity in the one nation between both 
groups.  The principle of equal rights for all is often used as a weapon in public 
debate for demanding the same rights for both groups13.  Taylor is, I believe, making 
a similar response to Habermas’s defence of liberal individualism when he argues in 
relation to the common good of patriotism that ‘patriotism involves more than 
converging moral principles; it is a common allegiance to a particular historical 
community’ (Taylor 1989a, p. 176).  This common allegiance is what I believe is 
lacking in the relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australians.  
Taylor argues that ‘Cherishing and sustaining this [this common allegiance to a 
particular historical community] has to be a common goal, and this is more than just 
consensus on the rule of right’ (Taylor 1989a, p. 176).  I would say that developing 
this allegiance in the first place is a condition of establishing any system of rights.  
The establishment of a system of rights would follow rather than foster the social 
solidarity that I regard as the essential quality of the theory of social justice I am 
seeking.  Because Taylor’s account of justice is based on the cherishing of an 
allegiance to a particular community, I believe his account promises more to my 
quest than the admittedly richer individualist one proposed by Habermas.  However, 
Taylor’s communitarianism faces another difficulty.  
 
As Smith points out, Taylor needs to specify the community to whom allegiance is 
owed: ‘Constitutional patriotism is one option, and Taylor suggests that a future-
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oriented patriotism may be more suited to contemporary conditions than the classical 
republican model’ (Smith 2002, p. 153).  Since my quest is for a form of justice that 
will include groups who are unjustly excluded from full participation in the 
Australian community, the community to which I would be advocating allegiance 
would be the new one all Australians can cooperate in building.  As I have argued 
throughout this thesis, Aboriginal Australians continue to be denied their rightful 
place in Australia’s constitutional system.  This sentiment is made abundantly clear 
in the 'Draft Statement of Indigenous Rights' attached to the NCAR's Draft Strategies 
to Advance Reconciliation: 
For the purpose of attempting to work within the Constitutional framework of 
Australia this whole proposition [i.e. the set of rights proposed in the statement to 
which this is the preface] is put forward without in any way forfeiting the notion of 
Sovereignty that Aborigines would hold has never been ceded or surrendered 
(NCAR 2000). 
 
Indeed, so strong are their feelings of exclusion from Australia’s present 
constitutional system that this document acknowledges "that there are many 
Aboriginal peoples that would not recognise the Australian constitution as a 
Document to which they have given any consent" (NCAR 2000).  In its Roadmap for 
Reconciliation the same body calls for reform of the Australian Constitution so that it 
‘recognises the status of the first Australians, and for removal of section 25 and the 
introduction of ‘a new section making it unlawful to adversely discriminate against 
any people on the grounds of race’ (NCAR 2000).  Section 25 still permits 
governments, whether Federal or State, to limit the right to vote according to race.  
This power was exercised until 1967 by some governments in Australia to deny the 
vote to Aboriginal Australians.  It would clearly be pointless to ask Aboriginal 
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Australians to lend allegiance to the Constitution that so discriminated against them 
in the past.   
 
Migrants from places other than the British Isles have already forced Australian 
governments to adopt the policy of ‘multiculturalism’.  Their aspirations are far from 
fulfilled, and their allegiance is very much to an Australia in the process of re-
defining its identity in multicultural terms.  In 2000, millions of Australians of all 
backgrounds walked over bridges throughout the land to support reconciliation with 
our Aboriginal people.  This is surely an assertion of an aspiration to re-define 
Australia’s identity in terms of ethnic and racial relations.  In recent years many 
thousands of Australians, and others in various parts of the world, have engaged in 
public protests against ‘globalisation’.  Globalisation is more than an economic 
phenomenon but its most contested effects are economic.  The insecurity of 
employment created by the mobility of capital leaves many in low-skilled jobs 
especially feeling excluded from the benefits allegedly brought to the economy of the 
nation.  It is likely that this group will feel distrustful of future promises, but they are 
also unlikely to feel much allegiance to the system that has failed them.  A 
community that takes their interests seriously is more likely to win their allegiance 
than one which regards them simply as losers in the economic and social competition 
that purports to draw its legitimacy from liberal individualist principles. 
 
Conclusion 
My quest has been for a theory of social justice that was capable of generating the 
social solidarity necessary to sustain a modern democracy.  In previous chapters, I 
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have rejected liberal individualist theories of justice on the ground that they were 
unlikely to be able to generate such solidarity.  In this chapter, I have been forced to 
consider a more complete version of the account of individual autonomy, originating 
with Kant but proposed in its modern form by Habermas.  While conceding that, if 
actualised, a system of rights of the kind Habermas proposes would achieve the 
individual and cultural recognition required in a just society, I argued this kind of 
system supposed rather than promised to generate the social solidarity necessary for 
such actualisation.  The Australian need, I contended, was for a theory of justice 
capable of generating that solidarity because of the severity of the exclusions 
applying to some groups under the present constitutional system.  Taylor’s explicit 
focus on common goods, I concluded, offered more hope of generating the social 
solidarity I regard as necessary to sustain a liberal democracy.  Pace MacInytre, I 
accepted Taylor’s plea that genuine goods can be found outside the practices of 
communities, and that liberalism - understood as a good rather than a meta-ethical 
principle - was one such source.  This being the case, liberal polities, I held, could be 
suitable settings for social justice.  It remains for me now to show in the Conclusion 
to this thesis how Taylor’s theory can provide the basis of a solution to the three 
major problems of social justice I have identified in Australia. 
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Notes to chapter five 
                                          
1  Proceduralist at least in the sense that, lacking a metaphysical conception of the good, such 
principles prescribe alternative procedures for achieving justice in the societies in which they are 
practised. 
2  Taylor’s point is that atomists are less successful in detaching ethical principles from the practices 
of human communities than they pretend and MacIntyre seems to admit.  Instead, Taylor writes:  
I think that we are far more ‘Aristotelian’ than we allow, that hence our practice is 
in some significant way less based on pure disengaged freedom and atomism than 
we realize.  Of course, this does not mean that getting the right meta-ethic makes no 
practical difference; without doubt seeing ourselves as atoms, for instance, distorts 
and inhibits the practices which embed the contrary understanding.  This is notably 
the case for practices of citizen participation in contemporary society.  But these 
practices nevertheless survive.  Our way of life never sinks to the full horror that 
would attend it (I believe) if we could be truly consistent Benthamites (Taylor 1994, 
pp. 22-3). 
3  On this see especially (Taylor 1985b, part I-1). 
4  The modern exponent of this view referred to by Taylor is Robert Nozick (Nozick 1974). 
5  Taylor writes of Nozick’s theory, for example, as follows: ‘Nozick too makes the assertion of rights 
to individuals fundamental and then proceeds to discuss whether and in what conditions we can 
legitimately demand obedience to a state’ (Taylor 1985b, p. 188). 
6  Unless otherwise stated, I am drawing on this section of this essay in the summary that follows. 
7  The context of this quotation is a reference to an example of the right to dispose of one’s property as 
one chooses. 
8  On this see (Taylor 1994, p. 37). 
9  On this see (Leahy, Michael 2001). 
10  Australia’s Prime Minister, John Howard, reiterated his commitment to difference blindness in 
Aboriginal policy his response to the Australian Labor Party’s proposal to scrap the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Commission, the semi-autonomous body established by the Federal Government 
some years ago to manage Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander affairs.  Mr. Howard said in a radio 
interview on this issue: ‘I think what we have to do is have the principle that everybody is treated 
equally, but you do have to have special programs to address particular disadvantage’ (The Age, April 
1, 2004, NEWS 4).  He was arguing that Aboriginal special programs ‘should be delivered in a 
mainstream way’.  Indigenous peoples see this denial of autonomy in their own affairs as a means of 
withholding political power from them, and of denying the duty of restoring stolen sovereignty to 
them. 
11  The literature on the issue of indoctrination is, of course, extensive so the following is a selection 
of contributions to that debate.  See especially essays in the following volumes: (Snook 1972), 
(Hollins 1964), (Astley and Francis 1994); and the following works by (Laura, Ronald S. 1978; 1981; 
McLaughlin 1984; Callan 1985; Laura, Ronald S. and McCarthy 1985; McLaughlin 1985; Gardner 
1988; Leahy, Michael 1988; Laura, R.S.  and Leahy 1989; McLaughlin 1990; Gardner 1991; 
Kazapides 1994; Leahy, Michael  and Laura 1997) 
12  The Australian Constitution does not include a Bill of Rights and very few rights are specified in it.  
There has been a lively public debate whether we ought to introduce an Australian Bill of Rights or 
whether our rights are better protected by our common law tradition.  Interesting contributions include 
(Mason 1989; Charlesworth, Hilary 1993; Galligan 1993; Kirby December 1994). 
13  Professor Mick Dodson made a point of insisting that ‘equal rights’ did not mean the ‘same rights’ 
in an address in the Geelong West Town Hall on November 1, 2000. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
Towards a fulfilment of my quest for a theory of social justice
My quest in this thesis has been for an account of social justice that can satisfy three 
tests.  First, it would have to make the right to subsistence independent of the 
capacity to earn.  Second, the account of justice I am seeking would have to provide 
a basis for including Aboriginal peoples in the Australian polity.  Third, that account 
would have to provide a basis for overcoming Australia’s problem of exclusivism 
towards groups that are racially, ethnically and culturally different from its dominant 
groups.  In order to be able to satisfy these tests, I argued, the required account of 
social justice would also need to show its capacity to generate the degree of social 
solidarity necessary to sustain that application in the societies to which it might be 
applied.  Principles of justice, I argued, will not be implemented in any society unless 
there is a sufficient commitment on the part of the relevant society’s members to 
their common good.  Being a society implies solidarity with one’s fellow members as 
well as choosing appropriate principles of justice.  I now submit that, while Hayek 
and Rawls can contribute elements of such an account of justice, the communitarian 
account advanced by MacIntyre and - in the more comprehensive form - by Taylor 
go closest to satisfying my three tests.  In order to fully satisfy those tests, however, I 
will have to modify or go beyond what is offered by any of these writers. 
 
Taylor contributes the fundamental insight necessary to satisfy my first test1.  What 
he refers to as his ‘social thesis’ shows that the right to subsistence, like any other 
right, presupposes the existence of a society for whom rights such as this are goods 
for the attainment of which members are associated2.  Hayek’s form of liberal 
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individualism denied this ‘social thesis’ on the ground that the process of social 
evolution had led to the supersession of this kind of society by one driven by 
individual freedom.  Following the Kantian moral tradition, Hayek thus reduced 
society and markets to creations of individual wills, acting however, on Hayek’s 
application of this tradition, for the sake of their own individual interests.  On such 
an individualistic conception of social and economic life, justice of course could 
have no reference to distributions.  But Taylor, I contend, exposes the untenability of 
this atomist thesis.  Firstly, while the influence of such individualism is undeniable 
and important3 in market societies, in the final analysis it is hard to see how a society 
could contract to respect any individual rights unless it first recognised itself as a 
community united at least by the good of deliberating about such questions.  Indeed, 
deliberation about such matters as what these rights are to be and how they are to be 
expressed already supposes such shared goods as a common language, a common 
political and legal culture in terms of which such rights might be expressed and 
enforced, and more fundamentally sufficient mutual respect to engage in such 
deliberations.  Secondly, it is just as difficult to see how such a society could last 
very long unless it recognised also the responsibility to nurture itself as the kind of 
society that valued individual rights.  The value of the rights themselves is not 
sufficient to guarantee their survival in any group.  A culture of respect for bearers of 
such rights needs to be established and passed on to future generations if the relevant 
rights are to be protected.  A group sharing such a culture and associated for the 
attainment of goods such as individual rights is constituted to the extent of its unity 
in these goods as a society.  And the right to subsistence, the particular right with 
which I am concerned in this part of my conclusion to this thesis, is, I claim, implicit 
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in one’s membership of a society.  For without subsistence, one cannot survive as a 
member of a society or contribute to its good. 
 
It is no answer to Taylor’s ‘social thesis’ to say that respect for the right to 
subsistence is sufficiently secured by a voluntary social contract.  Rawls’ ‘difference 
principle’, it is true, would secure far more than subsistence4, and its purported basis 
is purely contractual.  But there are formidable difficulties with this argument.  Like 
Hayek, Rawls faces the above objection that the goods supposedly protected by such 
a contract presuppose a society in which they are already valued and fostered.  But 
Rawls faces the additional criticism that his theory is an abstract device intended to 
show how rational individuals would implement their life plans, not a proposal 
adaptable to the historical circumstances of modern societies.  Despite his claim to be 
basing his theory of justice on liberal democratic ideas and institutions, Rawls’ 
‘difference principle’ could be applied only to a ‘society that we do not yet have’.  
The only kind of society in which the adoption of the ‘difference principle’ would be 
politically feasible would be one characterised by two improbable achievements.  
This society would first need to have already attained a level of commitment 
unknown in any contemporary democracy to the principle of ‘universal equality’.  
Second, such a society would need to possess a degree of solidarity among its 
members such that they would perceive this principle as the appropriate distribution 
principle for them.  In other words, the adoption of the ‘difference principle’ would 
itself presuppose the degree of patriotism, of commitment to this historical 
community, argued by Taylor to be a necessary condition of being a society (see the 
previous chapter).  I conclude therefore that the right to subsistence cannot be 
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preserved by the adoption of Rawls’ ‘difference principle’ as part of a social contract 
because such a contract is by its nature supposed to create the very commitment to 
this principle, and to the social solidarity underpinning it, that in fact it presupposes.  
For, according to social contract theory, the terms of any such contract are the 
product of free decisions of individuals, not the expression of pre-existing 
commitments and social bonds.   
 
Not only does Rawls face this difficulty of showing how his ‘difference principle’ 
can fit the circumstances of historical communities, but, so far as my quest is 
concerned, he is also in the disadvantageous position in relation to Taylor of having 
to propose a distribution principle as the most rational one to adopt.  Taylor, we 
recall, claims rather to be exposing commitments that are implicit in our present 
practices (see note 1 of previous chapter).  If the recognition of our social solidarity, 
for example, is somehow implicit in our present practices, the argument that it should 
be given a greater role in resolving questions of justice cannot be denied on the 
ground that it is not the most rational principle to adopt.  For justice, given this 
condition, would not be a matter of choosing the most rational distribution principle 
but of discerning what is implicit in our practices.  Nor could this argument be 
dismissed on the ground that it is unrealistic given, for example, our society’s 
commitment to the contribution principle, for if the commitment to social solidarity 
is implicit in our present practices, it is as much part of the circumstances in which 
we have to do justice as our society’s commitment to the contribution principle.  
Taylor’s Aristotelian theory of justice can satisfy my first test because it enables me 
to insist that the right to subsistence is dependent on citizenship while 
230 
acknowledging the limits placed on that right by the ambiguities of the Australian 
circumstances outlined in the Introduction to this thesis.  In applying Taylor’s 
theory of justice to Australian circumstances, I am of course going beyond any 
application he has made in his writings. 
 
The historical circumstances of justice in Australian society are indeed ambiguous.  
While there are some features of our culture that, for the moment at least, limit the 
kind of society we can be, there are other features in which we assert our identity as a 
society, and thus our entitlement to the basic necessities for subsistence.  For 
instance, Rawls’ ‘difference principle’ is the one some Leftists would, no doubt, like 
to see applied in Australia because it expresses so well the value of equality.  
However, its application to Australia would assume ‘a society we have not yet got’ 
(Taylor 1985b, p. 311).  Distributive justice could not approach so closely this 
socialist form in Australia because as a society we are too committed to what Taylor 
calls the ‘contribution principle’: we believe that what we get of our society’s wealth 
should be closely related to what we have contributed to its creation.  Thus, even the 
present Leader of Australia’s major Party of the Left (the Australian Labor Party), 
Mark Latham, advocates a Third Way solution to the problem of distribution.  He 
defines the Government’s role here in terms of enhancing citizens’ chances of 
climbing the ‘social ladder’ by improving education and training programs.  But the 
ambivalence of the Labor Party on the right to subsistence is evident in the fact that 
Latham had to invent a straw man to support this solution.  Nowhere have I found 
anyone advocating that citizens should be entitled to ‘bludge’5 on the society.  
Latham (and fellow supporters of such Third Way policies) has to pretend that there 
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are people who advocate such a position in order to justify his repudiation of the 
right to subsistence that parties of the Left have traditionally taken to be implicit in 
the notion of equal citizenship6.  The value of Taylor’s approach to justice in this 
instance is that, while it can acknowledge the limits placed on subsistence rights by 
the contribution principle, it can also apply counter pressure to that principle by 
pointing out the claims of the equality principle implicit in the notion of citizenship.  
Let me briefly outline some of those claims. 
 
The equality principle would imply first of all the right to equal access to the means 
of self-support, means such as education, training and jobs.  Exposure of inequality 
of such access, inequality far beyond the control of individuals in globalised 
economies7, immediately erodes the credit of the contribution principle in relation to 
subsistence.  Recognition that, as a nation, we are all in some measure at the mercy 
of these economic forces should logically encourage acknowledgment of a degree of 
social solidarity obscured by strict application of the contribution principle to 
distributions in Australian society.  This recognition should also expose as a straw 
man the argument underpinning the ‘mutual obligation’ principle, namely, that some 
citizens claim the right to ‘bludge’ on society.  Recognition of our common exposure 
to economic risk should also expose the futility of blaming the victims of such risk.  
Blaming these victims violates the principle of equality by sharing unfairly the 
responsibility for managing such risk.  The principle of equality would rather 
commend alternative policies such as programs that facilitate access to the means of 
subsistence.  To the extent that the development of such policies is the result of 
citizens’ assessment of ‘mutual obligation’ and victim-blaming policies as unworthy 
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of their society, the equality principle can be seen to be revealing to citizens their 
solidarity as members of that society.  That solidarity is revealed by such processes 
to revolve around such goods as mutual respect, mutual deliberation and mutual 
cooperation.  
 
The claims of the equality principle are to some extent acknowledged in practice by 
the resistance of Australians to attempts to make the contribution principle the 
dominant one for determining distributions of wealth in this country.  We retain an 
extensive system of welfare, and have resisted stoutly attempts to reduce major parts 
of it like the medical insurance scheme from a universal to a ‘safety-net’ scheme8.  
Implicit in such resistance, in my view, is an affirmation on the part of Australian 
society of its identity as a society: we are not just individuals contracted to one 
another for our mutual benefit and retaining only the modicum of compassion 
necessary to lend a helping hand to a few who fare badly in the competitive 
economy.  Rather one of the Aristotelian ethical ‘practices that … survive[s]’ in 
Australian society, referred to by Taylor (Taylor 1994, pp. 22-3 see the previous 
chapter), is the recognition that as members of that society we are entitled to certain 
basic necessities independent of our contribution to the wealth that funds their 
provision.  The so called Third Way principle of ‘mutual obligation’, I believe, errs 
by failing to recognise this consciousness of social solidarity manifested in the 
Australian community’s resistance to the reduction of Medicare to a ‘safety-net’ 
scheme.  It is true that the resistance to this principle’s application to Australia’s 
unemployment relief schemes has been less stout, but at the same time there has been 
strong pressure on governments to protect jobs by not reducing tariffs on imported 
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motor vehicles, for example9.  Even the ambivalence in the Australian community’s 
attitudes towards the use of state power to protect members from unemployment and 
its consequences includes an assertion of an identity as a community that is entitled 
to protection by state power.  The protection sought here is not just of negative 
liberty: the right not to have the state interfere with my affairs as an individual.  
Rather it is a positive protection of my right, as a member of this community, to a 
job10.  While the role of industrial tribunals in fixing wages and conditions has been 
eroded considerably in recent decades, Australia has not been able to abolish 
altogether the role of the state in setting minimum wages and conditions for workers.  
This is so despite the fact that economic orthodoxy assumes full employment, and 
that, in the words of the economics editor of one of Australia’s major newspapers, ‘if 
we don’t have it, it is because governments distort labour markets with minimum 
wages and unfair-dismissal laws that stuff up the machinery of the market’ 
(Colebatch 2004, p. 9).   
 
In Australia there has also been strong opposition to the economic rationalist 
argument that inequalities in distributions do not matter provided there is no absolute 
poverty11.  The Australian Senate Community Affairs Committee’s Inquiry into 
Poverty and Financial Hardship in Australia, however, seemed less than totally 
convinced by this argument when it concluded chapter three of its report as follows:   
Evidence presented to the Committee and recent studies provide a profoundly 
disturbing picture of the extent of poverty and deprivation in Australia.  While the 
numbers of those living in poverty varies between studies, even the most 
conservative estimates point to substantial numbers of people in material 
deprivation, struggling to make ends meet and largely excluded from social and 
economic participation in the wider society (Senate 2004). 
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In the next paragraph, the Committee goes on to comment on the relationship 
between poverty and inequality: 
Evidence to the inquiry and specialist reports have also highlighted a trend towards 
increasing income and wealth inequalities in Australia….While the impact of taxes, 
transfers (social security payments) and other benefits, such as education, health and 
welfare has resulted in some redistribution of income, inequality remains 
unacceptably high in this country (Senate 2004). 
And if one doubted that poverty and inequality would be recognised by a 
parliamentary body as a political responsibility, one’s doubt would be dispelled by 
the first sentence of the next paragraph of the Report: ‘The wider society must now 
face the consequences of increasing levels of poverty and disadvantage in this 
country’ (Senate 2004).  Welfare groups like the Australian Council of Social 
Services (ACOSS)12 and its State affiliates, as well as church groups and trades 
unions have also been prominent among those publicising the problem of inequalities 
in wealth distributions13.  The Catholic bishops of Australia have been so concerned 
about these inequalities that they conducted their own national enquiry on the matter.  
In their draft report they commented: ‘It is not an exaggeration to describe what has 
happened as income polarisation among Australian families’ (AEC 1991); they also 
asked Catholics to consider endorsing a recommendation in their final report ‘That 
the Government seriously consider conducting a Wealth Inquiry’ (AEC 1991).  
Economic rationalist defences of ‘relative poverty’ have been underpinned by 
arguments that welfare expenditures had become by the 1980s ‘excesses’ that needed 
correction if the contemporary problems of inflation and unemployment were to be 
solved.  John Freedland points out, however, the ‘corrective’ measures taken by 
Australian Governments of the day failed to produce their intended results.  
Referring to a series of restrictions on eligibility for Unemployment Benefits and 
other pensions during the 1980s, Freedland wrote:  
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In short, there is little narrow economic benefit in the current moves to rationalise 
the socially dependent population.  Rather, the moves serve to reinforce the 
stigmatisation of the socially dependent, to isolate the ‘undeserving poor’.  Perhaps 
the decade of new right agitation has had a significant effect on Australia’s social 
agenda (Freedland 1987, p. 9). 
A clearer recognition of the dependence of the right to subsistence on citizenship 
rather than contribution would enable Australians to avoid such futile and divisive 
economic and social policies.  Indeed, the threat of denial of subsistence to some 
members of society demeans, I suggest, our sense of what it means to be a society.  If 
we feel morally free to threaten to deny some of our members even subsistence, what 
moral good is it that unites us as a society?  Indeed, under these circumstances, how 
can we be a society at all?  Subsistence cannot be conditional upon our contribution 
to the common good, rather it is a condition of our being able to contribute to that 
good. 
 
The social solidarity that I have argued is necessary, in addition to a commitment to 
principle, for social justice to prevail is expressed in the esteem that is communicated 
to members of society in virtue of their membership.  If a member feels valued as a 
member of a society, s/he is much more likely to adhere to the principles of 
distribution adopted by that society.  For all its attractions as a principle, however, 
the Rawlsian ‘difference principle’ is unlikely to be embraced by any society that did 
not possess such mutual esteem.  My claim is that, since the recrudescence of 
economic rationalism over the last thirty years, the basis of Australia’s commitment 
to social justice has shifted from a (admittedly morally ambiguous) form of social 
solidarity to one of commitment to principle.  Assent to the principle of ‘mutual 
obligation’ is easier for those to whom it will probably never be applied, than for 
those to whom it will be applied.  The latter are the ‘socially dependent’ and 
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politically weak, and are in the minority in Australia.  These people are thus likely to 
feel that the principle is rather a weapon to punish them for their dependence 
regardless of the causes.  The effect of its application will thus be to alienate a sector 
of society rather than to integrate them by making them feel valued because they are 
fellow members.  Thus, I am arguing that a renewed recognition of the expressions 
of and aspirations to social solidarity, such as those mentioned in the preceding 
paragraphs, could launch a shift back in the direction of such solidarity, and thus to a 
more worthy and durable form of social justice in Australian society. 
 
The second test I set for the theory of social justice I am seeking was that the relevant 
theory would have to provide a just basis for including Australia’s indigenous 
peoples in the Australian polity.  I believe that Taylor’s theory, along with some 
elements from James Tully’s study of ‘constitutionalism’ (Tully 1995), offers some 
important elements of such a basis.  However, the circumstances of justice in relation 
to this test are such that the case I make for Aboriginal justice, to which I put these 
elements, is my own.  The circumstances of justice in relation to Australia’s 
indigenous peoples differ in some important respects from those relevant to my other 
two tests.  At the root of the Aboriginal case is a claim for restorative justice; no 
such claim arises in relation to my other two tests.  Secondly, the issue of whether 
justice requires recognition of difference presents itself quite differently in the 
Aboriginal case from the case of migrant or refugee groups.  The restorative justice 
claim is for restitution of, or compensation for, sovereignty, land and culture that 
particular groups of people would have inherited had they not been illegitimately 
seized from these peoples’ ancestors by the British.  This claim makes no sense, in 
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other words, unless Aboriginal people today are recognisably the legitimate heirs and 
descendents of those peoples originally dispossessed.  Recognition of difference is 
thus not part of the content of this claim for restorative justice but a status in virtue of 
which the claim is brought.  In the case of migrant and refugee groups, however, 
such recognition is part of the content of their claim for social justice.  Moreover, by 
their claim for restorative justice, Aboriginal groups are distinguishing their 
relationship to the Australian polity from that of other groups: Aboriginal groups are 
insisting that they are not yet, if they ever will be, full members of that polity since 
they have never ceded their sovereignty or assented to the Australian Constitution 
(NCAR 2000).  One condition of any treaty to integrate indigenous peoples into the 
Australian polity would therefore be, as the Draft Statement of Indigenous Rights 
insists throughout, recognition of their distinctive status as the First Peoples of this 
country with the rights entailed in that status.  Part of the common good that would 
thus unite such an Australian polity would be the mutual recognition of the status and 
rights of each part of the polity, and a consequent commitment to mutual deliberation 
and esteem.  Failure to grant the recognition supposed by their claim for restorative 
justice will undermine any attempt at including them in a polity bound by rules of 
justice based on any common good.  I need therefore to outline the indigenous case 
for such justice before proceeding to a consideration of how Taylor’s theory can 
provide a conceptual basis for their participation in a community united around some 
common good. 
 
The Aboriginal case for restorative justice is perhaps best expressed in the 
abovementioned Draft Statement of Indigenous Rights drawn up by National Council 
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for Aboriginal Reconciliation (NCAR) (NCAR 2000)14.  Their first claim is to 
sovereignty.  The argument for this is that, since in terms of international law 
Australia was annexed by the British by ‘conquest’ rather than by ‘treaty’ with its 
indigenous peoples15, those indigenous peoples are entitled to the rights of peoples 
laid down by the United Nations.  Two International Covenants begin with the 
following proclamation: 
All people have the right to self-determination.  By virtue of the right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development16. 
In support of this claim to sovereignty, this Statement reminds us that 
For the purpose of attempting to work within the Constitutional framework of 
Australia this whole proposition [i.e. the set of rights proposed in the statement to 
which this is the preface] is put forward without in any way forfeiting the notion of 
Sovereignty that Aborigines would hold has never been ceded or surrendered 
(NCAR 2000). 
 
In addition to the rights specified in these International Covenants, the NCAR 
claimed for indigenous peoples “distinct rights as Indigenous peoples" (NCAR 
2000).  The rights of indigenous peoples, according to the same passage of this 
Statement, include "the right to identify as indigenous", and this right includes not 
being "subject to any … measures of assimilation".  In particular, this right (no. 2) 
insists that Aboriginal peoples ‘shall not be subject to … The removal of our children 
from our families and communities’.  This is a rejection of the practice of forcible 
removal of children of mixed blood from their familles under a policy designed to 
‘breed out the colour’, a policy subsequently denounced by the Australian Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission as ‘genocide’ (HREOC 1997).  
Aboriginal peoples also claim the right to restoration, where possible, of their 
traditional lands and compensation where restoration is not possible (NCAR 2000).   
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The case for restorative justice is rejected by the present Australian Government.  On 
the restoration of sovereignty by means of a treaty, Prime Minister Howard went to 
the 2001 Federal Election on a policy which said on this matter: 
Labor has left open the question of a Treaty. In contrast the Coalition has taken a 
decision in the national interest and has ruled out a Treaty believing, [sic] that it 
would be divisive and could damage the spirit of reconciliation that has developed 
in this country (LPA 2001). 
For the Liberal Party of Australia, to have equal rights means to have the same 
rights.  This philosophy underpins what Tully calls the legal tradition of ‘modern 
constitutionalism’ (Tully 1995, p. 34ff.), one of whose foundational assumptions is 
that sovereignty belongs only to nation states.  For to grant to some within a nation 
such rights as those included in these International Covenants, such as the right "to 
determine their political status" for example, would be to grant rights to the 
beneficiaries that other citizens do not enjoy.  Moreover, since self-determination in 
accordance with this provision could lead to secession, it has been assumed within 
this tradition that the right of self-determination had to be restricted to sovereign 
nations and denied to indigenous peoples.  Despite his commitment to this 
philosophical principle and legal tradition, Prime Minister Howard tolerated the 
existence of an indigenous body elected to determine in some measure indigenous 
affairs.  In April, 2004, however, he announced that the Government was going to 
abolish this body, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), 
and to replace it with a selected rather than an elected advisory group of indigenous 
people.  In its Native Title Amendment Act 1997 the Howard Government also 
drastically amended the Native Title Act 1993, which had been passed under the 
Keating Labor Government to give expression to the native title rights recognised by 
the High Court of Australia in its landmark Mabo decision (1992).  Prime Minister 
Howard has also steadfastly refused to apologise to the ‘stolen generations’ for their 
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removal from their families on the grounds that the present generation cannot accept 
guilt for wrongdoings of past generations, and that it is wrong to judge practices of 
the past by the standards of the present17.  But these counter-arguments to the 
indigenous case for restorative justice are flawed. 
 
Take the argument that recognition of indigenous sovereignty would amount to 
recognition of the indigenous right of self-determination and thus of secession.  This 
argument depends upon the equation of sovereignty with statehood.  But as Tully 
points out, this equation is the doing of ‘modern constitutionalism’, not of the 
'common constitutionalism' practised in earlier times and still in operation in some 
American and Australian legal practice today18.  The first of the conventions of 
'common constitutionalism' requires only the relevant parties' 'mutual recognition' of 
each other as "equal, self-governing nations" (Tully 1995, p. 117).  Although nations 
may have territorial boundaries, these need not signify secession from the nation-
state in which they are located.  Australian indigenous peoples have recently 
addressed this difficulty by posing the question "Is a treaty about setting up a 'black 
state'?".  Their answer was: 
Treaties in other countries have provided for indigenous self-government.  It is 
likely that Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islander peoples would want to 
negotiate self-government in relation to traditional lands as part of a treaty in 
Australia (NTSG 2001). 
 
Since Australia is already a federation of six sovereign States and its Constitution 
provides for increasing that number (Section 121), the establishment of self-
governing indigenous territories should not be seen as an act of secession even under 
the foundational assumptions of ‘modern constitutionalism’.  However, recognition 
of indigenous sovereignty as defined by the foundational assumptions of ‘common 
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constitutionalism’ need not entail territorial division at all: the kind of indigenous 
self-government canvassed by ATSIC (NTSG 2001) can be exercised within existing 
boundaries.  It is true that many indigenous peoples want any eventual United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to include among those 
rights the right to self-determination including the right to secession19.  But by 
distinguishing sovereignty from statehood as 'common constitutionalism' does, the 
option of sovereignty without secession is made available in negotiations between 
nation-states and their indigenous peoples.  Restorative justice as it relates to 
indigenous sovereignty, on this conception, can be achieved without resort to 
secession. 
 
As to the indigenous claim for restoration of land rights, the High Court has already 
recognised in some measure the justice of this claim.  Although the court reaffirmed 
the sovereignty of the Crown over this land, it none the less recognised what 
Australian governments and courts had denied throughout our history: that native 
title was not extinguished on any Australian land unless some extinguishing act had 
occurred on the relevant land.  The iniquitous fiction of terra nullius was dispelled 
once and for all, the existence of societies with regimes of law before annexation of 
the continent by the British was acknowledged.  While the current legislation 
severely limits the access of indigenous peoples to Native Title rights, some claims 
are none the less being settled and alternative agreements known as Indigenous Land 
Use Agreements being reached where the legal determination of claims is too 
difficult.  Restorative justice is not only possible in regard to land rights;  it is also 
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taking place, and could be considerably enhanced in the context of negotiation of a 
treaty of reconciliation. 
 
It is misleading to pretend that an apology is being sought for past wrongdoing in 
which the present generations had no part.  Events in the distant past are matters of 
shame for us, but not of guilt unless we are perpetuating their consequences.  And of 
course the whole case for restorative justice is one to the effect that the present 
generations are perpetuating the wrongful dispossession of indigenous peoples.  An 
apology for our recalcitrance in repaying the debt to our indigenous peoples is 
therefore singularly appropriate.  It is even more misleading to give the impression 
that that all the evils perpetrated on Australia’s indigenous peoples happened in the 
distant past.  Prominent Aboriginal leader, Dr. Mick Dodson, in his Corroboree 2000 
address in the Sydney Opera House reminded the nation of this in passionate terms 
when he, then aged 50 years, recalled that his sisters were removed from his family 
under the iniquitous laws then in force.  One of those members of the audience who 
turned her back on the Prime Minister while delivering his speech on the same 
occasion was a woman with whom I work closely, and who was removed from her 
mother in the 1970s.  Many members of the ‘stolen generations’ are still alive and so 
are some of those responsible for the policies and laws which permitted the stealing.  
Many of the present generations were citizens and voters at the time those laws and 
policies were in force.  When the plea is made that justice demands an apology from 
these people, the ground of the refusal then tends to shift.  The argument then 
advanced is that we should not judge the policies and laws, and their practitioners, of 
yesteryear by the standards of today.  The unpalatable truth is that these laws and 
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policies were obviously racist, and designed to serve white interests, by the standards 
of their own day.  The forcible removals were still going on in Australia when the 
crime of ‘genocide’ was defined by the United Nations in 1946, and in 1948 when 
the Genocide Convention was adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations20.  Since the definition of genocide included actions of the kind governments 
in Australia were engaging in - the forcible removal from their families of children of 
mixed blood in order to ‘breed out the colour’ - it can hardly be denied that no 
challenge existed to the standards of the day.  This defence of refusing an apology is 
a mere fig leaf. 
 
I have followed Taylor in arguing that human beings are social and political animals.  
Human societies are thus natural not voluntary formations.  But to say that societies 
are natural formations is not to say that they must be of a particular kind, for 
example, of a kind that cannot recognise cultural differences.  It means rather that 
once the natural impetus to form a society asserts itself, the relevant members must 
deliberate in some way or other as to the goods that shall unite them.  I have gone far 
beyond Taylor’s position in arguing that in the case of Australian society, the 
existence of a debt of restorative justice is a circumstance determining in part what 
kind of a society we can be, and for what goods we are associated.  In order to be a 
genuine society, in other words, the Australian polity will need to be one in which 
indigenous and non-indigenous members recognise each other’s status.  In return for 
recognition of their status as the First Peoples of this land (as defined in the 
preceding paragraphs), indigenous people would recognise the status - agreed to in a 
process of deliberation - of the non-indigenous members of this polity.  The NCAR 
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expressed this aspiration in terms much more eloquently than these legal ones when 
it said: 
Speaking with one voice, we the people of Australia, of many origins as we are, 
make a commitment to go on together recognising the gift of one another’s presence 
(NCAR 2000). 
Refusal of restorative justice, on the other hand, would condemn us to a perpetuation, 
and exacerbation, of the divisions which presently corrode our polity21.  Other goods, 
I submit, would accrue to both indigenous and non-indigenous Australians from such 
mutual recognition. 
 
The existence of a debt of restorative justice enables me to avoid the standard 
objection to the recognition of cultural difference: that such recognition implies that 
all cultures are of equal value.  However, Taylor’s response to this objection in the 
context of a more general discussion of ‘multiculturalism’ prompts me to suggest a 
list of the goods that indigenous culture might contribute to Australian society.  
Defending what he calls ‘the presumption of equal worth’, Taylor writes: ‘one could 
argue that it is reasonable to suppose that cultures that have provided the horizon of 
meaning for large numbers of human beings, of diverse characters and 
temperaments, over a long period of time … are almost certain to have something 
that deserves our admiration and respect …’ (Taylor 1994, pp. 72-3).  It has long 
been remarked that non-indigenous Australians have struggled to live in harmony 
with the Australian environment22.  Indigenous Australians, on the other hand, have 
achieved a life sufficiently in harmony with the land to enable them to survive here 
for tens of thousands of years.  The source of this harmony, indigenous peoples 
claim, is a spiritual affinity with the land itself.  This spiritual insight is one their 
representatives on the NCAR aspired to share with non-indigenous Australians.  
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Having referred to ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples as the original 
owners and custodians of traditional lands and waters’, the Draft Declaration for 
Reconciliation continues: ‘And through the land and its peoples, we may taste this 
spirituality and rejoice in its grandeur’.  Non-indigenous Australians, by contrast, 
have seen the land in purely commercial and instrumental terms.  The combined 
imperatives of capitalism and consumerism have driven them to exploit the 
environment beyond the limits of its endurance in some cases.  Besides the global 
threats of the green house effect and the shrinking ozone layer, we can think here of 
the land and water degradation by inappropriate use that is so characteristic of 
Australia.  Western culture’s reduction of rationality to the matching of means to 
ends has, I submit, turned its greatest fruit - its scientific and technological might - 
into a blind giant: it can do almost anything but it can’t decide what it ought to do.  
Indeed, our culture has succumbed largely to the influence of what I call the 
‘technological imperative’: because we can do it, we must do it.  The power of the 
environmental movement is abundant evidence of a hunger for a spirituality that 
preserves and fosters nature rather than instrumentalises and destroys it.  The 
spirituality offered by its indigenous peoples may thus offer an enrichment to many 
other Australians that is not readily available in non-indigenous culture. 
 
The third test I prescribed for the theory of social justice I was seeking was that it 
provide a basis for including in the Australian polity certain groups presently 
excluded from our society, groups such as refugees.  I also have in mind here the 
situation of some groups that are recognised as citizens but whose cultural identity is 
to a greater or lesser extent suppressed by Australian law and policy.  The situations 
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of these two groups clearly differ from one another and even more from the situation 
of indigenous Australians.  The cases of each will thus require a degree of separate 
consideration.  However, since the psychology and ethic driving the policies of 
exclusion are similar in each case, my criticism of these driving forces will be 
similar.  That psychology and that ethic, I believe, was best expressed in the Prime 
Minister’s defence of his so called Tampa policy to which we referred in the 
Introduction to this thesis: ‘We will decide who shall come here and under what 
circumstances!’ (Hansard, 29/8/2001).  It is to a criticism of this stance that I now 
turn. 
 
We have already seen from our consideration of the status of indigenous peoples in 
this polity that the referent of the ‘We’ of the Prime Minister’s words is problematic.  
The right to admit or exclude is being claimed not by the original owners and rulers 
of the land but by the descendents of those who seized it ‘without treaty or consent’.  
If this did not give them pause in making this claim, one might be forgiven for 
thinking that the circumstances of the arrival of their forebears would do so.  For the 
latter came in most cases by boats23 and usually in search of a better life if not in 
flight from persecution.  If in the minds of supporters of the Howard policy the 
settlement of our non-indigenous forebears in this country was justified on these 
grounds, how can they justify excluding those seeking admission on similar grounds?   
 
One answer is of course that, since annexation to Britain, Australia has become a 
nation state and it is part of modern constitutional doctrine that nation states are 
sovereign within their own borders and entitled to protect the integrity of those 
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borders.  It is ironic that the Government that in the name of national sovereignty is 
so jealously guarding its borders against the inflow of foreign people is the same 
Government that is urging its citizens to recognise the futility of guarding those 
borders against the inflow of foreign goods that threaten Australian industries and 
jobs.  If foreign trade and investment do not threaten Australian sovereignty, it is 
hard to see why the admission of more foreign refugees should threaten it.  Yet that 
the inflow of foreign people poses the greater threat is the premise of the 
Commonwealth Border Protection Act 2001.  What is wrong with this response to 
foreign refugees is that it defines ‘the nation’ in terms that are perniciously 
nationalist, that it claims absolute rights over admission to nation and territory.  But 
when rights are invoked in this way, they are used as weapons to trump the claims of 
others rather than as submissions to a public debate, and they serve also to obscure 
the possibility of alternatives. 
 
We have seen in the previous chapter that, according to Taylor, a democratic society 
must be a ‘deliberative community’ if people are to develop the allegiance to it 
necessary to sustain it (Taylor 1998, p. 220).  Taylor characterises a ‘deliberative 
community’ in the following terms: 
the people is supposed to rule; this means that the members of this people make up a 
decision-making unit, a body which takes joint decisions.  Moreover, it is supposed 
to make its decisions through a consensus, or at least a majority, of agents who are 
deemed equal and autonomous…. It is also necessary that each person’s opinion 
should have been able to take shape or be reformed in the light of discussion, that is 
to say by exchange with others (Taylor 1998, p. 220)24. 
Failure to act as a ‘deliberative community’, according to Taylor, exposes a nation to 
the risk of fragmentation and alienation.  One of the major potential sources of 
fragmentation25 and alienation for democratic societies is a nationalism defined 
exclusively, or nearly so, in the terms of one culture.  It is this exclusivist kind of 
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nationalism that was evident in much of the public response, orchestrated in no small 
measure by the Australian Government, to the so called ‘boat people’, namely, in 
their efforts to demonise them.  The Prime Minister himself led this campaign.  A 
photograph was released by the then Defence Minister, Peter Reith, of refugees 
holding their children over the sides of their vessel26.  The Government, before 
releasing the photograph, had used it as the basis of a claim that these refugees were 
threatening to throw their children overboard unless they were assured of asylum by 
the Australian authorities.  The Prime Minister said repeatedly that he would not 
want in Australia people who would treat their children in this way27.  When the 
photograph was released, the Government’s interpretation of the parents’ actions was 
completely discredited, and in a subsequent Senate inquiry it was made clear that the 
military had not in fact supported the Government’s interpretation of the event.  
Further evidence of the Government’s deliberate policy of demonising such refugees 
was revealed in government policy to restrict or block media access to refugees in 
order to limit the flow of humanising images of these people to the public28.  
Demonisation of its nature is an offence against truth and respect for human dignity; 
used as an instrument of exclusion, it is also a failure of compassion; used by a 
government to avoid its obligations under international law, it is an exposure of the 
cynical reality of the ethics that apply at this level: naked self-interest.  The other 
aspect of this exclusion concerned the rights flowing from sovereignty. 
 
The element of my case contributed here by Taylor is that rights are not absolute; 
they cannot be invoked simply to trump the claims of others, such as the claim to 
admission to the nation and to its territory, in the way that the Howard Government 
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has done.  This is not to deny that one of the goods for which a society will normally 
be associated will be to inhabit and probably to rule over some area of land; rather it 
is to assert that, since everybody needs a land and a society to which they can belong, 
the definition of national identity and territorial borders must take this need, and the 
right it gives rise to, into account.  Australia’s insistence in the Prime Minister’s 
words that ‘we shall decide who comes here and under what circumstances’ supposes 
that ‘The very concept of a right seems to call for integral satisfaction, if it’s a right 
at all; and if not, then nothing’ (Taylor 1995, p. 213).  In the case of refugees to this 
country, the offer in most cases is ‘nothing’ despite a need so evident that measures 
such as demonisation and disguise of their human identity have to be taken by the 
Government to hide it from public view.   
 
The Government’s response to these criticisms, of course, is that it respects 
individual human rights by honouring the letter of its obligations under international 
law.  The first problem with this response is that the legality of Australia’s 
mandatory detention of asylum seekers who arrive without appropriate 
documentation is challenged by the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission and by some leading lawyers29.  But there is a second, and more 
important, problem with this response.  Human rights theory assumes that the 
individuals composing a society will choose to uphold those rights.  But, as Taylor 
points out, ‘Only those with a supermuscular Kantian conscience would be willing to 
knuckle under to a majority with which they felt no links’ (Taylor 1995, p. 204).  
Thus, if  the rights of these asylum-seekers are to be respected by the Australian 
polity, the citizens of that polity need to be encouraged to feel sympathy for them30.  
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In fact, however, the Government is encouraging citizens to feel unsympathetic and 
even hostile to these people.  Perversely, the success of the Government in winning 
electoral support for this policy is dependent not, as its atomistic theory of justice 
demands, on the muscularity of individual citizens’ commitment to human rights but 
on the creation of a malignant sense of national solidarity.  
 
The other groups that are, if not excluded from, at least marginalised in Australian 
society are migrant groups, particularly those of non-English-speaking origin and 
since September 11th  2001 Muslim groups.  At the Diversity Conference 2001, the 
demand was expressed by several speakers that their cultures not only be ‘tolerated’ 
but also fully ‘accepted’ by other Australians31.  The standard difficulty with this 
demand, considered at length by Taylor, is that it implies that all cultures are of equal 
value.  That all cultures are not of equal value is argued with particular sarcasm by 
some commentators in relation to Australian Aboriginal culture.  Gary Johns, for 
example, a former Labor Government Minister, holds that authentic Aboriginal 
culture has been all but wiped out since white settlement, so the only moral principle 
left to Aborigines to support their claim to sovereignty is ‘“We were here first!”’ 
(Johns 2001a, p. 14).  The alternative principle Johns advances to justify denying this 
sovereignty is based on the superiority he alleges of western civilisation over 
Aboriginal culture: "Of course, Western civilisation could offer a modest contrary [to 
the moral principle he imputes to Aborigines] principle: that all are created equal - a 
morality that has freed white and black people the world over, and a basis for 
civilisation that offers the longest, most comfortable, free, and artistically and 
intellectually stimulating life ever known" (Johns 2001a).  The case against regarding 
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Aboriginal culture as equal in worth with western culture is argued with even more 
passion by Roger Sandall (Sandall 2001).  Inveighing against what he dubs the 
'culture cultists' who, Sandall claims, believe "[a]ll cultures exist on a level plain", he 
writes: "But there's a Big Ditch right in the middle of this plain which separates the 
tribal world from modernity…" (Sandall 2001, p. viii).  For Sandall, the 'facts'  about 
'traditional cultures' provide a justification and even a 'duty' (Sandall 2001, p. x) for 
assimilating them to modern cultures.  These 'facts' are that "[m]ost traditional 
cultures feature domestic repression, economic backwardness, endemic disease, 
religious fanaticism, and severe artistic constraints" (Sandall 2001, pp. viii-ix).  
There are several problems with these arguments for denying the presumption of 
equal worth to non-western cultures. 
 
First, Johns presumes the right and competence of the western judge to define the 
boundaries of other cultures.  He wants to deny the legitimacy of developments in 
Aboriginal culture under the influence of western civilisation32 but he apparently 
acknowledges no similar restriction on western culture.  Westerners no longer travel 
in horse-drawn buggies and prosecute women for bathing in costumes that are less 
than neck-to-ankle length, so why should such changes in their culture be legitimate 
and those in Aboriginal culture illegitimate?  Of course, a case might be argued that 
some changes are more authentic developments of either culture than others but this 
case would have to be detailed and it would have to look at the changes in each 
culture impartially.  But neither Johns nor Sandall has made such a case.  Their 
interest is the  polemical one of beating down their opponents, who are challenging 
the legitimacy of non-indigenous sovereignty over Australia, rather than the 
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academic one of showing how authentic cultural developments may be discerned 
from inauthentic ones. 
 
Second, writers like Johns and Sandall presume the right and competence to evaluate 
other cultures.  One problem with this presumption is that the criteria they apply in 
their evaluations of Aboriginal culture in the previous paragraph express 
predominantly western values.  These writers offer no serious evaluation of 
Aboriginal values - of a spiritual dimension to life reflected in their bonds to each 
other and to their land, for example.  These western evaluations of Aboriginal culture 
give little if any weight to problems, failures and manifestations of evil in western 
culture.  They do not acknowledge the problems of uneven distribution of wealth and 
consequent poverty that the western economic system gives rise to, nor the failure of 
western culture to save the globe from the greenhouse effect.  Instead of an 
evaluation that humbly acknowledged western society’s perversion of its capacity for 
scientific and technological development into an enhancement of its capacity to wage 
a war that could destroy civilisation as we know it, we get a contemptuous dismissal 
of the values of an ancient culture that managed to preserve its people and this land 
for tens of thousands of years.  Johns and Sandall purport to have produced - at least 
in part - universally acceptable criteria for evaluating cultures in the principle ‘that 
all are created equal’.  Curiously in a civilisation that places such a high value on 
private property and its protection, they attribute no value to the title by which 
Aboriginal peoples held their lands before they were seized by the colonists.  Johns’ 
and Sandall’s principle of equality, it seems, is racially selective in its application to 
land title.  Their purportedly universally acceptable criterion for evaluating cultures 
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thus turns out in its application to Aboriginal peoples to be a mere instrument of 
oppression of the weaker by the more powerful group.   
 
Since the position of migrant groups in societies like Australia’s is invariably weaker 
than that of the dominant group, the use of criteria derived from the dominant culture 
as instruments of oppression is also possible in relation to those groups.  The danger 
of such oppression is greater when the image of a particular cultural group is in some 
way tainted.  Following the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, 
Muslims in Australia have felt that they are under suspicion in this country33.  
Against this atmosphere the wearing of the hijab by Muslim women has become a 
subject of controversy in the Australian press34.  Muslim women were forced to 
defend themselves against the accusation that the wearing of such garb to hide their 
faces or other bodily features was a sign of male oppression within their culture.  
Letters to the newspapers during this period from Muslim women stressed that the 
wearing of such garb was their choice not a male imposition.  Indeed, a female 
Muslim representative at one of the New South Wales Heads of Faith consultations 
during our study Religion, Cultural Diversity and Social Cohesion in Contemporary 
Australia contrasted the modesty such garb permitted Muslim women to the 
immodesty to which modern fashion condemns non-Muslim women (Cahill, Bouma 
et al. 2004)35.  Simply to declare that our culture is a secular culture and therefore we 
have the right to regulate religious dress in public places, as the French seem to have 
done, is to divide rather than unite our society.  A deliberative community might 
agree as a result of discussion that some areas of life should remain secular.  In this 
case the relevant society would still have to accept such restrictions on dress, but 
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they would be restrictions that all had agreed were for the common good, not 
impositions of the values of the dominant group on weaker groups. 
 
To argue that there are no universally acceptable criteria for evaluating cultures is not 
however to argue that all cultures are equal, or that a society may not be justified in 
rejecting elements of some cultures.  A much publicized, though thankfully not 
widely practised, example of a cultural rite in some African and other cultures (both 
Christian and Muslim) is female circumcision36.  A more familiar example of a 
problematic cultural practice sometimes encountered in Australian society is the 
refusal of Jehovah’s Witnesses to allow their children to have blood transfusions.37  
The lack of universally acceptable criteria for evaluating cultures does not mean, in 
my view, that the state does not have a right and indeed a duty to intervene in such 
cases.  In Taylor’s terms there are some goods such as these that must be protected at 
all times.  However, issues such as the protection and education of Aboriginal 
children are more problematic.  If Australian history has one lesson to teach us, it is 
that state intervention to remove Aboriginal children from their families did much 
more harm than good.  If safety or other welfare concerns require the removal of 
children, removal should not be based on racial considerations.  Welfare protection, 
surely our history teaches us, is one more area of Aboriginal life that ought to be 
determined by Aboriginal peoples not by the non-Aboriginals.  The entire 
relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal culture must be a negotiated 
one, not an imposed one.  Negotiation is characteristic of a deliberative community 
and thus it is by negotiation that other cultural issues in a multicultural society need 
to be decided.   
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 Taylor’s specific response to the problem of cultural diversity is what he calls a 
‘presumption of equal worth’ (Taylor 1994, p. 72).  No one can yet produce a set of 
ultimate criteria for evaluating cultures, and thus until and unless such a set is 
available we have to find a way of dealing with one another.  He suggests that ‘this 
stance we take in embarking on the study of the other’ is not necessarily a right that 
others can demand of us but simply ‘the way we ought to approach others’(Taylor 
1994, p. 72).  But how then might this presumption be grounded?  Why is this 
presumption to be preferred over the presumption of western cultural superiority, for 
example?  Not ruling out an appeal to a divine foundation for valuing other cultures, 
Taylor comments:  
But merely on the human level, one could argue that it is reasonable to suppose that 
cultures that have provided the horizon of meaning for large numbers of human 
beings, of diverse characters and temperaments, over a long period of time - that 
have, in other words, articulated their sense of the good, the holy, the admirable - 
are almost certain to have something that deserves our admiration and respect, even 
if it is accompanied by much that we have to abhor and reject.  Perhaps one could 
put it another way: it would take a supreme arrogance to discount this possibility a 
priori (Taylor 1994, p.72-3). 
It is such arrogance that I detect in declarations like Prime Minister Howard’s about 
who shall enter Australia and under what conditions.  It is the same arrogance that I 
want to expose in the dismissal of the case for Aboriginal sovereignty.38  And it is the 
potential enrichment of all in our society that is available from granting the 
presumption as we ‘embark upon the study’ of each other’s cultures that I want to 
underline.  By granting that presumption and committing ourselves to that mutual 
study, we learn to respect and value each other and each other’s cultures.  Merely to 
tolerate each other and each other’s cultures on the basis of some principle of 
procedural justice, I submit, will not be enough to satisfy the explicit demands for 
acceptance into society by immigrant groups or to create peace when particular 
256 
groups come under public suspicion as Muslims have now.  If we are to satisfy these 
demands and overcome this problem, we need to create the kind of social solidarity 
that comes of recognising our nature as political animals and following it by 
deliberating together over the goods which make us a society. 
 
In this thesis social justice has meant more than distributive justice.  This is so 
because the authors whose works I have trawled for contributions to my quest have 
interpreted social justice thus.  Hayek inveighed against ‘social justice’ not just 
because it imposed particular distributions of wealth upon society but above all 
because it stifled the individual liberty that, faithful to his Kantian tradition, he saw 
as the generator of civilisation.  Rawls explicitly construed social justice as the 
distribution of ‘the benefits and burdens of social cooperation’ (Rawls, John 1972, p. 
5) in a free society.  MacIntyre and Taylor maintained that social justice consisted in 
the rules for deliberating over a community’s goods as well as for distributing its 
wealth.  The construal of social justice in these broad terms fitted my purpose, for the 
problems on which I was seeking light included not just those of distributive but also, 
in the Aboriginal case, of restorative justice, and justice in defining citizenship and 
rules for admission to it. 
 
My judgment is that justice is not properly conceived merely as a set of abstract 
principles but as principles that express what it means for humans to live in society 
by guiding them towards solutions to sharing the burdens and benefits of such life.  
My three tests have thus functioned not so much as abstract criteria for measuring 
abstract theories of justice but as operational standards for social and political 
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animals to test abstract theories.  While I am indebted to Taylor - and to a lesser 
extent to MacIntyre - for this insight into the nature of the individual and society, the 
application of those insights to what I have asserted to be the primary problems of 
justice in Australia is entirely my own.  Likewise, while the tradition upon which I 
rely in criticising the other theories I have considered in this thesis is the 
communitarian one, the judgments I have come to on those theories is my own.  My 
judgment on Hayek was that while he sounds some important cautions against undue 
interference with market processes, he omits from his account of those processes the 
role of other goods that are the product of community life not individual decision.  
The common languages and moral traditions, upon which markets rely, are not the 
results of the spontaneous choices of free individuals, as Hayek seems to suppose, 
but of necessary engagement with each other that is better explained as an expression 
of our nature as political animals.  Nor, in my judgment, are the rules of justice self-
given commands authenticated merely by their universalisability.  If intelligent 
devils39 can devise rules for keeping the peace to serve their own evil ends, justice 
cannot be reduced to abstract rules to which citizens assent for selfish ends.  Justice 
requires rather that the ends towards which the rules are directed be good, that is, that 
they serve the good of the community.  Rules, as we saw in the case of Australia’s 
Aboriginal peoples and of Muslim women in the preceding paragraphs, can be used 
as instruments of oppression for imposing order when there is conflict between such 
groups and the rest of the society.  Rules are of course necessary for social order, but 
to be effective in times of crisis those rules require the kind of allegiance that comes 
of being a ‘community of deliberation’.  For a truly deliberative community 
generates a sense of having had a say in the making and application of the rules even 
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if they do not reflect all that one’s own group argued for.  Such a community 
develops mutual respect and esteem for all groups without requiring surrender of any 
essentials of one’s cultural identity.  This kind of justice, I believe, is necessary to 
make social justice independent of one’s capacity to earn, to restore to Australia’s 
Aboriginal peoples their rightful inheritance or at least compensation that will satisfy 
them, and to establish rules for defining and granting citizenship that are not based 
on the kind of cultural arrogance underpinning present Australian rules. 
 
Is social justice possible?  Concluding remarks 
The question with which this thesis began was whether social justice was possible in 
liberal democracies like twenty-first century Australia.  The major theoretical 
challenge to that possibility was that such a conception of justice depended upon two 
doubtful suppositions: (1) that human beings were social and political animals, and 
society was thus a natural rather than a voluntary formation; and (2) that as a 
consequence justice was necessarily social.  These two suppositions involve a 
rejection of what has been referred to throughout this thesis as ‘social atomism’, the 
view that the individual was capable of achieving his or her own good independent 
of society, and of the view that the good is the product of the individual will alone.  I 
now wish to conclude this thesis by affirming the possibility of social justice on the 
ground that these so called doubtful suppositions are well founded. 
 
It was Thomas Hobbes who asserted in his Leviathan (1909) that societies are 
formed out of the desire of human individuals to protect themselves from each 
other’s mutual predations, this position being the grimmest form of social atomism.  
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Conceptually at least, the prior condition of human beings, and the alternative to 
society for Hobbes, was the ‘state of nature’: ‘a condition of war of every one against 
every one …’ (Hobbes 1996).  In that condition, according to Hobbes, ‘every man 
has a right to every thing; even to one another’s body’ (Hobbes 1996).  In order to 
protect themselves from the predations in which each is thus entitled to engage, 
Hobbes argues that human beings form contracts or ‘covenants’.40  The renunciation 
of this right of predation, he contends, ‘is a voluntary act …’ and its ‘object is some 
good to himself’ (Hobbes 1996).  I have rejected this Hobbesian view of the 
individual and society for three reasons. 
 
First, since individuals never exist in a ‘state of nature’, it is engaging in mythology 
to suggest that their condition must be interpreted as one of natural enmity such that 
they need to, and in fact  do form, social contracts to protect themselves from one 
another.  That conflict is a feature of many relationships between individuals and 
groups is an undeniable fact, but it is not the only fact about, nor necessarily the 
predominant feature of, those relationships.  There is abundant evidence also of 
human relationships characterised by harmony, respect, affection and even selfless 
love.  Indeed, even criminals and tyrants like Saddam Hussein are at pains to present 
themselves publicly as possessed of such human virtues as tenderness, compassion 
and generosity.  Undeniably also, the achievement of peace at all levels is 
diabolically difficult but his has not led to universal disavowal of the possibility of 
world peace.  The difficulty of achieving such peace is warrant for speculation about 
its explanation, but that difficulty does not compel assent to Hobbes’s pessimistic 
atomism as its explanation. 
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 Second, as well as being born into biological families, individuals are born into 
linguistic, cultural and even moral communities.  It is a feature of human existence 
neglected by the likes of Hobbes that our language, our culture and our moral and 
religious traditions form part of our social inheritance.  Even though we can and 
sometimes do modify this inheritance, we do not invent our language, culture or 
traditions.  Rather our language, culture and traditions are in a very large measure the 
things that make us the persons we are, and, in so making us, set limits to our ability 
to modify their influence upon us.  We can, for example, learn other languages but 
we can never eradicate the results of having learnt to understand the world first in the 
terms in which it is conceptualised for us in our first language.  Indeed, it is hard to 
understand how our language, culture and traditions might be the result of the 
decisions of individuals conceived in the atomistic terms of Hobbes.  They are such 
inescapably social features of human existence that the notion that some choice 
forms us into communities seems artificial.  In fact, it seems to me a misconstrual of 
the role of choice in human existence to see societies as the result of voluntary 
contracts between individuals.  The power of choice enables us to deliberate about, 
and pursue, our good as the social beings that our language, culture and traditions 
show us to be, but that power does not enable us to reject our condition as social 
beings. 
 
Third, Hobbes’ conception of the human good in these atomistic terms is at odds 
with these social features of human existence.  If, in other words, humans are 
inescapably social beings, as I have argued, it follows that the human good must also 
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be in an important sense social.  Our engagement with the fellow members of our 
society is not, as Hobbes holds, a contingent voluntary act designed to secure the 
good of our own protection from the predations of others but a necessary feature of 
our nature as social beings.  It is our recognition that we are by nature cast together 
as members of human societies that leads us to make laws to protect the good of 
individuals: our good as individuals is necessarily bound up with our good as 
societies.  Hobbes, I am arguing, distorted the Western understanding of the human 
good by weakening the link between the good of the individual and the good of his 
or her society.  If we are inescapably social beings, we cannot flourish fully as 
individuals except insofar as we flourish as societies.  This being the case, we 
endanger our good both as individuals and societies when we allow their 
interdependence to be obscured.  Both our individual and collective security, to take 
the example of the good that preoccupied Hobbes, is imperilled to some extent when 
our sense of social solidarity is blunted, and when our moral traditions are allowed to 
develop in such a way as to obscure the importance of that sense.  If we are to 
flourish as individuals and societies, our common good has to be discovered by a 
process of reflection, and defined, and refined in a process of mutual deliberation.  
Of course, these are voluntary processes in the sense that  we can will to engage or 
not engage in them.  But they are not voluntary in the sense that, whether we like it 
or not, our nature as social beings makes our good dependent upon our engaging in 
them.  Our good is in this sense independent of what we will. 
 
As we have observed in previous chapters, it was Kant who provided the theoretical 
underpinning for locating the good in the human will.  ‘Nothing,’ he said, ‘can 
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possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good 
without qualification, except a good will’ (Kant 1996, p. 647 emphasis in original).  
But Kant, as Taylor points out (Taylor 1989c, p. 83), did not mean by the ‘good will’ 
that anything willed was good merely because one willed it; rather Kant meant that 
the possibility of having a will, which was good because it was governed by a 
commitment to duty rather than by inclination, was the source of human dignity.  
Inclinations, after all, could be contrary to reason but duty meant what reason 
demanded.  But by limiting the good to the will, even Kant’s moral theory is open to 
the same criticism that applies to his proceduralist successors like Hayek and Rawls, 
the criticism that historical circumstances and human nature are not relevant to the 
goodness or otherwise of our acts.  It is of profound importance to the good of any 
society, it seems to me, that it be able to evaluate as evil such maxims as, for 
example, the injunction to treat all equally except those of a particular race.  Yet a 
person with such a desire could will without contradiction that all in similar 
circumstances should obey this injunction.  Limiting goodness to the will to act out 
of duty, in other words, denies us the possibility of evaluating in any other terms - 
terms such as the consequences of acting upon it in a particular society, for example - 
the goodness of actions that may affect many, if not all, members of society. 
 
Even thus limited, Kant’s account of the good remained substantive (or in Rawls’ 
terms ‘metaphysical’) inasmuch as the will to act out of duty was good because such 
a will defined human dignity.  A life of dignity was the good life for human beings, 
on Kant’s ethics.  Human dignity, thus understood, provides a basis for social and 
political order inasmuch as such dignity enjoins respect on citizens and governments.  
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‘So act’, he wrote, ‘as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of 
any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only …’ (Kant 1996, p. 651 
emphasis in original).  Indeed, Kant thought that citizens conceived as ends could 
constitute a ‘kingdom of ends’: ‘By a kingdom I understand the union of different 
rational beings in a system by common laws’ (Kant 1996, p. 651 emphasis in 
original).  But even if morality, defined by Kant as action conforming to reason, 
demanded membership of and participation in such a society, this definition of 
morality in terms of the goodness of the human will is too limited, in my view, either 
to sustain or to evaluate the laws and policies of any society.  Kant’s proceduralist 
successors like Hayek and Rawls have removed the possibility of evaluation of such 
laws and policies in any substantive terms save respect for individual liberty. 
 
What ‘communitarians’ like MacIntyre and Taylor have restored to theoretical 
debate about the nature of justice is concreteness.  Though their theories differed 
profoundly in many respects, Hobbes and Kant (along with others in the British and 
European philosophical traditions) framed those theories in the abstract terms of 
individual reason.  While these philosophers may have had cause for rejecting the 
metaphysical theories of the objective moral order bequeathed to them by medieval 
philosophy, they neglected the possibility - and indeed the evidence for - an objective 
order conceived in sociological terms.  Once the social nature of human beings is 
recognised, the role of the precious good of individual freedom (reason) can be re-
contextualised, and the determination of goods and the demands of justice 
acknowledged as requiring consideration of the relevant social and historical context.  
The conception of justice in purely individual terms will thus be exposed as a mere 
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abstraction, and thus far too limited in its capacity to generate social solidarity and to 
provide guidance in the seach for the good in modern democracies. 
 
Notes to Chapter Six
                                          
1  This communitarian insight is of course shared by MacIntyre but, as we have seen in chapter 4, he 
refuses to recognise modern liberal democracies as polities where this conception of justice could be 
applied. 
2  We recall that Taylor is prepared to use the language of ‘rights’ provided that they are construed as 
goods to be weighed against other goods and not as meta-ethical principles that trump all rival goods. 
3  So important in fact that the survival of market societies depends upon avoidance of unnecessary 
interference with market processes by governments.  This insight, together with the understanding of 
markets as knowledge exchange systems, is, I believe, Hayek’s major contribution to my quest. 
4  And a society that would embrace this principle I would regard as the ideal society.  By this 
principle, Rawls would ensure to the extent practicable in a free society equality in the actual 
condition of citizens as well as equality of opportunity.  Rawls thus contributes to my quest an ideal 
for liberal democracies to aim at. 
5  Jocelyn Pixley comments on the function of this appellation in the 1990s in Australia: ‘The most 
lasting construction of unemployment, at its most crude, is that particular categories of social 
dependants (sole parents, unemployed teenagers) “bludge” because they do not “work”’.  But as 
Pixley goes on to point out, ‘The rhetoric of blaming the victim, however, insists that [unemployment] 
is a chosen condition.  This is not only unlikely but it is also quite untestable, during the fifteen years 
that unemployment has far exceeded job vacancies’ (Pixley 1992, p. 235). 
6  Gordon, Hunt and Weiler remind us that the notion that the right to subsistence depended on one’s 
capacity to earn was an innovation by capitalism: 
The capitalist notion that one’s right to subsistence comes from one’s ability to earn 
cannot be understood unless one sees it in contrast to the pre-capitalist principle that 
subsistence belonged to any person as an attribute of membership in a community.  
The idea that ties between people are voluntary, artificial, and designed to satisfy 
self-interest - in other words, the assumption that there are no social bonds beyond 
contractual obligation - can be appreciated only when compared to the medieval 
belief that society was organic and that reciprocal obligation was inseparable from 
one’s status in society (Gordon, Hunt et al. 1987, p. 76). 
Socialists, of course, aimed at overturning the capitalist order.  The Australian Labor Party adopted a 
‘socialist objective’ as part of its platform in 1921.  For a discussion of this issue see (Maddox 1996, 
p. 38-6). 
7  Recall Beck’s thesis that ‘[c]apitalism is doing away with work’ (Beck 2000, p. 58). 
8  Known in Australia as the Medicare scheme.  On this see (Palmer and Short 2000), and (Duckett 
1999).  This resistance was manifested also in relation to the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme.  On the 
recent increase in co-payments for pharmaceuticals, Duckett wrote: 
Australia’s health-care system is functioning well.  Health expenditure is within 
reasonable bounds and is almost exactly what would be predicted from international 
comparisons, given the size of our economy.  That does not stop doomsayers from 
speculating that, within a short time frame, costs will escalate out of control.  The 
most recent example was the Intergenerational Report, released with the 2002-2003 
Australian Federal Budget, which was used to justify an increase in co-payments for 
pharmaceuticals.  This was essentially a policy to shift more of the costs of ill-health 
from the healthy and wealthy (who pay tax) to the sick (who pay co-payments) 
(Duckett 2002, p. 533 emphasis added). 
The clear implication of the italicised text here is that care of the sick is a community responsibility, 
not an individual one. 
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9  Major campaigns were mounted by the City of Greater Geelong (this State’s largest provincial city), 
the relevant trades unions and Federal and State politicians to protect jobs at the Ford Motor 
Company, Geelong, when the Federal Government signalled its determination in 2003 to proceed to 
the next phase of tariff reductions in that industry. A similar local campaign was coordinated by the 
City of Greater Geelong, the Geelong Manufacturing Council, Geelong Textile Network, Geelong 
Chamber of Commerce and Geelong and Region Trades and Labour Council in relation to the planned 
cuts to tariffs in the Textile, Clothing and Footwear Industry(www.geelongcity.vic.gov.au/Geelong 
Australia - City unveils TCFL no tariff cuts billboard.htm). 
 
10  John Horton points out that for Taylor liberty is a common good of a self-governing community.  
Like friendship, this good cannot be enjoyed as an individual because of its nature it is attained in 
engaging with others in the processes of governing one’s community.  In a passage elucidating ‘the 
importance of the patriotic identification of citizens with their polity’ for Taylor but which, according 
to Taylor, liberal proceduralism lacks, Horton writes: 
 
This [a sense of the importance of patriotic identification with the polity] is made 
possible because the civic republican understanding of freedom is not merely as a 
property of the private life of independent individuals - the liberal sense of ‘negative 
liberty’ - but as a common good of a particular community.  Freedom is associated 
with a self-governing polity, one in which citizens are politically active in shaping 
the public life of their community (Horton, John 1998, p. 161 note omitted). 
11  The Australian Bureau of Statistics defines ‘absolute poverty’ as existing ‘where a family’s income 
does not pay for basic necessities such as shelter and food’, and ‘relative poverty’ as existing ‘where a 
family’s income is low in comparison to the income of other families’ (ABS 2000).  The Australian 
Senate Community Affairs Committee’s Inquiry into Poverty and Financial Hardship in Australia 
noted that the Centre for Independent Studies (a conservative Australian thinktank) criticised a Smith 
Family (Australian charity) study of poverty because it ‘confused poverty and inequality by adopting 
a relative view of poverty, whereas most people think of poverty in absolute terms’ (Senate 2004).  
The Committee also notes the arguments of Professor Peter Saunders disputing this criticism. 
12  ACOSS President Andrew McCallum issued a press release welcoming the Report of the Senate 
Community Affairs Reference Committee into Poverty and Financial Hardship in Australia.  
McCallum commented: ‘The Report’s call for a national anti poverty strategy involving all levels of 
government and parts of the community is widely supported’ (McCallum 2004). 
13  The Australian Bureau of Statistics maintains measures of inequalities (ABS 2000) as does the 
Reserve Bank of Australia (Kohler, Connolly et al. 2004), so obviously they acknowledge them to be 
matters of public concern.  Welfare bodies like Catholic Social Services Victoria are more forthright 
in their condemnations of poverty.  See their challenging study of this phenomenon in Melbourne 
(Cameron and Duncan 2001).   
14  There are seventeen rights claimed in this Statement. 
15  Cook was ordered to "take Possession [of such lands] with the Consent of the Natives" (quoted by 
Kevin Gilbert in a draft treaty titled Aboriginal Sovereignty: Justice, the Law and the Land prepared 
by Gilbert in consultation with Aboriginal Members of the Sovereign Aboriginal Coalition at Alice 
Springs on 19-21 June 1987; reproduced in (Attwood and Markus 1999)). 
 
16  Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 
Article 1.  
17  John Howard has been a strong opponent at the political level of what historian Geoffrey Blainey 
labelled the ‘black armband’ view of Australian history told by historians with whom Blainey 
disagrees like Henry Reynolds.  Reynolds records Howard’s proclamation of the success of the 
Sydney Olympic Games in 2000 as delivering ‘a huge serve to the nation’s detractors, those who 
portray a negative view of our history’ (Reynolds 2001, p. 2 note 1).  Reynolds also reports Howard’s 
view ‘that it was time we stopped navel-gazing and got on with the future.  It was time we “stopped 
using outrageous words like genocide”’ (Reynolds 2001, p. 2 note 2). 
18  Tully refers to what he calls "the three conventions of common constitutionalism:  mutual 
recognition, continuity and consent" (Tully 1995, p. 116).  He explains that  he means constitutional 
convention in the common-law sense: "laws that come into being and come to be accepted as 
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authoritative in the course of constitutional practice…" (Tully 1995, p. 116).  Justice, he argues, will 
be done in constitutional negotiations on matters of cultural recognition if these conventions are 
followed.  Tully is referring chiefly to the American experience of such negotiations and the 
colonisation which gave rise to the need for them.  The similarities and contrasts are, however, 
illuminating for the Australian debate on cultural recognition for our indigenous peoples.  Such 
recognition did not arise from a treaty with Australia’s indigenous peoples because Captain Cook 
failed to carry out his orders from the Admiralty that he not annex any lands without the consent of 
the native peoples.  There were, however, other forms of recognition accorded by the British Crown.  
Henry Reynolds has uncovered evidence of instructions from colonial administrations to purchase 
lands for white use.  According to Reynolds, Lord Glenelg, British Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
instructed the South Australian Colonization Commission in 1836 that the Commissioners 'were to 
prepare a plan for securing the tights of the Aborigines which plan should include … arrangements for 
purchasing the lands of the Natives' (Reynolds 1999, p. 199 quoting minutes of Commission meeting).  
Reynolds also demonstrates that a specific legal instrument called a 'pastoral lease' was invented to 
permit use of certain lands for both white and indigenous purposes.  Reynolds states the case on this 
point as follows: "The Colonial Office created pastoral leases to allow for the mutual use of the same 
land - the pastoralist had a right to conduct his pastoral enterprise, the Aborigines to use the land in 
their traditional manner.  [The customary owners' rights] were rights not granted by government but 
recognised to exist because they derived from the time before the arrival of the Europeans" (Reynolds 
1999, p. 211).  The Mabo (1992) and Wik (1996) cases,  and the legislation they led to, constitute 
degrees of mutual recognition even in Australian law.   
 
19  On the issues of self-determination and the right to secede, see (Buchheit 1978, passim; 
Crawford 1988, ch. 4; Iorns 1992, part II; Cassese 1995, esp. part V). 
20  On this see (Reynolds 2001, p. 13ff.). 
21  It is important to note that neither I nor Australia’s indigenous peoples are claiming the restitution 
of all that was taken from them, despite a claim by Prime Minister Howard in a national advertising 
campaign on the Native Title Amendment Bill 1997 that our ‘backyards were in danger [of being 
claimed]’ under the existing Act.  Indigenous peoples have always denied they were targeting private 
properties with their land rights claims.  As one recent commentator on reconciliation processes in 
various parts of the world points out, restitution in such processes has a different purpose form 
regaining all that was taken away: 
Restitution is the restorative aspect of justice.  We can never undo and make good 
the evil that has been done;  in this sense strict restorative justice is impossible.  We 
can seek to repair the damage that has been done, where that is possible.  However, 
restitution should be seen more as an act of compensation that fulfils certain 
functions in the present: firstly, as a sign of recognition of the seriousness of what 
has happened; secondly, as a sign of the seriousness of repentance; thirdly, it meets 
some need of the victim; and fourthly, it aims at facilitating a more human future.  
Recognition and respect are given to the victim, or their memory (Stevens 2004, p. 
128). 
22  Most recently by Germaine Greer (Greer 2003). 
23  As deliverer of the Geelong Catholic Social Justice Committee’s Annual Social Justice Lecture in 
2003, former Senator and Labor Government Minister, John Button, remarked on the Australian 
aversion to people who arrive in boats.  It is a fact that Australia has many more so called ‘illegal 
arrivals’ by air than by sea but Australian Governments have been much less diligent in detecting and 
dealing with them under the relevant immigration laws than they have with those arriving by boat. 
24  Elsewhere Taylor defines ‘truly democratic decision-making’ thus: 
(1) the mass of the people ought to have some say in what they are going to be, and 
not just be told what they are; (2) this say should be genuinely theirs, and not 
manipulated by propaganda, misinformation, or irrational fears; and (3) it ought to 
some extent to reflect their considered opinions and aspirations, as against ill-
informed and knee-jerk prejudice (Taylor 1995, p.201). 
25  On this see (Taylor 1995, p. 210ff.). 
26  In its report on this incident the Senate Committee of Inquiry into a Certain Maritime Incident said: 
On the afternoon of 10 October, Mr Reith gave an interview on ABC radio. In this 
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interview, he produced the photographs as evidence of the report that children had 
been thrown overboard, noting that they depicted women and children as well as 
one man in the water. He also said: 
I have subsequently been told that they have also got film. That film is apparently 
on HMAS Adelaide. I have not seen it myself and apparently the quality of it is not 
very good, and it’s infra-red or something, but I am told that someone has looked at 
it and it is an absolute fact, children were thrown into the water. So do you still 
question it? (6.16) (Transcript of the Hon. Peter Reith MP Radio Interview with 
Virginia Trioli, Melbourne Radio 3AK, 10 October 2001.) 
Subsequent enquiries by the military and the department of Defence produced advice that there was 
no evidence to support Mr. Reith’s claims.  This fact led the Committee to comment as follows in its 
Conclusion: 
Although by 11 October the Minister and his staff had not been told unequivocally 
that the original report of children thrown overboard was incorrect, each of their 
numerous inquiries had been met with the advice that there was not any evidence to 
support the claim. 
Despite this lack of evidence and in the face of public and official questioning of the 
allegations, the Minister confirmed the veracity of the original report in the media 
and advised Ms Halton, the senior official responsible for the whole-of-government 
management of ‘border protection’ issues, that he had evidence which backed up the 
claim. 
The Committee is struck by the minister’s keenness to persist with the original story 
in the face of repeated advice that there was no evidence available to corroborate it. 
The original report was extremely useful politically to a government making much 
of its tough stance on border protection. 
 
27  For example, In the official Transcript of the Prime Minister The Hon. John Howard Press 
Conference, Melbourne on 8/10/2001, the Prime Minister said: 
Well we don’t want people who seek to come to this country illegally to be able to 
do so and I would have thought what we’ve done over the last few weeks is to 
demonstrate a determination to send that message.  I express my anger at the 
behaviour of those people and repeat it.  I can’t comprehend how genuine refugees 
would throw their children overboard.  I find that it is against the natural instinct, 
people leave a regime, leave a country, flee persecution to give a better life and to 
give a better future to their children.  Not to put it at risk in the way that, 
apparently, some of those people have done.  I don’t retreat from the remarks that I 
made about that behaviour (emphasis added). 
28  The most recent evidence of this policy was presented on the ABC television’s program Media 
Watch on 10/5/2004.  Several networks had been blocked from access to groups of asylum seekers 
who had landed on Ashmore Reef in one case and Melville Island in another.  In some cases, the 
networks had earlier been given permission to film the asylum seekers but had had it revoked at the 
last moment.  Media Watch consequently sought advice from the Government about what its policy 
was in relation to media access to asylum seekers.  The spokesman for the Minister for Customs 
replied: 
The government has no policy about media access to unauthorised arrivals in regard 
to Customs operations. That is strictly a matter for Customs operations. 
-Chris Ellison’s spokesman to Media Watch, March 19 2004 
Another spokesman for this department finally confirmed that  
Ultimate direction on media and media-related issues concerning 
unauthorised boat arrivals is provided to Customs by the People Smuggling Task 
Force which is chaired by the Department of Immigration. 
-Simon Latimer statement to Media Watch 
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When Media Watch finally tracked down the spokesperson for this Task Force, she made the 
following demand: 
Before expending resources in supplying you with a response to your questions, I 
would appreciate it if you would provide written confirmation that our response will 
be used in full and in context. 
-Kym Charlton email to Media Watch, May 6 2004 
Media Watch refused this attempt to control media expression and commented: 
So there is a policy to control the media but DIMIA won't tell us what it is, unless 
they can control how we report it. There go the last doubts we might have had about 
DIMIA's contempt for the public's right to know. 
For an account of how the former Minister for Immigration, Philip Ruddock, has depicted asylum-
seekers, see (Mares 2001, pp. 16, 28, 32, 93, 153-4, 159).  For another set of critical essays on this 
area of Howard Government policy see (Stephen 2002). 
29  This Commission has brought down several reports on the question of the rights of asylum seekers.  
In its 1998 Report, Those who've come across the seas, this Commission wrote: 
The major finding of the Inquiry is that the mandatory detention for extended 
periods of almost all unlawful non-citizens who arrive by boat breaches Australia’s 
human rights obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Commission has found 
that human rights under these international instruments are violated by the 
conditions of detention   
- detainees’ restricted access to services, including legal advice and 
representation  
- the practice and effects of long-term detention 
- restricted access to judicial review of detention (HREOC 1998, pp. 13-4). 
In its most recent Report, A Last Resort? (HREOC 2004), the Commission found that Australia was in 
serious breach of its human rights obligations to children in immigration detention.  See Major 
Findings (HREOC 2004).  Julian Burnside QC argued in a public address in the Wesley Church, 
Geelong, in 2003, that Australia’s mandatory detention laws violated its obligations in international 
law to asylum seekers. 
30  For Taylor’s views on the costs of the loss of ‘the bonds of sympathy’ from a community, see 
(Taylor 1995, p. 211). 
31  Annual conference conducted by RMIT and Sydney Universities of Technology, on this occasion 
in Sydney. 
32  Johns writes:  
The only “authentic” Aboriginal successes are the artists, painters, dancers and 
story-tellers who keep alive ancient artistic traditions.  Aboriginal culture grew out 
of specific living conditions before settlement (or invasion).  They have not been the 
same since, but are adaptations and remnants (Johns 2001a, p. 14). 
33  The representative of the Islamic Council of Victoria at a Victorian Heads of Faith consultation 
testified to this effect in our study Religion, Cultural Diversity and Social Cohesion in Contemporary 
Australia (Cahill, Bouma et al. 2004). 
34  Although less critical of the wearing of the hijab, Pamela Bone wrote on the wearing of the burqa 
by teachers in schools: ‘A hidden face is contrary to any notion of liberalism, openness and equality.  
Women who choose to cover their faces are colluding in the oppression of all women.  They should 
not be permitted to impart such a message to schoolchildren’ (Bone 2004).  Anglican Primate 
Archbishop Peter Carnley, was moved to condemn the decision by the French Government to ban the 
wearing of the Muslim veil and other forms of religious adornment in the Sydney Morning Herald on 
12/2/04. 
35  See articles by Pamela Bone for a contrary view to this one (Bone 2004; 2004). 
36  In our study into Religion, Cultural Diversity and Social Cohesion in Contemporary Australia 
(Cahill, Bouma et al. 2004)we found little evidence of this practice in the Muslim communities we 
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spoke to, and in our interview with the Victorian Equal Opportunity Commissioner we were told they 
had encountered very few cases of it. 
37  All Jehovah’s Witnesses are of course prohibited by their religion to have blood transfusions but 
this religious prohibition runs foul of the law of the land in the case of children where the state has the 
right to override the wishes of the parents. 
38  That arrogance is also manifested in less polemical ways when the overthrow of Aboriginal rule 
over this land is defended as ‘inevitable’.  In his recent Boyer Lectures on the ABC (Blainey 2001), 
professor Geoffrey Blainey, for example, "laments the tragic way in which the Aboriginal way of life 
was undermined, notably by contagious diseases" (Blainey 2001).  He makes no mention of the 
massacres and murders now so well documented by historians like Henry Reynolds (Reynolds 1990; 
2001) but asserts that "the passing of this way of life was probably unavoidable …" because, being 
nomadic, "it was extremely prodigal of that richest of all resources - fertile and productive land" 
(Blainey 2001).  Blainey construes criticism of this thesis as entailing the view that "that a cordon 
should have been placed around the continent in 1788, effectively quarantining the Aborigines from 
unwanted outsiders …" (Blainey 2001).  Blainey errs on at least two counts.  First, colonisation 
everywhere was the result of human decision, not some impersonal force.  Those decisions can and 
should therefore be appraised among other things for their justice and legality.  Second, the way in 
which this country was colonised differed markedly from the way in which countries like New 
Zealand and the Americas were colonised.  In the latter countries, treaties were made with the 
indigenous peoples whereas in Australia no treaties were made.  The justice and legality of Australia's 
acquisition by the colonists is the issue that Blainey glosses over by claiming that the colonists' 
dispossession of its indigenous peoples was inevitable.  If that acquisition was unjust and illegal, then 
today's indigenous peoples have been dispossessed of their rightful inheritance and the rest of us have 
inherited an encumbered estate.  There is thus a moral and possibly also a legal obligation to pay that 
debt regardless of what the result of an indigenous act of self-determination might be.  Whether 
intended or not, the argument that colonisation and dispossession of Aboriginal peoples was inevitable 
serves the interests of those who continue to benefit from those acts.   
39  This was an observation of Kant: ‘The problem of organizing a state, however hard it may seem, 
can be solved even for a race of devils, if only they are intelligent’ (Kant 1795, Supplement at 1). 
40  In Hobbes’s terms a society is a ‘commonwealth’ formed when many persons form ‘covenants’: 
A commonwealth is said to be instituted, when a multitude of men 
do agree, and covenant, every one, with every one, that to 
whatsoever man, or assembly of men, shall be given by the major 
part, the right to present the person of them all, that is to say, to be 
their representative; every one, as well as he that voted against it, 
shall authorize all the actions and judgments, of that man, or 
assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to 
the end, to live peacably amongst themselves. and be protected 
against other men (Hobbes 1996). 
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